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ABSTRACT
One of the most important recent developments in the
provision of health care has been the development of
alternative delivery systems and managed care systems. This
development, however, comes into conflict with the
traditional styles of the provision of health care,
especially the autonomy of the individual clinician. Such a
conflict has serious implications for the medical and dental
professions as well as for the viability of managed health
care systems.
This dissertation discusses the impact of professional
autonomy on the management and financial success of one type
of alternative delivery system - the dental franchise. In
contrast to comparatively low failure rates of non-
professional franchises, the failure rate of dental
franchises has been quite high. Two hypotheses have been
suggested to explain this failure. One hypothesis was that
dental franchises were failing due to poor management
decisions, and inadequate management of employees. The
alternative hypothesis was that failure was due to the
presence of special difficulties in managing dental
professionals, who expect a far larger degree of autonomy
than most employees, and the absence of adequate management
theory to deal with this special group.
A case-study approach is used in which the dentist-
franchisees and central organization personnel are studied
via detailed questionnaires and personal interviews. Two of
the dental franchises examined have failed and one is still
in existence. Results from this study support the
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alternative hypothesis; that failure was primarily due to
incompatibility between the autonomous nature of the dental
professional and the strict management control required by
franchising. Franchise management control systems evoked
resistance among the professionals, and conflict that was
difficult to resolve. Therefore, for a managed dental care
program to be successful, it must ensure professional
compliance through the development of a system that
encompasses principles of professional clinical autonomy.
Thesis Supervisor: Stan N. Finkelstein, MD
Title: Director, Program in Health Policy
and Management
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Among the most important developments in the field of
health care today has been the development of alternative
delivery systems and managed care systems designed to
introduce business approaches to medicine and dentistry.
These changes in health care delivery systems, however,
conflict with the traditional provision of health care, in
particular, the professional autonomy of the individual
clinician. This conflict has serious implications for the
medical and dental professions as well as for the viability
of managed health care systems.
Alternative systems to deliver medical and dental care
have been encouraged by government, employers, and insurance
companies in order to control the rapid escalations in the
cost of health care. These systems generally entail a
greater degree of management involvement and control than do
more traditional forms of health care. The effect of this
increased role of management is complicated by issues
involving professional autonomy. Management of health care
no longer just applies to the business aspects such as
records and accounting, but now extends to the management of
both the care and the care-givers. The success of managed
care organizations may be highly dependent upon the desire
of medical and dental professionals for autonomy.
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Academics have studied professional autonomy in order
to better understand why professionals react the way that
they do.(Ku 1990, Burns et al. 1990, Lichtenstein 1984) Key
issues in the professional literature include conflict,
power, and autonomy. The many years of education involved
and the specific nature of the service industry attract,
promote, and create a unique kind of individual - the health
care professional.(Freidson 1972)
Past academic research on professional dominance has
primarily focused on the nature of the medical professional
in the hospital environment.(Linn 1985, Okoronfor 1983,
Shortell 1985) Little investigation has been done on
professionals in other settings, such as franchise, health
maintenance organization or other forms of alternative
delivery systems.
The autonomous nature of the professional may
contribute to even greater difficulty in models such as
medical or dental franchises. Health professionals such as
physicians and dentists may be less likely to adhere to
franchise orders or rules than is the typical franchisee.
Such noncompliance leads to great difficulties especially in
a franchise setting where the business is structured around
management and control.
The focus of this thesis is to utilize one specific
alternative delivery system, i.e. dental franchising, as the
vehicle to explore issues surrounding management of
professionals. In general terms, franchising is "a system
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in which franchisors offer management expertise and
marketing resources to small business enterprises with
limited capital, to help them achieve success." (Seltz 1987
pl) More specifically, the franchisor sells to a franchisee
an already successful business approach including the right
to do, use or sell a good or service that is the property of
the franchisor. In exchange, the franchisee pays an initial
or annual fee and/or royalty or license fees.
Franchising is one of the most prominent and profitable
of any type of businesses in the United States today.(Seltz
1982) There are over 50,000 franchised businesses which
account for more than one-third of all current retail sales.
Franchising has experienced spectacular growth in the past
ten years. In 1989, a total of 509,000 franchise outlets of
all kinds accounted for $640 billion in sales, a 52 percent
increase since 1983.(DeGeorge 1989) Dun and Bradstreet
report that on average, franchises have a much lower failure
record than comparable non-franchised businesses. (Walker
and Cross 1988, Atkinson 1969)
In an effort to duplicate the success rate of
franchises in other industries, the first dental franchise
center started operation in California only months after the
1977 Supreme Court decision that legalized advertising in
medicine.(Bates v Georgia 1977) In 1980, Dental World Inc.,
a New York based franchisor, became the first franchise to
sell stock in a public offering. In spite of small market
share, (only two to five percent of all dental care is
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provided through all types of non-traditional
practices),(Council on Dental Practice 1983) the existence
of franchise dentistry has generated much controversy since
its recent introduction.(Eagan 1984)
Dental franchises have not, for the most part,
performed well.(Yavner 1988) Currently, only two out of
twelve established dental franchises are still in
existence.(see Table 4-2) The reasons for the poor
performance of most dental franchises are not readily
apparent.
As part of this research, two alternative hypotheses
concerning dental franchise failures were initially
proposed. One hypothesis was that dental franchises were
failing because of poor management decisions and inadequate
management of employees. A second hypothesis was that
failure was due to the presence of special difficulties in
managing dental professionals, who expect a far larger
degree of autonomy than most employees, and the absence of
adequate management theory to deal with this special group.
To test these hypotheses, a case-study approach
analyzing three dental franchises was employed. Two of
these franchises, Omnidentix Inc. and Smiles Inc. have
failed. One franchise, Dental Health Services is still
operational. Forty-five dentist-franchisees along with the
central franchisors of these three franchise organizations
were interviewed and completed questionnaires. These three
dental franchises, Omnidentix, Smiles, and Dental Health
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Services are analyzed, in order to better understand whether
their success and/or failure is primarily due to management
or dentist autonomy issues.
Chapter two reviews pertinent literature in the social
science of professional autonomy as well as in the
management field of franchising to provide a solid basis for
discussion of this multi-disciplinary study. General
principles for successful franchising are also presented in
order to be utilized as a basis for comparing franchise
performance. The methods of research are detailed in
chapter three.
Chapter four describes the entry of franchising into
the dental care market. The advantages and disadvantages
that franchising entails for both the franchisor and the
franchisee are discussed, followed by a description of
dental franchises and the industry's numbers and trends.
Chapter five presents case studies of the three dental
franchises examined in depth. A description and analysis of
management mistakes made by each of the dental franchisors
continues in chapter six. Chapter seven discusses the
impact that professional autonomy issues have upon the
success or failure of the dental franchises. The relative
success of the non-franchised dental care market as well as
general financial issues of the dental franchises are
detailed in chapter eight, in order to rule out an overall
poor dental market as an explanation for dental franchise
failure.
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Dental franchising is theoretically structured around
the concepts of management and profit as well as the
provision of care to the patient. Yet, in a professional
organization such as a dental franchise, the approach and
type of management controls advocated by franchise and
management experts lose reliability. The end products, the
oral health of patients, are far from uniform. The process
of treating different patients with different services is
complicated by the biological variation of each patient.
There is no single scientific formula for estimating costs,
process or product in a dental office. Management control
of both the complex production process and the autonomous
dentist is difficult. Therefore, a modified approach to
managing professionals is needed.
In summary, this paper is an attempt to bridge two
overlapping but usually distinct subjects; the social
science of professional autonomy and the management
discipline of franchising. Franchising presents a system of
planning and control which, if closely adhered to, leads to
success. Professional autonomy theory predicts that
physicians and dentists will resist outside control. These
seemingly conflicting theories from each discipline are
combined in a dental franchise. Dental franchising is thus
a unique vehicle through which to explore both the nature of
professional dominance and the impact of managing
professionals on the success of a health care system.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
I PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY
General
Physicians constitute one of the most powerful groups
in American society. Scholars have long tried to understand
the scope of physician power, the reasons for it and the way
that physicians employ it.(Lichtenstein 1988, Light and
Levine 1988) Physicians and dentists in general, derive
most of their traits and power from their position in
society as professionals.
A profession can be defined as an occupation that has
achieved autonomy or self-direction. (Vollmer and Mills,
1966). An exploration of the nature of physician autonomy
will provide a better understanding of professional
dominance in health care and dental franchise settings.
The first part of this chapter will review literature
discussing the characteristics of physicians and the nature
of physician autonomy. Conflicts arising due to
professional dominance and physician-management
relationships will also be explored to understand the
importance of professional autonomy upon the success of a
health care venture such as dental franchising. Although
professional autonomy literature has primarily dealt with
physicians and hospitals, research has demonstrated the
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similarities in personality and attitudes between physicians
and dentists.(McDaniel 1988, Manhold 1963, Rosenberg 1965)
For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that
dentists and physicians, as fellow professionals involved in
the delivery of health care, are similar with respect to
aspects of professional autonomy.
The Theory of Professional Dominance
The prevailing concept of professional dominance
suggests that health care providers place a high value on
their autonomy.(Ku 1990, Linn 1985) The professional
retains autonomy not only over his own work, but also over
the work of others.(Stamps 1988) Autonomy is granted to
professionals by the public both through explicit licensure
laws, and by informal actions in the belief that
professionals can be trusted to act in the public interest.
(Wolinsky 1988, Anderson 1985)
Societal deference to professionals results from three
characteristics which physicians and dentists, as members of
a profession, are thought to possess. (Freidson 1970) The
first characteristic of a profession is a long and
specialized training period conferring knowledge and skills
that the layman does not possess. Medical school also
serves a socializing function, so that students graduate
with the attitudes and belief structure necessary to conform
to the role of the professional. (Freidson 1972, Stone 1980)
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A second trait of professionals is their service
orientation. Service orientation allows physicians to be
trusted to provide the highest quality care without the need
for outside supervision.(Vaughan 1989) The public credits
health care providers with possessing a 'cosmopolitan
orientation' that is, " low on loyalty to the employing
organization, high on commitment to specialized role skills
and likely to use an outer reference group orientation."
(Gouldner 1957 p.290) The more society values good health,
the greater the dominance of the physician.
The final characteristic of a physician is dominance in
the medical division of labor, and an assumption of risk.
Only the physician has the knowledge and the power to
diagnose and treat illness. The doctor is granted autonomy
because of the pervasive belief that medicine and dentistry
are complex and nonroutine.(Freidson 1972)
Not only does the physician assume authority in the
sphere of his expertise but the physician's dominance
extends to give him a "wedge into other zones of practice."
(Freidson 1972 p.3) In this way, physicians have additional
control over such non-clinical practices as facilities and
management.(Equitable Life 1984)
Control of Physician Power
The autonomy of the physician leaves medicine a
profession not easily controlled by others.(Murphy
1990,Okoronfor 1983) Physician desires to retain their
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independence have largely shaped past methods of controlling
physician actions.(Starr 1987,Stone 1980) As a result,
traditional forms of clinician control including peer
review, state boards and medical associations are
ineffective. A brief discussion of these control mechanisms
and their limitations allows a better understanding of the
problems inherent in creating new controls for doctor
behavior.
The most prominent form of control of physicians is
peer review. Peer review doctors informally observe the
performance of other physician's work and render suggestions
for improvement. In order to function adequately as a
control mechanism, peer review requires doctors to perform
three actions; observe another doctor's work be willing to
criticize another doctors' performance and, take sanctions
against another doctor. These conditions are rarely met.
(Freidson 1972) Even when physicians work together in group
practices, each retains his autonomy.(Stone 1980)
More formal methods of clinician control such as
professional associations and state boards of medical
examiners also do not appear to be effective. Few state
boards or medical associations have the legal right or the
inclination to monitor the clinical performance of
physicians. (Stone 1980 p.48)
In practice then, both informal and formal methods of
professional control have been unsuccessful. Doctors place
a high value on their autonomy and resist external control.
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Physician Control in a Traditional Hospital Setting
Physician autonomy not only limits government
constraints on physician behavior, but also restricts the
control of physicians in a traditional hospital setting.
Management has little power to punish inadequate work by
clinicians and it has limited power to reward superlative
efforts.(Gross 1961,Engel 1965) Economic controls such as
salary have negative consequences for the professional due
to constraints placed upon the medical professional's
traditional freedoms. Instead, normative controls are more
effective since they preserve physician autonomy.(Burns et
al. 1990, Equitable Life 1984)
Physician resistance has also neutralized much of the
authority of management. Doctors especially resist
management actions that interfere with their clinical
actions.(Carpenter 1989) Conflict between clinicians and
managers is often explained by the different goals of the
two groups. (Engel 1965, Scott 1965) The goal of management
is to have the organization run efficiently and provide the
maximum amount of quality care with the inputs at their
disposal. The goal of the professional is to provide the
best quality care to their individual patients regardless of
cost.(Freidson 1970,1972)
To minimize conflict when professional and management
structure are combined in a traditional hospital setting,
the issue of physician autonomy has resulted in two separate
lines of authority. (Smith 1958, Harris 1977) Each group
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acts independently while struggling for jurisdiction and
control over the organization as a whole.
Alternative Theories of Professional Dominance
Despite the many changes in the delivery of health care
in the past decade, the prevailing concept of professional
dominance remains the basis for study of health care
professionals. (Wolinsky 1988, Ku 1990, Schulz 1988)
Although the autonomy of individual physicians may have been
reduced, the autonomy of the profession remains intact.
Even when individual physicians do not control their
environment, they are managed by other physicians. Thus,
physicians still dominate medicine, either individually or
collectively.(Freidson 1984,1985,1986b)
The changes in health care have, however, led other
academics to argue that there has been movement away from
the autonomous model.(Shortell 1985, Scott 1982) Several
alternate theories of the role of the professional have been
proposed including deprofessionalization - emphasizing
consumer revolt and corporatization - stressing corporate
control of medicine
Deprofessionalization argues that professional
dominance is weakening and that medicine is losing its
prestigious societal position.(Haug 1981) This shift is
attributed to increasing medical and general knowledge by
consumers and a resultant rising cynicism concerning
professionals.(Haug 1973,Haug 1976 and Haug and Levin 1981)
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The growing corporatization of medicine has resulted in
a reduction in the self-employment and the autonomy of
physicians. (McKinlay 1988) Professionals are increasingly
subjected to corporate control such as utilization review,
incentive programs, quality review, and restrictions on
practice patterns and the organization of practice. (Burnham
1984, Stoeckle 1988, Scovern 1988) Corporatization
predicts that professionals will retain control over the
means of their work, but not over the end products. (Derber
1982, p169-87)
Summary
The professions of medicine and dentistry have
undergone radical changes in the past twenty years.
Professions once consisting solely of independent health
care practitioners practicing in traditional fee-for-service
systems have now expanded to include group practices,
capitation plans and franchised health care. Nonetheless,
professional autonomy literature suggests that physicians
and dentists, as professionals, desire to be autonomous.
(Wolinsky 1988, Light and Levine 1988)
The desire by professionals for autonomy and self-
control has been studied by many academics. (Lichtenstein
1984, Scott 1982) Past attempts to control professional
autonomy, especially in the clinical setting, have led to
conflict within the organization. Physicians view
themselves as being primarily concerned with quality of care
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issues and management as being concerned with cost and
efficiency issues.(Equitable Life 1984)
To minimize conflict, management and government have
traditionally depended upon physicians to regulate
themselves. Past attempts at government regulation of
physicians have not been effective.(Stone 1980) There is
also little evidence that management control strategies are
effective in increasing physician satisfaction. (Burns 1990)
The physician's autonomy is also preserved by having two
separate lines of authority, one for management and one for
providers.
The growth of alternative delivery systems may affect
the traditional nature of the autonomy of the health care
professional in the future.(Shortell 1985,Burns 1990) These
organizations tend to rely more on management of health
professionals than do more traditional modes of delivery.
Alternative health care delivery systems, by emphasizing
business and management techniques, may improve efficiency
and profitability. At the same time, however, the greater
scope of management allows it to increasingly influence
clinical practice. By decreasing provider autonomy and
contributing to physician dissatisfaction, these
organizations may also be undermining their very
existence.(Scovern 1988, Traska 1988)
The autonomy of doctors in all health care settings may
also be challenged with the increase in information
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networks. Even traditional hospital settings are
increasingly encroaching on physician autonomy.
The continued dominance of the theory of physician
dominance and the failure of government's currently existing
methods for controlling physician behavior, lends doubt as
to the ability of any system to overcome this force.(Lachine
1988) Ultimately, the long-run success of non-traditional
health care systems, such as dental franchises, relies on
its professionals. Without the support of the health care
professional, success is not likely.
II MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES OF FRANCHISING
Introduction
Franchising is one of the fastest growing segments of
the US economy. A main component of its success is the
small number of franchises which fail.(Isaacs 1986) The US
Dept. of Commerce and the Small Business Administration
report that after two years, 95 percent of franchises are
still operating, while only 70 percent of independents
are.(Battle 1986)
Management literature is replete with articles and
books purporting to instruct the novice on how to establish
and operate a successful franchise organization.(Seltz
1982,Tarbutton 1986) These guidelines, however, are
confined to nonprofessional franchise organizations.
Nonprofessional organizations appear to be more receptive to
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the concept of franchising, than are professional
organizations.(Levitt 1985)
Franchisors usually provide their franchisees with
initial and continuing expertise and instruction. These
services commonly include site selection, facility design,
lease negotiation, zoning advice, financing,
employee/management training, operating manuals, and
management advice. Other ongoing services in a well
operated franchise system, include discounts on purchases of
equipment and supplies, quality inspection, field
supervision, merchandising and promotional help, national
advertising, and centralized purchasing.(Mendelsohn 1985 p3)
This section will analyze such critical areas in
franchising as finance, marketing, franchisee training,
franchisee selection, location, support, and control.
Franchise experts believe that following these general
guidelines will lead to successful franchising for all types
of franchises including dentistry.
Finance
Financial management is a critical aspect of franchise
organization.(Kreisman 1986, Padmanabhan 1986) An adequate
financial plan, capital requirements, and financing are
necessary for any type of franchise organization. (Oxenfeldt
and Thompson 1968, Walker 1988)
Financial advantages exist in a franchise system.
(Wright 1986, Caves and Murphy 1976) For example,
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franchising allows for the rapid acquisition of large
amounts of capital without diluting ownership in the
venture, or creating high debt levels.(Oxenfeldt and
Thompson 1968) Pooling the franchisor's and franchisee's
resources decreases the cost of capital offered by lending
institutions.(Diaz and Burnick 1969)
Despite these advantages in securing capital, financial
undercapitalization is a key factor in franchise failure.
(Nevin and Collins 1988,Tarbutton 1986) Total franchisor
capital requirements for prototype and package development,
and for working capital and reserve requirements are
substantial, and usually in the range of $100,000 to
$500,000.(Seltz 1982) Adequate financial capital is
infrequent in new franchises. (Walker and Cross 1988, Nevin
and Collins 1988) Undercapitalization of franchisors also
affects franchisees adversely, since franchisees do not
obtain the support expected from their franchisors.(Ayling
1987)
Before expanding, the viability of the venture as an
investment must be carefully evaluated to assure a
reasonable payback period and rate of return. Too rapid an
expansion can result in inadequate resources and failure of
the franchise system.(Kreisman 1986)
Revenues
There are several forms of revenue sources available
to the franchisor. These include franchise fees, both
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initial and ongoing fees such as royalties, along with
rental/sale of premises, equipment, supplies, raw materials,
and sale of territorial rights. (Seltz 1982, Peterson et al.
1989)
In order to become successful, franchise fees and
royalties must be structured, in order to facilitate the
entry of qualified franchisees.(Woll 1968) The initial
franchise fee is the fee which franchisees must pay to enter
the franchised business. This fee can range from several
thousand dollars to over $250,000 for a McDonald's
franchise. The setting of the initial franchise fee has
important implications for the success of the franchise.
(Oxenfeldt 1968) A low franchise fee will facilitate entry
by franchisees. A high franchise fee will limit entry of
franchisees to those with substantial capital.(Calhoun 1975)
Ongoing fees should allow both the franchisee and
franchisor to make a reasonable return on investment, to
meet price competition, and to maintain quality. Franchise
fees that include a royalty or commission based upon the
gross sales typically average two to five percent. (Nevin
1988) The decision to charge royalties as a flat charge, or
as a percentage of sales, reflects franchisor strategy.
Fees based upon percentage of sales are a form of risk-
sharing by the franchisor. With a flat fee, the risk is
borne solely by the franchisee.(Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1968)
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Marketing
Another critical aspect of successful franchising is
marketing. Marketing includes both the analysis of
marketing opportunities and the choice of marketing mix such
as media, advertising, and promotion components.
Advertising and promotional activity are important facets of
the marketing program of most franchise organizations.
(Kotler 1987,Tarbutton 1986)
Advertising allows for the establishment of the
franchise name, thereby attracting consumers to a recognized
name representing a high level of satisfaction. Franchises
can also take advantage of economies of scale in advertising
due to their size and purchasing power.(Kotler 1987) By
locating many outlets within the advertising medium's
effective radius or Areas of Dominant Influence (ADI's),
significant savings can be realized.(Seltz 1982) ADI's
enable the franchise chain to purchase advertising on a
regional/national level at cost-minimizing prices. The
degree to which these economies can be realized will
increase with increasing size of the organization.
Despite its importance, research into marketing
performance of franchises has suggested that franchisor
marketing skills are often poor.(Davis 1985, Carson 1985,
Pettit and Kirkwood 1986) In general, franchisees accept
their franchisor's expertise in marketing and conform to
franchisor marketing decisions.(Pettit 1988) However, a
1984 survey of 200 franchise organizations in the food and
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hotel industries reported a wide degree of variability
between and within franchising systems in marketing
assistance.(Howden 1984) Another study of three leading
franchise organizations, although acknowledging the
importance of a recognized brand name and national
advertising as major advantages of franchising, reveals that
over 60 percent of the franchisees were dissatisfied with
their marketing support.(Stamworth 1983)
Many franchisees prefer greater marketing resources to
be spent on a local basis, and desire more active
involvement and influence in the overall marketing decision-
making of the franchise organization. Franchisees want
increased marketing efforts in the areas of sales promotion,
selling skills, market research and market planning.(Davis
1985)
Selection and Training Of Franchisees
The selection of franchisees is considered to be a
critical element in the design of a successful franchise.
Surveys have shown that the recruitment and selection of
qualified candidates is the franchisor's single most
pervasive operating problem.(Lewis and Hancock 1987 p80,
International Franchising Association 1989)
Many studies have focused on the relationship between
characteristics of a franchisee and success of a franchise
center.(Mescon and Montanari 1981,Brockhaus 1982)
Franchisee characteristics examined fall into three general
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categories: knowledge/capabilities, personality and
financial considerations. The personality of franchisees is
considered by franchisors to be the most important
characteristic of franchisees.(Olm and Eddy 1988) Credit
and financial resources are also a high priority.
(Tatham,Douglass and Bush 1972) Other important factors are
industry, motivation, perseverance, attitude with others,
general management, and energy.(Weinrauch 1986) The least
important factors in franchisee selection are knowledge,
health, marital status, celebrity status, resident two years
in the area, and skills in merchandising and accounting.
(Olm and Eddy 1988) These rankings express the belief that,
despite previous experience, franchisee motivation and hard
work will lead to high performance and success.
The training of franchisees is another important facet
of successful franchising. The goal of franchising is to
reproduce a successful business venture. As such, the
efficient and accurate transfer of knowledge and skills is
essential.(Padmanabhan 1986) The process of franchisee
training therefore, is at the crux of any successful
franchising program.(Weinrauch 1986,Wattel 1968)
Surveys reveal franchisee training to be a critical
mechanism of assuring efficiency and quality standards in
each franchised unit.(Levine 1985,Izreali 1972).
Franchisees must be instructed in many diverse skills
including management, advertising, promotion, and
accounting. Training varies with the type of franchise
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system and ranges from on-the-job training (such as in
Baskin Robbins) to intensive schooling (such as 50 hours
preregistration, 300 post registration and 11 day managerial
training at McDonald's Hamburger University). (Hackett 1977)
Effective training is critical to the success of a
franchised unit. (Holder 1985, Franklin 1985, Fenske 1984)
Research indicates that franchisors provide most of the
necessary start-up training to franchisees for both
managerial (94 percent) and non-managerial (84 percent)
functions. Less continuing training is provided (managerial
79 percent and non-managerial 74 percent).(LaVan,Latona and
Coye 1988) Training devices most frequently employed
included the training manual and company newsletters. Of
all franchising services provided, franchisee training
consistently receives the highest levels of satisfaction
from franchisees.(Saubart and Saubart 1988)
Location
The importance of franchise location decisions is
acknowledged by franchise experts.(Seltz 1982,Tarbutton
1985) Location decisions refer to market selection, area
allotment of franchises or the number of franchises to
locate in a given area, the actual site selection and
outlet size and characteristics.(Zeller et al. 1980)
The actual process of location analysis is an important
factor in the decision-making. Detailed discussions of
location evaluation data and methods have been compiled.
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(Love 1988, Applebaum 1966) When choosing a location most
franchises adhere to guidelines established by the Small
Business Administration (SBA). The most important community
location criterion is population size and demographics,
followed by availability of a good franchisee and a good
site location. The two factors considered to be least
important include the adequacy of the supply of labor and
the degree of product competition.(Bush,Tatham and Hair
1984)
Location decisions are often a major source of conflict
between franchisee and franchisor due to the different
locational goals that each possesses. The individual
franchisee is concerned with choosing the profit maximizing
location for his outlet. The franchisor, on the other hand
is concerned with maximizing profits from all outlets.
(Zeller,Achabal and Brown 1980)
Support and Control
The success of a franchise depends to a large extent
upon management, financing, marketing and location,
especially during the initial period of operation.
Thereafter, the ongoing support of the franchisor becomes
critical as a means to sustain the success of the franchise
unit, and to justify its franchise fees.(Peterson and
Goddard 1986)
It is the ongoing management services that franchisors
most often fail to provide.(Seltz 1982, Hunt 1972) A
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Federal Trade Commission summary of franchise complaints
lists 'management services' as the primary area of
complaints by franchisees. Franchisees are much less
satisfied with franchisor ongoing services than franchisors
believe.(Knight 1986, Saubart and Saubart 1988)
Management control devices are especially important in
a franchise organization, since it is this uniformity of
quality which secures the franchise reputation.(Saubart and
Saubart 1988, Stephenson and House 1971) Control over
franchisees is established through standardization of
products and operating procedures.(Izreali 1977) In order
to provide adequate management services to franchisees,
constant supervision is necessary. This type of control
should be constructive supervision, of which communication
between franchisee and franchisor is the key.(Nevin 1988)
Properly administered quality-control procedures, then,
influence franchise success by assuring uniform quality
throughout the franchise chain.
Despite their importance, however, franchisees may be
averse to controls in a franchise organization especially
when franchisors tend to move toward more control, and less
autonomy for the franchisee.(Stamworth and Curran 1983,
Crandall 1970) In the general equipment rental industry,
several rental franchises lost many franchisees when they
attempted to assert a high level of control over their
networks. (Curry 1966) Although the high autonomy condition
leads to greater franchisee satisfaction, the low autonomy,
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high control condition has a greater probability of
financial success. High standardization and centralized
decision power provide an efficient means of resolving
conflict. (Stern and Brown 1988, Pettit 1988) Therefore,
franchisors must maintain a delicate balance between
allowing franchisee independence and exercising sufficient
control which would lead to a successful
franchisor/franchisee relationship and a financially
successful franchise. (Bernstein 1968)
The degree of autonomy allowed by franchisors not only
is a function of operational control exercised in the
franchise, but also influences the degree of branding of the
franchise's product. (Stephenson and House 1971) The degree
of branding reflects the amount of preference and awareness
for the product by consumers. For example, McDonald's
franchises have high branding since their customers have
definite expectations with respect to McDonald's prices and
products and from which it is difficult for individual
franchises to deviate. As branding increases over time, a
franchise system will move towards less franchisee autonomy
and greater franchisor control.(Stephenson and House 1971,
Stamworth 1988)
The degree of autonomy exercised by franchises appears
to be cyclical in nature, and reflect the length of time as
a franchise. Franchisees typically follow franchisor
suggestions in the first year. During the second year, they
rely more upon their own decisions, and thereafter they
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adopt a middle pattern consistent with their past experience
in the system.(Anand 1987)
The replication of a franchise depends to a large
extent upon there being a limited offering based upon
standardized products. (Izreali 1977) This strategy allows
for easier establishment and greater control over a
franchisee. In this way, management decisions are limited,
and can be integrated into standard operating procedures.
Control is simplified through standardization.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FRANCHISE FAILURE
Many authors have attempted to describe why some
franchises fail. Most failures can be traced to the
franchisor's failure to provide an adequate support system
for franchisees along with inadequate management and a
deficiency of capital.(Peterson 1988 p2, Kreisman 1986)
Experts agree on three essentials for franchise
success;
1) a sound concept
2) adequate financing
3) and a good relationship with franchisees
(Rice 1985, Tarbutton 1987)
Before franchising, a franchisor must have a well-
established business with no unsolved problems, sufficient
financial resources for funding beyond the startup phase,
management depth, be economically viable and able to provide
a sufficient rate of return to both franchisee and
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franchisor.(Kreisman 1986) Both the franchisee and
franchisor must believe that what each receives from the
relationship is greater than what each pays. When the
franchisee especially, feels that he/she is giving more than
he/she is receiving, the relationship is threatened. (Curry
1986)
Several factors reduce the value of the franchisors'
contributions and increase the possibility of failure.
These include a low value of the franchise name in
attracting customers, difficulty in replicating operations,
low cost savings (from financing/equipment) and strong
entrepreneurial personalities by franchises.
Industry specific characteristics may also be
contribute to franchise failure. Such a relationship has
been shown in the general equipment rental industry
(Peterson 1988) and the automobile repair market (Crandall
1970).
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Study Design
Survey of Franchise Organizations
A preliminary survey of dental franchised organizations
was conducted in 1987. Ten questionnaires were mailed to
dental organizations appearing to fit the definition of
franchise dentistry. These were identified through
literature review, contacts with dental societies, and
national franchise organizations. When possible, site
visits and personal interviews were used to supplement the
questionnaires. This initial questionnaire primarily dealt
with management structure and the management control systems
employed in each organization. (see Appendix A)
Seven replies were received out of the ten
questionnaires mailed, representing a 70 percent response
rate. Six out of these seven questionnaires were complete.
Those dental franchises responding to the survey included
Dwight Dental Care Inc., Jonathan Dental Care and Dental
Health Services. Three other dental franchises, including
DentaHealth Inc., Smiles Inc. and ConsumerHealth Inc. also
completed questionnaires although each had or was currently
reorganizing under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy
code. One organization, The Dental Store responded, but did
not classify itself as a franchise organization. Two other
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organizations, Amdent and Consumer Dental Network, declined
to respond to the survey, stating that they no longer
classified themselves as franchise organizations. The only
dental franchise declining to participate was Nu-Dimension
Dental Services.
Personal Interviews of Franchisors
A case study approach was then designed to study the
dental franchise industry in greater depth. Two successful
dental franchises were to be compared with two failed
franchises. The failed franchises chosen to study were
Smiles of New England Inc. and Omnidentix Systems Inc. Both
franchises had been among the largest of the dental
franchise organizations and had set the standards that other
franchises followed. Both franchises were also in close
geographical proximity. The choice of successful franchises
was limited by a rapid decline in the number of dental
franchises. By the time study design was finalized, only
two franchises continued to exist. Of the two, only Dental
Health Services agreed to cooperate in this study. (Jonathan
Dental declined to participate.)
Key central organization employees from each franchise
were interviewed extensively. Employees interviewed
included the chief executive officer and usually the chief
financial officer or vice-president of dentistry. Topics
discussed included marketing efforts, franchisee selection
and training, management structure and style, finances,
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management philosophy, and relationship with franchisees.
(See Appendix B for complete interview schedule)
Personal Interviews of Franchisees
Personal interviews of dentist-franchisees were then
conducted. Each franchisee completed a written
questionnaire detailing personal background, philosophy, and
finances. Dentists also rated franchisors on services
provided, such as communication levels, marketing efforts,
autonomy, and franchise product. (See Appendix C for
interview schedule)
Response Rate
A total of 45 dentists participated out of 55 (n=45)
for a response rate of 82 percent. Response rates for
individual franchises were as follows: 100 percent for
Omnidentix Systems Inc. (3/3), 85 percent for Dental Health
Services Inc. (11/13) and 79.5 percent for Smiles of New
England Inc. (31/39).
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis was used to further support the
discussion. Success of a dental franchise is modeled
mathematically using logistic regression. Although the
small sample size precludes statistically significant
conclusions, logistic regression reveals the relationship
between franchise success or failure and performance in the
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areas of management, communication, marketing, and finance.
Parameters (B's) are estimated from the data using maximum
likelihood estimation. Alternative models were examined to
determine which produced a suitable fit to the data.
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CHAPTER 4
The Dental Franchise Industry
Definition of Dental Franchising
The American Dental Association defines dental
franchising as "a system of marketing usually under a trade
name, where permitted by state laws or regulations. In
return for a financial investment or other consideration,
participating dentists may also receive the benefits of
media advertising, a national referral system, and financial
and management consultation."(Council on Dental Practice
1983 p518)
The Dental Franchise Concept
The franchise concept is an integral part of any
franchise organization and incorporates a specific business
strategy and a unique franchise identity. In theory, each
franchised center bears the same name, a common identity,
and embodies the same franchise concept.
Most dental franchises incorporate a similar franchise
concept. Dental franchises are designed so that patients
are attracted by such benefits as convenience of location
and hours, together with pleasant surroundings and posted
fees. Locations of centers are professionally selected.
All are accessible by car, and are usually located in retail
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malls, although some franchisors are now finding malls to be
too expensive, and are opening freestanding centers.
Some franchises, such as Family Dental Centers Service
Co. of Cleveland, locate inside department stores like Sears
Roebuck and Co. In this type of setup, the franchise builds
upon the name and reputation of its host store. It is hoped
that the patient will extend the reputation of the store to
the dental clinic, even though the two are legally separate.
By locating in a mall, the franchise may also attract a
new segment of the population who appreciate the
convenience, parking, and extended hours of the mall. A
mall location has the advantage of facilitating the
formation of a dental PPO or HMO with companies located in
the same mall. This type of financing arrangement provides
dental care for members, and guarantees a minimum patient
base for the franchise, thereby decreasing the franchise's
risk of failure.
Patients can shop in the mall and carry beepers that
notify them when the dentist is ready. Thus, waiting time
is minimized. Since time spent waiting by the patient has
an opportunity cost associated with it, the cost of service
to the patient is also decreased. The facilities are
usually open extended hours, usually 12-18 hours per day and
six to seven days per week. Walk-in emergency service is
advertised for added convenience.
Dental franchise centers usually conform to a
recommended size that management considers to be optimally
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efficient. Most Omnidentix centers have seven operatories
and each Dental World center has nine operatories.
Most franchisors offer a full selection of both general
and specialized dental services. A large range of dental
care appeals to patients desiring to simplify their
purchasing process by obtaining dental care at just one
location. The franchise might sequence its entry by
initially employing only generalists and then expanding to
include specialties when the center reaches profitability.
Most franchises offer liberal financing plans for payment by
credit card or bank loan. Some franchises such as Dwight
and Omnidentix even offer company credit cards.
In order to make dental visits more enjoyable,
franchises design their waiting rooms and operatories to
project comfort, in contrast to the sterile atmosphere
present at many dental offices. Waiting rooms are equipped
with such amenities as television and movies to make waiting
time more pleasant.
Some dental franchises have adopted unique franchise
concepts. In the case of Smiles Inc., its creator Dr. Gary
Sloan originated a franchise concept based upon the
promotion of oral hygiene and prevention of periodontal
disease. He advocated frequent scalings performed by
hygienists, so that the patients did not need to see a
dentist at all if they did not so wish. The fear associated
with dental visits was thus intended to be decreased.
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Dental World was built on a concept of cosmetic dentistry
and new bonding techniques that its founder originated.
One of the most controversial aspects of the dental
franchise concept has been its use of business expertise.
Most other industries utilize management to a much greater
degree than does the solo practice of dentistry or medicine.
Dental franchises maintain that the employment of management
control systems will lead to a more efficient and profitable
dental organization.
Dental franchises share the general advantages and
disadvantages of franchises in other industries discussed
previously. However, dental franchises may also possess
certain unique qualities.
Dental Franchise Advantages
Dentistry is a service industry distinct from retail or
manufacturing industries. In an industry such as dentistry,
largely composed of small-scale independent practices, group
practices may have significant advantages. Lipscomb and
Douglass found that cost-efficiency increases with practice
size, over the range from one to four-dentist practices.
(Lipscomb and Douglass 1986) Although these authors were not
able to determine the presence of scale economies for
practices with five or more dentists, other authors have
found evidence that larger practices are more efficient.
(Nash and Wilson 1979, Kushman 1978)
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Dental franchises as group practices might realize
gains in productivity. Increases in productivity are
attributed to both labor and nonlabor inputs. As practice
size increases, auxiliary personnel can be utilized in
greater numbers and more efficiently due to increased
specialization and division of labor. Increases in
productivity can also result from standardizing nonlabor
inputs such as instrument storage procedures and scheduling
of patients.
Along with technical economies of scale, there also
exist pecuniary economies of scale. Pecuniary cost savings
are realized from discounts attributable to bulk purchases
of dental equipment and office supplies. Discounts in
equipment may reach ten percent. The discount available in
bulk supplies, however, is at most 0.5 percent.(Spang and
Pyner, interviews) Additional cost savings may be realized
from the sharing of overhead expenses such as space,
laboratory fees, computing systems, auxiliaries, billing,
repairs, and mortgage.
Capital cost is decreased further by utilizing
facilities more effectively. For example, the staggering of
work schedules allows sixteen hours' utilization of
facilities rather than the traditional eight. In this way,
the fixed cost of capital is decreased by being spread over
a larger quantity of patients. Larger practices also
facilitate the introduction of more efficient inventory
systems with subsequent declines in inventory costs.
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Cost savings can also be realized by hiring young
dentists when a large supply exists, such as in an area
saturated with dental schools. Starting salaries at dental
franchises ranged from $25,000 in Chicago, where four dental
schools are located to $60,000 in undersupplied
locations.(Eagan 1984 p168, FTC 1982 p26-9) Contracting
dentists are often paid on a commission basis, receiving a
percentage of net revenue as salary.
All of these cost efficiencies can be realized in any
large-scale dental operation and are not exclusive to
franchise dentistry. The only economies solely associated
with franchises are the marketing advantages inherent in
advertising the generic name of the franchise. Franchises
depend upon sophisticated marketing techniques to increase
name awareness and build brand loyalty among consumers.
Significant economies of scale exist in national and local
marketing regions. Clustering of franchised dental offices
allows for advantageous media rates.(Hankin 1987)
Dental Franchise Disadvantages
Dental franchises also have many disadvantages
including franchise fees, government regulation, organized
resistance, and image problems. Center improvements in a
mall location such as plumbing and laboratory facilities are
sunk costs that cannot be regained. Rent in a high traffic
mall setting is expensive for franchisors, especially if the
rent is based upon a percentage of gross income. Staff
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costs tend to be higher in franchises due to the greater
numbers of staff functioning in an administrative capacity.
Total equipment and supply costs are also higher due to more
operatories and patient volume. These increased costs lead
to increased risk on the part of the franchisee.
The initial investment necessary to open a solo dental
office is estimated by the American Dental Association to be
approximately $100,000.(Ciao 1989) In contrast, the
additional costs incurred in opening a franchise center as
discussed above, require that the minimum investment for an
Omnidentix or Dental Health Sevices franchise range from
$350,000 to $500,000.(Sanger 1984)
Franchises also experienced difficulties with
government regulators. DentalWorld was warned repeatedly by
the New York Education Department's Office of Professional
Discipline about misleading advertising, and profit-sharing
plans with its staff. In June, 1986, the New York Attorney
General's Office forced DentalWorld to change its prospectus
for investors. (FTC 1983)
Organized dentistry has also attempted to regulate the
dental franchise industry. Led by solo practice proponents,
many state dental associations have resisted the entry of
dental franchises. The California Dental Association
unsuccessfully sought to outlaw the waiver of insurance
copayments and deductibles by franchises.(FTC 1983 p63-5)
In Maryland, dentists backed unsuccessful bills challenging
trade names, and barring dentists from advertising on radio
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or television.(Baltimore Sun 1982) In Florida and
Massachusetts, the dental associations successfully
sponsored a law prohibiting laymen from contracting with
dentists to develop, lease or in any way maintain control
over a dental office.(FTC 1983 p63) In September 1981, the
Massachusetts Dental Board alleged that Omnidentix Inc.
violated regulations prohibiting group dental practice
under any name other than the names of the dentists. The
notice of violation was subsequently withdrawn.(Omnidentix
1983 p15) As dental franchises have become less numerous,
organized dentistry's campaign against dental franchises has
diminished.
Private dentists have also retaliated against dental
franchise entry by changing their mode of practice.
Traditional dentists have increased their marketing efforts,
both internal and external, and altered their practice
procedures. By scheduling longer, more convenient office
hours and providing patients with greater flexibility of
treatment plans and payment for services, nonfranchised
dentists can successfully compete with franchises.
Modern marketing approaches and retail settings may
have caused franchises to be associated with lower quality
care. Barbara Davenport, manager of a dental center in
Rhode Island, states that " Although the franchise is owned
by the dentist, it is a kind of absentee-ownership that is
not so much patient-oriented as it is profit-oriented." (FTC
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1983 p43) Turning dentistry into a forprofit business has
thus made some professionals and patients skeptical.
Critics emphasize that franchises provide incentives
for contracting dentists to lower the quality of care
rendered and produce high volumes of treatment. In at least
one dental franchise, if a contracting dentist does not
generate enough volume, she/he is asked to leave.(Pyner
interview) A California Dental Service study of retail
dentistry (Illinois Dental Journal 1982,FTC 1983 p48) shows
that for California Dental Service union/employee groups,
the average dollar claim when matched procedure for
procedure for retail dentists was 28.5% higher than that for
non-retail dentists. When these claims patterns are
analyzed further, retail dentists are found to be performing
certain common procedures more frequently than other
dentists treating insured patients from the same groups.
This study suggests that retail centers may provide
unnecessary services.
The apparent lack of long-term care from the same
dentist is also contributing to a poor image for franchise
dentistry. The turnover of contracting dentists at
Omnidentix was very high and was estimated by management to
be approximately 40 percent yearly. Also contributing to
the poor image of franchises is the relative inexperience of
some of the contracting dentists employed. The average age
of contracting dentists at Omnidentix centers for example,
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was 28 in its North Dartmouth location, 29 in Hyannis, and
30 in its Boston center.(Eagan 1984 p171)
Dental franchising, as with any type of franchising,
may have one more disadvantage. A franchise is set up to
raise capital quickly. As a corporation, a franchisor has
limited corporate liability for failure; a possible
inducement for franchisors to take greater risks. Thus, the
very structure of franchising may stimulate reckless
business decisions which might result in higher failure
rates.
Industry Trends
The dental franchise industry has performed poorly.
Dental franchising experienced a large growth spurt during
the early 1980's. (see Figure 4-1) By the end of 1983,
there were 12 franchises in the nation with at least two
different centers bearing its name.(Council on Dental
Practice 1983) By 1990, all but two of these franchises had
either filed under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy code
or no longer classify themselves as franchises. Table 4-2
identifies each dental franchise along with its size and its
current status. Currently only two dental franchises still
exist; Jonathan Dental Inc. and Dental Health Services.
The two remaining dental franchises appear to be continuing
to expand but at a much slower pace.
Page - 61
Number of Franchise Centers
N 4 O co 0 N t
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
llNllllllllllll 
-A
. 1 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ,
0
X
0o
N
to
Page - 62
-A
0o
.K 
Iv
00
w
t
00
00
.4.
a CA
I a
CD
O
-h
z
m
5.C)1
0II
-n
r-
~1CrD
00
01
-
00
N
0
CD
3
_.
XM0ct
3
-II
0
-I
r-
Cn
I
m1
LC)W 0
iD =r
-n0 rCP)
-
Ien:D
0
-A
00
00
00
Co
1 I ·
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIII.. IIIIIII I i
IIIII1II IIIII II1III1111111 111111111 6 
. . .
. . ..
. . . .
..
.
. .
e8I8cBara
i
-
I II T Ir rrITM V t elIr rrir riiI rrI1 r rrr
Table 4-2
DENTAL FRANCHISES
Number of Centers and Current Status
Franchise Based In # of
Centers
Current Status
Amdent Inc.
Americare Inc.
DentaHealth Inc.
Dental World
DentCare Inc.
(Dwight Dental)
Dental Health
Services Inc.
Dental Works
Inc.
General Health
Systems Inc.
Nu-Dimensions
Inc.
Omnidentix
Systems Inc.
RDC Dental Inc.
(Jonathan)
Smiles Inc.
Garden City, 35
Garden City, 35
NY
Phoenix, AZ 4
Phoenix, AZ 32
Roosevelt, NY 16
White Plains, 26
NY
Tampa, FL 20
Allentown, PA 10
Elk Grove, IL 4
Englewood Cliffs, 9
NJ
Dedham, MA 21
Minnetonka, 21
MN
Cambridge, MA 60
ceased franchising
1986
ceased franchising
year unknown
chapter 11/dissolved
1986
chapter 11/dissolved
1986
chapter 11/reorganized
as Dwight Dental Care
1986
chapter 11/dissolved
1988
currently operating
chapter 11/dissolved
1984
chapter 11/dissolved
year unknown
ceased operations
year unknown
chapter 11/dissolved
1985
reorganized as
Jonathan Dental 1985
currently operating
chapter 11/dissolved
1986
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Location of Franchises
As of 1986, the majority of franchises (seven) had
franchised centers located on the East Coast. The largest
number of franchise centers are found in New York (3),
Massachusetts (2), Arizona (2), and Pennsylvania (2). These
areas (except for Arizona) coincide with the states
producing the greatest number of dental graduates. (Council
on Dental Education 1985) By locating in areas with a large
supply of young dentists, the franchises, as hypothesized
earlier, appear to be selecting locations, so as to decrease
professional costs.
Although a few of the franchises expanded to 35
centers, none achieved national scope. Instead, most were
clustered in a small geographic area with several centers in
one or two states. Little direct competition between
different chains existed since franchise territories rarely
overlapped. DentaHealth was the exception since it located
centers in four widely separated states on the West coast
and in Mid-West areas.
Franchises usually locate along Arbitron lines to take
advantage of the economies afforded by these advertising
divisions. Arbitron subdivides the country into distinct
media areas. Advertising rates are based according to the
numbers of people reached by advertising in each Arbitron
area.
Franchisors also base location upon other factors such
as traffic flow. David Slater, the president of Omnidentix
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believes that to be successful, a dental franchise must
locate in a heavy traffic pattern area. Slater considers
other factors, such as the existing supply of independent
dental practitioners already in the area, to be unimportant.
The decision regarding where to locate a new center is
also based heavily upon patient demographics. Results from
this study indicate that the patient population primarily
targeted by dental franchises was an urban, white, middle-
income population with private insurance or a fee-for-
service (FFS) mode of payment. This desired patient base is
similar to that of independent private praticitioners, whose
patient base is FFS (45%), private insurance (50%), and
public insurance (5%). (Bureau of Economic and Behavioral
Research 1989) The ethnicity of the population appeared to
matter less than did their payment structure. Many
franchises including Omnidentix and DHS, refused to accept
welfare payments, and areas with large welfare populations
were avoided.
SUMMARY
During the past ten years, the dental franchise
industry has performed poorly. Most dental franchises no
longer exist and the two that remain have slowed their
growth. Theoretically dental franchises may have advantages
over solo practices but most of the advantages can also be
realized by nonfranchised dental practices. Indeed, few
franchises ever reached the critical mass necessary to
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realize significant national marketing economies of scale.
Despite the relatively few advantages in dental franchising,
dental franchises still require dentist-franchisees to pay
steep franchise fees. The next chapter will explore more
closely the operations of the three dental franchises;
Dental Health Services Inc., Omnidentix Systems Inc., and
Smiles of New England Inc.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDIES OF THREE DENTAL FRANCHISES
DENTAL HEALTH SERVICES INC.
History
Dental Health Services Inc. (DHS), a company in the
business of franchising dental centers, was founded by two
optometrists, Drs. George and Dennis Linsey in 1981. The
Linsey brothers had previously been successful in
franchising optometry centers. The older brother Dennis
initially worked as an optician with Sterling Optical, a
large chain of franchised optometry centers. With this
franchising experience and an investment of $12,000, the
Linseys began setting up discount optical shops in small
towns in New York and Pennsylvania.
The Linseys offered the public one-hour service on
eyeglasses, walk-in service, and a large variety of frames.
Unlike competing optometry chains, the Linsey's company
placed the optometrists fully in charge of the offices.
Their philosophy was " to establish a doctor-patient
relationship... other chains open stores, we open
practices."
In its first year of operation, sales of the Linsey's
Vision Care Associates were $500,000. By year two, sales
reached $1 million and were expanding at 60 percent/year.
Pre-tax margins were approximately 14 percent. Six years
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later the Linseys sold their chain to Pearle Vision for more
than seven million dollars. With a no-compete clause in the
sales contract, the brothers decided to apply their strategy
to dentistry and opened a string of retail dental centers
that they called Dental Health Systems Inc. (DHS).
In 1981, the Linseys erected their first dental clinic
near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The brothers admit that
they knew nothing about dentistry at that time. Six months
later, the Linseys opened their second center in Tampa,
Florida. A third and fourth center opened shortly
thereafter. The Linseys were operating at a deficit and on
the verge of bankruptcy.
In order to avoid bankruptcy, the Linseys sold a nine
and one-half percent interest in the company to their old
business partner, Pearle Vision Inc. Involvement with
Pearle brought advantages and disadvantages to DHS. With
Pearle's financial backing, DHS was able to continue to
expand in Florida and Pennsylvania. The relationship with
Pearle also facilitated the leasing of prime mall locations
for dental centers.
These benefits came at a cost. The management at
Pearle was inflexible and generally unresponsive to changes
that the Linsays desired, such as providing financing for
dental franchisees. Pearle also demanded tight stategic and
financial control over DHS that included quarterly financial
reports and other expensive financial operating documents.
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In addition, Pearle wanted to rename DHS as Pearle Dental
Centers.
The demands placed upon DHS were compounded by an ever
changing corporate ownership. Pearle Vision was first
acquired by Monsanto Inc. and then by Britain's Grand
Metropolitan Inc., a six billion dollar food, beverage and
hotel conglomerate. Each company possessed different plans
and expectations for DHS as well as different management
styles. The constant changes in management produced
frustration as well as inefficient and costly efforts on the
part of DHS. Finally, the dental centers were sold back to
the Linseys.
DHS currently has 15 centers operating in Florida
and five centers in Pennsylvania. In 1989, the central
organization generated approximately $600,000 and netted
$300,000.(see Table 5-1)
TABLE 5-1
SUMMARY SHEET
DENTAL HEALTH SERVICES INC.
Number of Centers Open 20
Number of Centers Sold 15
Location of Centers PA. and FLA.
Number of Years in Existence 9
Name of CEOs George and Dennis
Linsey
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Total Gross Income (1988) $1,786,732
Net Income (1988) ($168,070)
Franchisee Mean Age 40 years old
Although the Company believes that it possesses great
potential to expand, the possibility also exists that DHS
may cease franchising altogether and sell its franchised
centers to the dentist-franchisees. Thus, future growth of
DHS appears to be questionable.
Philosophy
The Linseys apply the same formula, successful in
retailing optometric services, to franchise dentistry. This
philosophy is based upon the key principle of respecting the
professionals' autonomy. DHS management does not interfere
in the clinical delivery of dentistry. In this way, the
Linseys view their non-dental background as an asset, since
it prevents them from intervening in the dental aspects of
the centers.
The Linsey's formulas for franchising optometry and
dentistry are similar. The Linseys believe that the primary
function of DHS is to increase the volume and efficiency of
its affiliated dental practices. The volume of patients
crossing the threshold is increased by locating in a mall
setting, which makes the center available to more people.
DHS contributes management expertise to the centers, as
well as marketing efforts, with a central advertising pool.
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Management states that DHS provides a 35 percent discount in
equipment purchases, and a small discount below typical
industry costs, for dental supplies. The Linseys also give
advice on leases and staff utilization. By providing these
management and advertising services, management estimates
that franchisees can save $3,000 to $5,000 annually through
their affiliation with DHS.
Although introductory specials were commonly utilized,
the price schedule reflects average dental fees. Welfare
patients are not accepted at DHS centers.
As an additional service to its franchisees, DHS will
sublet dental center space to independent orthodontists.
Typically the orthodontists pay: % of Gross
Rent 17% to the franchisee
Advertising 6% to DHS
Royalty 6% to DHS
Under this rental agreement, formerly nonproductive hours
and space in a dental center become additional income for
the franchisee.
The Linsey brothers attribute much of their success to
their complementary natures. George is the aggressive
innovator who spots the business opportunities. Dennis is
the conservative negotiator, who prevents Dennis from moving
too fast. No project is pursued unless both brothers agree.
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Franchisees
The mean age of the DHS franchisees is approximately 40
years old. Seventy-three percent are married. None had any
previous management experience. Few of the DHS franchisees
are recent graduates from dental school. The average length
of time in practice is nine and one-half years.
According to management, franchisees were selected
solely on the basis of personality and salesmanship.
Dentist-franchisees would be chosen if Mr Linsey believed
that, "this dentist could sell a three-unit bridge."
Many DHS franchisees had previously practiced privately
in the Northeast and moved south for health or recreational
reasons. Five of the eight Florida franchisees had
relocated from the North. All but one of the franchisees
had been residents of their current area less than ten
years. These dentists purchased a franchise to minimize
start-up time, when setting up their new dental practice.
In order to become accustomed to the DHS system and ensure
their compatibility, 64 percent of the current DHS
franchisees worked in their franchise before buying it.
Financial
Start-up costs for a DHS franchise total approximately
$225,000. Franchisees pay an initial fee of $65,000.
An additional $160,000 is required to purchase the actual
dental center. The company maintains that this figure is
20% less than it would cost an independent dentist to build
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an equivalent center. Potential savings are attributed to
the Company's experience. For example, DHS paid $210 per
square foot to build the first office. Seven years later,
DHS only pays $97 per square foot to build a new office.
Savings are achieved by employing cost-saving devices such
as designing an operatory with a single X-ray unit serving
two chairs or using a floating nitrous tank instead of in-
wall tubes. In order to facilitate the purchase of
franchises, DHS provided financing for new franchisees at 1
1/2 percent over the prime rate.
Ongoing financial fees of owning a DHS franchise
include the following:
% of Gross
Bookkeeping/Accounting = 2.1%
Advertising = 6.0%
Royalty = 6.0%
Mean annual revenues for DHS franchised dental centers
in 1989 were $600,000. DHS estimates that new franchisees
can expect to gross $60,000 to $75,000 during the first year
of operation and $125,000 per year after the first year.
DHS thus promises its ranchisees that it will only take a
year to increase a DHS center's revenues to income levels
that would normally take a private dentist ten years to
achieve.
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Summary
DHS, one of two surviving dental franchises, was
started by entrepreneurs with experience in optometry -
another health care profession. Its franchisees in Florida
are primarily older, more experienced dentists who have
relocated from the Northeast.
The franchising philosophy of DHS incorporates a non-
centralized management approach, once an affiliated center
is generating a profit. The company is localized in two
distinct areas of operation (and marketing ADIs)
Pennsylvania and Florida, with a respected and knowledgeable
area coordinator managing each region. Despite past
success, franchisee complaints and the greater profitability
available in optometry lends doubt as to the continued
future of DHS.
OMNIDENTIX SYSTEMS CORPORATION
History
Omnidentix Systems Inc., a business administering a
chain of dental franchises, began operations in 1980. The
founder, David Slater, a lawyer-entrepreneur, has sometimes
been referred to as "The Franchise King" due to his many
successful franchising ventures. Mr. Slater has previously
built the 'Mister Donut of America, Inc.' franchise into an
international chain of more than 1000 stores. Mr. Slater
has also successfully franchised automobile brake shops,
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steak houses, and homes for the mentally disabled. The idea
of applying franchise techniques to dentistry originated
when Mr. Slater, looking for new opportunities in
franchising, underwent root canal therapy performed by an
endodontist, Dr. David Pyner.
For the Omnidentix management team, Mr. Slater hired
Ronald Kopack, another experienced franchisor. Mr. Kopack
is a former Mr Donut vice president whose most recent
accomplishment had been the transformation of the Japanese
restaurant chain of Benihana Inc. into a successful
franchise. Dr. Pyner was hired as Chief of Dental
Operations. To cover start-up costs, Mr. Slater and Dr.
Pyner each invested $48,750 while Mr. Kopack invested
$15,000 into the venture. Mr. Slater's subsidiary Mutual
Enterprises also contributed $37,500 to open the first
Omnidentix prototype center in Medford, MA. in 1980.
With the success of this first center, Omnidentix
quickly expanded the number of its centers. By December
1982, Omnidentix had three dental centers operational and
twelve centers as of October 1983.
In October 1981, Omnidentix had its first public stock
offering in which 5,250,600 shares were sold at one dollar
per share. Within a year the price of Omnidentix stock had
increased to $6 per share. In fiscal year 1981, Omnidentix
Inc. generated revenues of $160,906 and experienced a net
loss of $57,668. By 1982, revenues had almost doubled to
$301,740 but net losses had increased by more than six times
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to $369,813. By 1983, the stock price had stabilized at $3
per share.
Omnidentix continued to expand although the Company was
experiencing difficulties in securing investors for its
dental centers. One investor in three centers in Chicago
failed to honor his commitment and forfeited his deposit.
Lack of investor interest forced the Company to invest its
own resources in the new centers.
By June, 1984 there were 24 Omnidentix centers open.
Another eight centers were under construction. Of the eight
uncompleted centers, only six had been sold to franchisees.
The Company owned all the assets in ten of the 24 operating
centers and a portion of the assets of three other centers.
According to Omnidentix management, these later centers
required a longer time than anticipated to reach break even,
thus forcing the company to advance additional funds to meet
their working capital needs. As a result, the company's
cash needs were substantial.
Omnidentix's losses continued to mount throughout
1983 and 1984. By 1984, Omnidentix was generating an annual
net loss of $4,209,665. In June 1984, the company obtained
a revolving loan commitment from New World Bank for five
million dollars. By the end of June, the company had
already borrowed four million dollars from its line-of-
credit. In late August Neworld Bank refused to extend
additional credit to Omnidentix and plunged the company into
an immediate liquidity crisis.
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The company then instituted several measures to
minimize expenses and raise additional capital through the
issuance of a second stock offering that was expected to net
five million dollars. A delay of nine months and a
generally poor stock market contributed to the issuance only
generating $3.25 million and netting only $1.75 million
(after commissions and expenses). At this time, Neworld
Bank, also experiencing financial difficulties, called in
Omnidentix's loan. With such large financial problems, the
price of Omnidentix stock fell drastically, making a third
stock offering impractical.
In order to raise the capital needed to avoid
bankruptcy, Omnidentix was offered for sale. There were few
interested buyers. One potential buyer, Tridont Dental
Centers, a Toronto-based dental franchisor of 64 dental
centers throughout Canada, withdrew its offer after
Omnidentix's finances were examined and found to be in
extremely poor condition.(Gorov 1984) When efforts to
secure capital from venture capital groups also failed,
Omnidentix filed under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy
code on December 30, 1984.(see Table 5-2)
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TABLE 5-2
SUMMARY SHEET
OMNIDENTIX SYSTEMS INC.
(as of September 1984)
Number of Center Open 24 (+ 8 under construction)
Number of Centers Sold 15 (+ 6 under construction)
Location of Centers MA,NY,FL,RI,NJ,VA,IL
Number of Years in Existence 4
Name of CEOs David Slater-CEO
David Pyner DMD-VP Dentistry
Total Gross Income (9/84) $1,596,818
Total Net Income (9/84) ($1,553,358)
Franchisee Mean Age 42.0
Philosophy
Omnidentix sought to differentiate itself from other
dental franchises through the experience of its central
management personnel. The presence of Mr. Slater and Mr.
Kopack, with proven track records in franchising, made
Omnidentix appear less risky than other comparable ventures
to investors.
The Omnidentix philosophy was to provide dentistry like
donuts. "It's not that different from opening a donut shop"
"The ultimate business may be different," says Mr. Slater
"but I see it as a system not an industry. Each unit is a
replication, like using a cookie cutter." Mr. Slater
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expected that the same marketing and management principles
successful in other franchising ventures would also work
with dentistry. Mr. Slater still believes that to franchise
any type of business including health care, the first step
is to find a need, define the customer, locate great sites,
promote it, and monitor it closely. The result will be a
success.
In return for their investment, the franchisee received
a "turn-key" dental clinic, that is a clinic ready for
immediate operation. Omnidentix provided its franchisees
with a wide variety of services such as site selection,
facility design, lease negotiation, zoning advice,
financing, employee training and hiring, operating manuals
and management advice. Other ongoing services included
discounts on centralized purchases of equipment and
supplies, quality inspection, field supervision,
advertising, and promotional assistance.
Omnidentix centers are designed as freestanding store-
front clinics, usually in a high traffic, mall setting.
Clinics contain seven operatories to provide walk-in, high
volume dental care. Other factors such as the existing
supply of dentists already in the area was considered
unimportant. Most Omnidentix centers are located in areas
with greater than average number of dentists.(see Tables 5-3
and 5-4)
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TABLE 5-3
Omnidentix Locations in Massachusetts
Comparison of Local and National
Population to Dentist Ratios
TOWN Population/Dentist National
Hadley, MA 2,063:1
Boston, MA 958:1
Medford, MA 1,350:1 1,823:1
Dartmouth, MA 1,409:1
Hyannis, MA unavailable
Table 5-4
OMNIDENTIX LOCATIONS BY STATE
A Comparison of State and National
Population to Dentist Ratios
STATE Population/Dentist National
Massachusetts 1,441:1
New York 1,366:1
Illinois 1,788:1 1,823:1
Rhode Island 1,797:1
Virginia 1,909:1
Florida 2,135:1
-------_____________________________________________________
Omnidentix's advertising strategy was to attract
patients with promotional gimmicks such as a low priced
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examination and prophylaxis. At that time patients would be
given brochures on each dentist and the center. According
to Mr. Slater, this type of nonfear introduction was
successful. Most patients did, in fact, follow through with
the proposed treatment plan. Fees for specific services
were at first set below market levels but, within a short
period of time, prices were raised to competitive rates.
The target population for Omnidentix was the middle and
upper-middle class family.
Omnidentix also initiated several unique but
unsuccessful programs designed to increase profits,
including Omnidentsave and Omnidentlease. The aim of the
Omnidentsave progam was to provide the employees of large,
cooperating employers with discounted fees. The program did
not, according to management, provide the large patient base
expected.
The Omnidentlease program sold dental centers to
corporate, non-dental investors desiring high yields and tax
credits. These investors then leased the centers to
dentists who wanted to open a franchise but did not have the
necessary resources to do so. The practice was thus owned
by the dentist, but the assets were owned by the investor.
Franchisees
The mean age for Omnidentix franchisees was 41 years
old. According to Omnidentix management, the selection
criteria for Omnidentix franchisees was strict. Mr. Slater
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states that the most important characteristics for a
successful franchisee are a desire to succeed, work hard,
high standards, persistence, and an adequate capital base.
Potential dentist-franchisees were recruited through
advertising in professional journals and at professional
meetings. Direct mail brochures were sent to 100,000
dentists, as suggested by a Boston Consulting Group study
commissioned by Omnidentix. This recruitment strategy
elicited over 400 inquiries from dentists.
The franchisee selection process included character
references, background checks, and personal interviews. At
the time of their bankruptcy, Omnidentix was in the process
of developing a personality test to discriminate among those
dentists most likely to be incompatible with franchising.
According to Omnidentix management, Omnidentix had few
difficulties attracting dentists in Boston, Chicago or
Washington, probably due to the urban locations, the highly
competitive market, and the large supply of recent dental
graduates. In nonurban areas, however, recruiting dentists
was more difficult, due to barriers created by dental
societies and peer pressure. Salaries for contracting
dentists in these areas were higher, and the quality of
provider also suffered.
Initial training of franchisees was accomplished
through several training seminars. Potential dentist-
franchisees also worked for one month in another Omnidentix
center to gain experience in the Omnidentix system. After
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opening a new center, central Omnidentix staff stayed on for
another month as a support team.
Continuing training did occur to a lesser degree.
According to Omnidentix franchisees, this training usually
included lectures on motivating employees. Other seminars
dealt with practice management, and less often with current
topics in clinical dentistry. The followup education
lessened with time.
Financial
Start-up costs for an Omnidentix franchise were
approximately $250,000. Franchisees paid an initial
franchise fee of $85,000. Ongoing franchise fees included a
flat annual franchise fee of $35,000 and $15,000 for
advertising. (see Table 5-4)
SMILES OF NEW ENGLAND INC.
History
Smiles of New England Inc. was a business converting
pre-existing dental centers into members of a franchise
system. Smiles was the inspiration of a general dentist,
Dr. Gary Sloan. Dr. Sloan opened the first prototype Smiles
center in Cambridge, MA. in 1981. Within a few years, this
center was grossing over one million dollars per year.
Following the prototype's success, Dr. Sloan decided to
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franchise his system. Dr. Sloan consequently sold the
Smiles franchise system to a group of investors previously
associated with Century 21 Real Estate. Dr. Sloan remained
as a consultant to Smiles Inc. for several years thereafter,
until sickness forced him to retire from the organization.
The Century 21 investors planned to expand Smiles into a
nationwide chain of dental franchises, much as Century 21
had previously done in real estate.
In order to raise the necessary capital to finance this
growth, the company sold 350,000 shares of stock during a
public offering in 1984. The stock price increased from
$2.25 in 1983 to $3.00 in 1984 and then dropped to $0.05 by
1985. The Company paid no cash dividends, and retained
earnings were reinvested back in the business. For fiscal
year 1984, the company experienced a net loss of $467,321 or
$.36 per share.
The goal of the Smiles company was to establish over
3,000 Smiles offices across the United States by 1990. To
accomplish this, Smiles utilized a marketing plan involving
simultaneous openings of five or more centers. On March 25,
1984, over 30 Smiles offices opened simultaneously in the
greater Boston market. These mass openings functioned to
blitz the market, and achieve quick, wide dissemination of
the Smiles' franchise concept.
By June, 1985 only 18 of the original group of 30
franchisees remained in the Smiles organization. However,
12 new dental offices signed up during the intervening time
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period. By the time of its demise in 1985, the Company had
30 Smiles franchises operating in Massachusetts and another
30 sold in Florida.
Smiles also sold regional marketing territories to
investors, who then possessed exclusive right to sell Smiles
offices in the designated territory. Under the license
agreements, the regional franchisee paid an initial fee of
$65,000 as well as a continuing fee of 20 percent of gross
revenues to the central corporation. By the end of 1984,
although three territories were reserved, only one territory
was sold - the New England Region. The purchaser of the New
England region was a former marketing director and owner of
Century 21 New England, Inc.
In 1984, Smiles entered into an agreement with
University of Pennsylvania to fund several dental related
research projects. Smiles also organized a subsidiary
called Dentech to fund and monitor research involving new
technologies such as oxygenated perfluorocarbons for the
treatment of periodontal disease.
Throughout 1985, Smiles continued to expand quickly
into Texas, Florida and Illinois. However, Smiles was never
able to generate a profit. Smiles filed for protection from
its creditors under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code in December, 1985.(see Table 5-5)
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Table 5-5
SUMMARY SHEET
SMILES OF NEW ENGLAND INC.
Number of Centers Open 60
Number of Centers Sold 60
Location of Centers MA,FL,TX,IL
Number of Years in Existence 3
Name of CEO Donald Foscato
Total Gross Income (1984) $12,226
Net Income (1984) ($479,321)
Franchisee Mean Age 41.2
Philosophy
The Smiles' franchise concept was based upon the
promotion of oral hygiene and the prevention of periodontal
(gum) disease. Smiles Inc. advocated frequent cleanings
three to four times a year for treatment of periodontal
disease. Scalings were performed by hygienists so that
patients did not need to see a dentist at all if they did
not want to. The fear associated with dental visits was
thus decreased. The patient would benefit since frequent
professional teeth cleanings, along with a program of
patient education and home care, reduces dental problems and
gum disease. The dentist-franchisee benefits by attracting
new patients as well as increasing the number of visits by
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patients already in the practice. Patients were attracted
to a Smiles office by advertised specials such as low priced
cleanings.
Unlike Omnidentix or DHS, Smiles was designed as a
conversion franchise. The franchise concept and system was
applied to an already existing dental practice. Smiles
provided only two services to its franchisees; a marketing
program that included advertising, and the franchise name
along with the preventive periodontal concept.
The hygiene program was later expanded to promote the
utilization of periodontal procedures in the centers.
Hygienists were trained to track the volume, services
performed, and frequency of recalls of their periodontal
patients. As a result of this intensive periodontal
program, the mean monthly gross hygiene production of Smiles
centers jumped 128% after becoming affiliated with Smiles,
from $3123 to $7130 per month. (Source: Smiles-internal
documents)
Smiles primarily used television, radio and print in
its advertising efforts. The advertising campaign was
designed by a large, experienced advertising firm, Doyle
Dane and Bernbach. Television commercials boasted such
celebrities as Carl Yastremski and Marvin Hagler. The
company also supplied promotional and educational literature
to the Smiles offices.
In addition, Smiles attempted other novel marketing
techniques such as a program called toothprints'. This
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program placed microfilm containing a child's name and vital
statistics into the sealant of a back tooth. In this way,
missing and lost children could be easily traced.
Franchisees
The mean age of the Smiles franchisees was 41.3 years
old. Fourteen percent of the dentists were single or
divorced while 86 percent were married. Over half of the
dentist-franchisees (63 percent) felt they possessed average
or greater than average management experience while 37
percent felt they had significant management knowledge.
According to management, franchisees were selected
primarily on their basis to pay the franchise fees.
Nonetheless, the franchisees were probably a self-selected
group. As franchisees with a new venture, 87 percent rated
themselves as above average risk takers.
The company provided franchisees with training in the
Smiles system. Initial and continuing training programs
were established and delivered by company staff. These
training programs included areas such as provider-patient
ralationships, management of dental practices, hygiene
education, and motivational support.
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Financial
Since Smiles was designed as a conversion franchise
with an already existing dental office, its franchise fees
were less than those for other dental franchises. Smiles'
franchisees joining early in the program paid an initial
franchise fee of $3,000 to become part of the Smiles
program. This fee was raised to $4,500 once the franchise
had reached a size of 30 centers. In addition, each office
had to pay continuing service fees of $750 per month as well
as an advertising fee of $500 per month.
Summary
Smiles of New England Inc. was based upon a system for
the prevention of periodontal disease. Entrepreneurs,
formerly affiliated with Century 21 real estate, sold
franchisees the Smiles' name, logo, management services and
hygiene system. As a conversion franchise, Smiles was a
much less expensive type of franchise than Omnidentix
Systems Inc. or Dental Health Services Inc. but it failed
nonetheless.
The results from these case studies form the basis for
discussion of important topics in the success and failure of
dental franchises. The issues raised in the dental
franchises studied appear to fall into three main
categories; franchisor management, professional autonomy and
financial issues. Each of these three topics will be
examined in detail in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION:MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Introduction
It was initially hypothesized that dental franchises
were failing due to poor franchise management. In every
franchise studied, however, upper management possessed
significant experience in the field of franchising. All had
previously developed or worked in successful franchises.
Smiles' franchisors had experience in Century 21 Real
Estate. Omnidentix franchisors had been associated with
Mister Donut franchises. DHS franchisors had experience in
optometry franchises. When interviewed, all acknowledged
employing most, if not all of the management devices
suggested by general franchise literature, especially in the
areas of productivity and cost control.
Despite franchising experience, franchisors acknowledge
making key mistakes in violation of generally accepted
franchising principles. Management mistakes led to
financial problems and franchisee dissatisfaction.
Franchise management made key errors involving:
1) overexpansion/financing
2) franchisee selection
3) marketing efforts and
4) choice of chief dental officer.
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These management mistakes will now be explored to determine
their effect on franchise success.
I OVEREXPANSION / UNDERCAPITALIZATION
General
Overexpansion refers to the opening of more centers
than prudent. Many incentives to overexpand exist in a
franchise, especially in advertising. Advertising economies
of scale increase with a greater number of affiliated
centers. More centers also mean greater funds available to
spend on advertising, thereby increasing advertising dollars
even further. Incentives are stronger in a young franchise,
due to its increased reliance on marketing methods, and need
for public visibility and awareness.
All of the dental franchises studied experienced
difficulties with overexpansion and undercapitalization.
Despite the potential advantages of an expansionist
strategy, in every case it caused severe financial problems
for the franchise. As a result of opening too many centers
too quickly, the franchises selected unqualified
franchisees, poor locations and possessed inadequate capital
reserves. Each of these problems presents a challenge to
the longterm success of the franchise.
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Omnidentix
The expansion of Omnidentix was dramatic. In 1980,
Omnidentix had only one center open. In 1982 there were
four Omnidentix centers. By 1984 22 centers were open.
Omnidentix had planned to open another 34 new centers in
1984 and an additional 25 in 1985.
Omnidentix franchisees interviewed believed that the
Company had overexpanded. Initially, the Company followed a
conservative approach of selecting prime locations and
franchisees. Centers were opened one at a time until each
was generating a profit.
Locations of initial Omnidentix centers were selected
by accepted methods utilized in other franchised industries.
Although sophisticated models and criteria, such as a
McDonald's, were not employed, the locational criteria were
reasonable. 'High-powered' locations were chosen with
visibility, high traffic, parking, square footage
requirements and reasonably priced, long-term leases.
Supply of dentists in the area was not a factor since it was
felt that Omnidentix centers would create their own market
for dentistry.
This conservative strategy towards growth was abandoned
in 1983 when the desire to expand quickly led to the leasing
of poor locations and money losing company-owned centers.
Pyramid Malls, a mall developer, offered Omnidentix
locations in three distant towns (Hadley MA., GlenFalls NY.,
and Ithaca NY.) at low cost. Rather than lose these lease
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options, Omnidentix rented the centers without franchisees.
With the Omnidentix system functioning well and centers
generating profits within six months after opening,
management was convinced that even if franchisees were not
found immediately, the company could still reap profits from
these corporate-owned centers.
The dental centers in these malls proved to be
unsuccessful. Their operating losses and distant locations
made it difficult to attract investors.
Early breakeven estimates for these centers proved to
be optimistic. Lower profit margins resulted from lower
revenues and the necessity of paying higher salaries to
contracting dentists. In order to entice contracting
dentists to these rural locations, Omnidentix was forced to
pay a premium in both a minimum base salary of $40,000 and a
40 percent commission. In Boston, contracting dentists were
only paid 35 percent of gross with no guaranteed minimum.
The distant locations also taxed management's ability
to oversee these centers. Due to the lack of owner-
operators, neither the center's managers nor dentists
possessed incentive to operate the centers efficiently.
This apathy was reflected in the care provided, and profits
dropped even more. (It is interesting to note that during
this period, Omnidentix hired as Director of Real Estate and
Construction, the former Pyramid employee responsible for
arranging Omnidentix's leases with Pyramid malls.)
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The number of corporate-owned centers continued to
increase, until Omnidentix had committed $1.1 million on
rent on 22 sites with only $239,140 in sublease agreements.
Company-owned centers became an enormous drain on company
finances. Primarily because of these company-owned centers,
revenues at Omnidentix rose from $160,000 to $301,000 to
$1,024,000 from 1981 to 1983. However, losses from
operations in these years increased more than
proportionately from $(59.000) to $(445,000) to
$(1,433,000). In retrospect, Omnidentix management
considers its overexpansion an avoidable mistake, which they
were aware of at the time but pursued nonetheless.
Dental Health Services Inc.
Dental Health Services (DHS) also experienced financial
difficulties due to overexpansion. Following the opening of
its fourth center, DHS was operating at a deficit and on the
verge of bankruptcy. DHS management admits that "It was a
classic case of overextending ourselves. We had built our
offices too large, with too many chairs, with too many
employees, with too much debt and too much rent and not
enough patients." DHS was only able to solve its financial
dilemma with a large infusion of capital by Pearle Health
Services.
Like Omnidentix, DHS had earlier followed a
conservative strategy and chosen successful locations. A
desire to expand quickly, however, led the company to ignore
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general principles for choosing locations. Poor locations
often resulted from tradeoffs with mall developers. In
order to lease a prime location in one mall, a second, less
desirable location also had to be rented. As in Omnidentix,
these poor locations proved to be costly mistakes for DHS.
To prevent such management mistakes from recurring, DHS
has returned to its initial conservative strategy for
growth. Locations are no longer traded off with developers.
Each location is judged on its own merits and is selected on
only that criteria.
Smiles Inc.
Expansion of Smiles franchises also occurred at a fast
pace. The Smiles' managers that were interviewed felt that
overexpansion was a significant problem in the Smiles
organization. When growth of the franchise slowed, the
national Smiles organization exerted pressure on local
organizations to expand quickly. New regions in Texas,
Florida and Chicago were rapidly created in order to gain
access to these large capital markets. Instead, with many
new, unsold and geographically isolated centers needing
large amounts of resources, Smiles became even more
leveraged with a weaker capital base. By not following a
structured, conservative plan for growth, Smiles experienced
financial difficulties.
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Conclusions
Overexpansion is a common cause for failure in
nondental franchising. Despite the experience of the dental
franchisors, all three of the dental franchises experienced
financial difficulties due to overexpansion. Management's
desire to expand quickly, without adequate capital
reserves, led to the selection of poor locations and unsold
franchise centers in DHS, Omnidentix and Smiles. The
franchise's tendency to overexpand also resulted in the
selection of unqualified dentist-franchisees.
II CHOICE OF DENTIST-FRANCHISEES
General
The selection of franchisee is a critical management
decision in any franchise. Possibly in an effort to expand
quickly and possibly because the characteristics of a
successful dental franchisee are not known, all of the
dental franchises made mistakes in this area. The
franchisors' previous experience in franchising did not
prevent them from choosing poor franchisees.
Miscalculations in the choice of dentist-franchisees
contributed to franchise failure.
Upon comparing the choice of franchisees with
franchising literature, it appears that mistakes involving
franchisee selection are of three main types. The first
common error is the choice of franchisees with psychological
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problems. A second mistake is the selection of non owner-
operators. A third problem involves selection of dentist-
franchisees who are unwilling to compromise their
professional autonomy and to follow the franchise system.
The effect of professional autonomy upon franchise success
will be discussed in the next chapter.
A. Poor Franchisee Choices
The franchisee selection process in the three
franchises studied closely conforms to the franchisee
selection criteria described in franchise literature. The
selection process usually includes references, background
checks, and interviews with perspective franchisees.
Omnidentix management notes that personal interviews are the
best predictor of franchisee success. As a result,
personal interviews at Omnidentix gradually became more
extensive.
This type of conservative selection process may not be
closely adhered to in practice. A Smiles manager claims
that in reality, the franchisee selection process was based
upon financial means. Franchises may also have selected
franchisees unlikely to adapt well to franchising, in order
to expand.
Out of 12 DHS franchisees, only one dentist was an
obviously poor choice because of psychological difficulties.
Following a religious rebirth, this dentist was unwilling to
charge patients or to pay franchise fees. The dentist
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eventually went bankrupt. To prevent such problems from
recurring, DHS has since instituted tighter financial
controls in the franchise contract.
Omnidentix sold two franchise centers to a dentist-
franchisee, described by management as psychologically
unbalanced. A third center was purchased by a dentist who,
unknown to management, had been a former patient in a mental
health institution. These centers were later reclaimed by
the central organization, but only after costly financial
problems.
Smiles did not appear to select any psychologically
troubled franchisees. Out of the almost 50 dentist-
franchisees chosen, only three (six percent) have been poor
choices. Thus, poor franchisee selection does not appear to
be a major reason for failure of the industry.
B. Lack of Owner-Operator
Franchised dental centers are also unsuccessful, due to
the lack of an owner-operator. Owner-operators are believed
to be critical to success in any type of franchise, since an
owner-operator is more likely to devote long hours and hard
work to the enterprise than is a non-owner.
In retrospect, DHS management attributes the poor
performance of the first DHS center in Pennsylvania to the
dentist-franchisee owning more than one practice. The same
center, when sold to an owner-operator quickly became
profitable. Despite this failure, the company continued to
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sell to non owner-operators. A Florida DHS center was sold
to an Indiana dentist. Another dentist bought two DHS
dental franchises in Florida, which were one and one-half
hours apart. Neither of these dentists was successful in
the attempt to run two distant centers alone. A fourth
center was bought by a distant group of three specialists.
Internal squabbling prevented the center from reaching its
potential.
DHS has since repurchased each of these centers. With
these failures, DHS now sees the presence of an owner-
operator as a critical part of a successful franchise. As a
result, DHS now only sells franchises to owner-operators.
Omnidentix management, in marked contrast to this
policy, consistently encouraged sales of its centers to non-
owner operators. Of its six franchisees, four owned more
than one center and two owned more than two centers.
Another franchisee's plan to buy a second franchise ended
only when the franchise failed. When interviewed, only one
Omnidentix franchisee thought that being an owner-operator
was an important factor for success. Neither Omnidentix
management, nor the other Omnidentix dentists saw multiple
ownership as a problem. As one dentist who owned two
centers stated,"I can see myself owning and running up to
five centers but that's my maximum. One for each day of the
week." The dentist did feel he may have made a mistake by
buying centers located two hours apart. Ownership of
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multiple centers has a much greater chance for success if
the centers are located close together.
In Smiles, the subject of owner-operated centers was
never an issue, since each dentist already owned his own
dental practice. Despite the beliefs of Omnidentix
affiliates, the difficulties generated by multiple ownership
of any type of franchise center are formidable. The
problems in multiple ownership are multiplied in a service
industry, like dentistry, in which patients desire to
receive a consistent service from the same provider. Lack
of an owner-operator increases the possibility of failure of
the individual center, as well as the dental franchise.
The choice of franchisees has broader implications for
the franchisor than just the immediate success of that
individual center. Since a franchise is built upon the
principle of consistent quality in each affiliate, each
franchisee is affected by the performance of other
franchisees in the organization. The selection of
psychologically troubled or unqualified dentist-franchisees
reflects badly upon all affiliated franchisees. In Smiles
especially, a sizable minority (32 percent) of the Smile
franchisees were dissatisfied with the qualifications of
their peers, especially those entering late in the
franchise's life cycle.
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III ADVERTISING
Marketing Stategies
A third critical management area in which mistakes were
made is advertising. Like the selection of franchisees or
site location, the advertising methods used by the
franchises appear to have been consistent with those
proposed in franchising and management literature.
Each of the franchises interviewed depended heavily
upon traditional franchising marketing methods. All of the
franchises used outside marketing agencies to develop their
marketing strategies. All three of the franchise chains
employed large, prestigious advertising agencies on the East
Coast.
The target groups of the dental franchises were middle
to upper-middle income white families and individuals 20-45
years old. Each franchise used many different types of
external marketing in their organizations such as newspaper
and magazine advertisements, television and radio, direct
mail coupons, and large yellow page ads.
The franchises' marketing strategies focused primarily
upon external marketing efforts. Advertisements were
intermittently timed rather than continuous. Special blitz
advertising programs were utilized to celebrate a new
center's opening.
Initially, each of the three franchises employed
advertising that was primarily price oriented with
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discounted fees. Increasing franchisee dissatisfaction with
this type of advertising, however, led to its being
discontinued in favor of an informational approach stressing
such factors as convenience and quality.
Marketing Mistakes
When interviewed, the franchisors all believed that
their advertising programs were successful. Their
advertising efforts had attracted patients and had increased
patient flow into affiliated centers. As Mr. Slater
asserts, " Patient flow could be turned on and off by
advertising."
The franchisors realize that many of their franchisees
were unhappy with their marketing efforts. Yet they do not
understand the reasons for this franchisee dissatisfaction.
Franchisors attribute this discontent to the belief that
marketing is an anathema to dentists, and seen as
unprofessional.
The dentists, however, believe that advertising is very
important. Eighty-three percent of Smiles franchisees
thought that advertising was very important to the success
of their franchise while only 13 percent thought it was of
little consequence. In DHS, over 90 percent of the
franchisees thought advertising very important while in
Omnidentix, 100 percent of the franchisees thought so.
Thus, although some of the dentists interviewed believed it
unprofessional to advertise, most accepted advertising as an
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integral part of a successful franchise. For many, being
able to benefit from the presence of professional
advertising, was a major reason for joining a franchise.
Most dentists viewed their franchisor's marketing
efforts as unprofessional, and of poor quality. The
advertising did not attract the necessary quantity or
quality of desirable patients to affiliated centers. This
same dissatisfaction was evident in all of the franchises
studied. In DHS, 70% of the franchisees questioned felt
that their franchisor's ability to advertise was poor and
only 30% rated it as good. In Smiles, only 10% thought it
was good and 67% rated their advertising as poor. However,
in Omnidentix, 67% of the franchisees rated their
advertising as good and only one franchisee thought it very
poor. An analysis of some specific examples of marketing
errors made by franchisors illustrates their importance in
determining franchise success.
A basic marketing philosophy behind DHS is that a
dentist - patient relationship begins with an emergency
situation and evolves into a continual relationship. That
is, patients are first attracted to DHS centers for an
emergency visit. If treatment is rendered satisfactorily,
the patients will follow through on the rest of the
treatment plan.
In fact, several of the DHS dentists estimate that 80
percent of their new patients come for emergency treatment.
These dentists believe that the vast majority of emergencies
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are referred via the Phone Book. Yet because of increasing
cost, two years ago DHS management decreased the size of
their advertisement in the Phone Book and moved it to a
corporate listing separate from the regular dentist
advertisements. As a result of these marketing changes,
several DHS dentists experienced a noticeable drop in the
number of new patients. These dentists were then forced to
place their own advertisements in the Phone Book. Finally a
year later, the company restored the original advertisement
in the Yellow Pages.
The Linseys have also substituted advertising on
television, radio, and in the TV Guide in place of the more
traditional forms of print advertising. Responses from DHS
dentists are unanimous in their opposition to these ideas.
This type of advertising is viewed as expensive and not
cost-effective. The dentists, for the most part, have a
more conservative marketing approach than the franchise
management. These differing philosophies must be recognized
and respected, since otherwise dissension will arise.
Franchisees in all three of the franchises also believe
that hiring a prestigious advertising firm was a
disadvantage. Although dentists were initially impressed by
the size and experience of the advertising firms associated
with their firms, this faith was replaced with discontent
over time. Six dentists interviewed specifically remarked
that, as a small account in a very large firm, they did not
receive the amount of effort that they would have in a small
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firm. More conservative and less high-tech advertising
techniques would have better suited their purposes.
There also seemed to be a lot of resentment among
franchised dentists concerning equity issues of the
advertising dollar. Suburban franchisees felt that they
were subsidizing the advertising of urban and company owned
centers. Several suburban Smiles' dentists refused to pay
the advertising fee, since they believed their benefits were
minimal. They cite as proof, for example, that most of
their patients did not read the large urban newspaper.
These dentists found it more effective to place their own
advertising in local newspapers.
Equity issues in advertising also caused conflict when
franchises attempted to direct more advertising dollars to
those franchise centers that were performing poorly. Many
non-benefiting franchisees became increasingly alienated
from the organization. In 1988, DHS orthodontists,
convinced that they were not getting their equal share of
the company's advertisements, sued the company and won.
Still, the one DHS franchisee who was doing poorly does not
believe that the company has in fact directed more money his
way.
Marketing mistakes by the franchisors also seem to have
produced franchisee dissatisfaction by attracting
undesirable patients. Franchisees were unhappy because of
the few patients attracted from the advertising efforts of
the franchise, fewer still were desirable patients.
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Franchisees complained that the marketing efforts
attracted patients from undesirable demographics to their
practices. For example, DHS's Florida unit marketed towards
the abundant elderly population in the immediate area.
Although theoretically, this would appear to be a good idea
due to the numbers and amounts of unmet dental needs among
the geriatric population, the dentists are unhappy. As one
DHS franchisee put it " The DHS keeps advertising to the
older retirees and all they look for is price. So they're
attracting the wrong patients."
Smiles franchisees also complained about the
undesirability of patients attracted to their practices.
Most of these were enticed by introductory, low-priced
cleaning specials. As one would expect from such a
marketing effort, the patients attracted were price
conscious and short-term oriented; traits which the dentists
found undesirable. Although the advertising later shifted
away from price and more towards informational advertising,
the stigma remained, and cost-conscious patients continued
to be the majority of patients attracted. Other patients
were frightened away by the image of a clinic.
Advertising Effectiveness
Advertising in the franchises was designed to have two
primary functions: 1) attract new patients
2) achieve brand name recognition
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Only about one-half of all franchisees believe that their
franchise name carried any weight in attracting new
patients. In DHS, 50 percent of the franchisees feel that
their franchise has established its name in the public mind
very well and 50 percent do not feel that they have
established it at all. In Omnidentix, two-thirds felt that
the Omnidentix name was well established in the public mind
and one-third felt that it was not. In contrast, only 23
percent of the Smiles franchisees felt that the Smiles name
was well established and over 75 percent thought that it was
not. Since branding is a critical precept in franchising,
this lack of name recognition in the dental franchises may
have been an important factor in their failure.
The dentist-franchisees, however, appeared to value the
branding function of advertising much less than the number
of new patients that it attracted. Whether or not the
advertising attracted new patients is difficult to evaluate.
Although the advertising did not appear to be effective at
all in the Smiles organization, in both Omnidentix and DHS,
the advertising did appear to attract many new patients.
Almost all of the DHS and Omnidentix dentists questionned
agreed that they were busy from day one. Several DHS
dentists estimate having 130-140 new patients per month.
These figures are much higher than for the average
nonfranchising dentist.
The dentists did not, however, credit their busyness to
corporate marketing efforts. One-third of all the
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franchisees ascribe new patients to their location. The
other two-thirds attribute their busyness to word-of-mouth
referrals and, as one dentist stated, 'about one percent to
advertising.'
These results seem to parallel franchisee opinions on
their franchisor's advertising efforts. Both DHS and
Omnidentix had fairly successful advertising campaigns which
resulted in a certain amount of branding and name
recognition.
Smiles, however, achieved little success marketing to
new patients or achieving name recognition. The majority of
Smiles dentists felt that the marketing efforts by the
company attracted few if any new patients to their office.
Over 95 percent of the Smiles franchisees estimated that
advertising attracted less than five new patients a week and
over 70 percent estimated that they had less than one new
patient per week.
Other marketing efforts that Smiles attempted also
failed to generate business for their franchisees. The
'toothprints' program, in which identification of children
was placed in their teeth, was expected to attract new
patients, and to generate goodwill and recognition in the
community. Although this program was heavily promoted by
the company, it was a failure.
Another marketing effort by Smiles to acquire new
patients by sending letters/coupons to new residents of the
area was also a failure. Unfortunately, the lists of new
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residents was usually laced with errors and out of date.
Several dentists, although discouraged with the Smiles
product, still thought the idea a good one. They signed up
for a new resident list from a private company whose lists
were more timely, and contained many fewer duplications and
errors than the ones compiled by the Smiles management
program.
Summary
In contrast to franchisor expectations, most of the
dentists believed advertising to be an important component
of a successful franchise, and did not view advertising as
an unprofessional action. Most franchisees were
dissatisfied, however, with the quality of the marketing
efforts.
The marketing efforts at Smiles were ineffective and
failed to attract new patients or achieve name recognition.
Although DHS and Omnidentix management believed that their
advertising was successful, and indeed it did appear to
attract many new patients to their affiliated centers, the
franchisees attributed new patients to either their location
or word-of-mouth. Franchisor marketing efforts were rarely
given credit for high patient volumes. Almost all of the
franchisees felt that the advertising was attracting
undesirable patients.
Many of these mistakes could have been avoided by more
input from the dentist-franchisees. A DHS dentist on his
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franchise's advertising committee, describes the committee
as having little influence on the company's advertising
strategy or budget.
Even though some of these franchisor mistakes have been
rectified, dentists remain bitter about past marketing
mistakes. Franchisees also believe that the dental
franchises place too much emphasis upon external marketing
techniques and underemphasize internal marketing efforts,
which are viewed as more professional and successful.
IV CHIEF OF DENTAL OPERATIONS
General
The choice of chief of dental operations is an
important decision which none of the three franchises made
in conformity with traditional franchise theory. Franchise
literature suggests that this person be a well respected
dentist possessing both clinical and management experience.
Although top management in the franchises studied had
excellent qualifications, the chief of dental services did
not. This lack of an effective spokesperson and dental
manager led to much dissatisfaction among the franchisees.
Ninety-three percent of dentist-franchisees surveyed
felt that the presence of dentists in upper franchise
management was integral in running a dental franchise. One-
on-one contact is an important method for diffusing conflict
between franchisee and franchisor, before it becomes a
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significant problem. Thus, the dentist-franchisees consider
it vital to have at least one dentist with knowledge,
experience, and the power to change the franchise system,
and with whom they can directly communicate problems and
suggestions.
Omnidentix
At Omnidentix, the choice for the chief of dental
operations was Dr. David Pyner. Other than being Mr
Slater's endodontist, Dr Pyner had few qualifications for
the position. As a specialist, he had a different
perspective on the dental operations of the Omnidentix
centers than did the franchisees who were all generalists.
As a result of a lack of management expertise and
personality problems, Dr Pyner commanded little respect from
either dentists or managers. Dentists did not have an
effective presence in the central organization to represent
their interests, and to whom they could turn with problems
or suggestions.
Dr. Pyner later left the organization but, Omnidentix
failed to select a replacement for Dr. Pyner. The absence
of a Chief Dental Officer only perpetuated the
dissatisfaction that the lack of an effective dental leader
created.
Franchisee confidence and unhappiness in Omnidentix's
central management team was further undermined by the hiring
of David Slater's son Jonathan, age 24, as treasurer and Mr
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Slater's niece as vice-president of marketing, both of whom
had little, if any, experience in these fields. Mr.
Slater's wife contributed to the interior design of the
centers.
Smiles
A similar pattern occurred in the Smiles organization.
The Chief of Dental Affairs at Smiles was originally Dr.
Gary Sloan, a charismatic, practicing dentist. Many of the
Smiles dentists joined primarily because of his presence.
When he became ill and left the organization, his
replacements were less qualified and respected and the
position experienced a high turnover rate.
As a result of the loss of Dr. Sloan and the high
turnover rate, the chiefs of dental affairs were not viewed
as having any power to effect change within the
organization. Thus, although the initial choice of Dental
Adviser was a good one at Smiles, subsequent choices were
not, causing dissatisfaction among the franchisees, who felt
uneasy and unhappy about dealing directly with a corporate
entity.
DHS
DHS approached the problem of dental chief in a
different way. DHS incorporated a close, one-to-one,
communication between franchisees and franchisor. Although
DHS does not have a Chief Dental Officer, frequent contact
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with the CEO is easily accessible to those franchisees
desiring it. The distant Pennsylvania region, an area where
close contact is not possible, has its own Dental Advisor.
This advisor is a general dentist who was the first DHS
franchisee and is well respected and knowledgeable about
both dentistry and the DHS franchise.
The arrangement found in Pennsylvania appears to be an
effective arrangement that is satisfactory to the dentists
in that region. In contrast, the absence of a real dental
advisor for those franchises near the central Florida region
is noted by about one-third of the DHS franchisees who
believe that a Chief Dental Officer is an integral
ingredient for a successful franchise.
SUMMARY
Data from the dental franchises studied indicates the
importance of selecting respected, qualified dentists for
central management positions. None of the franchises
studied employed a qualified, respected dentist in its
central organization for long. Omnidentix made an
injudicious choice for its Chief of Dental Operations.
Nonetheless, it was generally felt that neither Dr. Pyner
nor Dr. Sloan had any real power in their respective
organizations. Both dentists had progressively less of a
role in the decision-making of their companies as time
passed. Both were bought out and left their franchises
early on, leaving their franchises without a dental
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representative. This absence caused an intensification of
franchisee uneasiness. More judicious choices of head of
dental operations would probably have greatly benefited the
organizations.
The dental franchises did, however, appear to be
resolving this problem by promoting dentists within their
organization to management levels. In Omnidentix, one of
the franchisees and in Smiles, two of the dentists had been
promised a position in their central organizations. DHS has
already placed one of their franchisees in such a position.
This type of promotion from within appears to satisfy the
desires for representation by the dentist-franchisees. This
strategy also has the advantage of satisfying those dentists
with management aspirations.
Despite the initial hypothesis that dental franchises
were failing due to poor management decisions, data from
dental franchises indicates that management mistakes only
account for a small percentage of the dental failures.
Failure seems primarily due to professional autonomy issues
to be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
DENTIST FRANCHISEE AUTONOMY
Overview
Study of dental franchises suggests that the
alternative hypothesis presented earlier appears to be
valid, that is, that dental franchises are failing due to
the presence of special difficulties in managing health care
professionals. Health care professionals expect a far
larger degree of autonomy than most other types of employees
and do not accept the rigid control necessary for successful
franchising. Current management techniques are not adequate
to deal with this special type of professional employee.
Although bound by contracts, the dentist-franchisee
remains an independent businessman who is free to make
business decisions. This independence is a natural
extension of the autonomy of the dental professional.
Dentists, by virtue of their professional status and
training, desire independence and control over their
environment. It appears as if the most critical factor
determining the success of a dental franchise is the
dentist-franchisee.
Desire for autonomy makes dentistry more difficult to
franchise than non-health care industries. Dentists are
less willing to adapt to a franchise system or to listen to
franchisor advice than other franchisees, unless they have
great confidence in its merit. Even when the system does
Page - 120
seem to have merit, dentist-franchisees have difficulty
molding their individualistic styles to conform to a set
system.
The following section will examine the difficulties
imposed on franchising, due to the nature of dentists and
the impact of managing health care professionals upon
success of an organization. Dentist-franchisee autonomy
will be discussed as it relates to management control of
dentists, professional resistance to control, and the
resulting conflict between franchisee and franchisor.
I MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF DENTISTS
The task of influencing the behavior of employees to
achieve organizational objectives is recognized in the
management literature as an issue of central
importance.(Anthony and Herzlinger 1980 p6) In order to
influence the behavior of employees, business organizations
like franchises, utilize a variety of mechanisms, including
personal supervision, productivity analysis, and incentive
compensation systems. These mechanisms, as a whole,
comprise what the management field refers to as management
control systems. Theoretically, control systems are of
critical importance in a franchise organization, since they
are the primary mechanisms by which a franchise can monitor
productivity, and achieve product standardization, quality
control and cost control.
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The implementation of control systems was previously
hypothesized to be a key factor in the success of dental
franchises. The attempt by dental franchises to implement
management control systems has important implications for
managers, dentists and the patient. Control systems allow
organizations to better compete in the increasingly
competitive dental environment as well as to deliver higher
quality care to patients.
The data in this section was collected from seven
franchises, two of which are still in operation. All of the
franchises report using monitoring systems to some
degree.(Yavner 1989) All employ productivity reports,
personal supervision, performance appraisal, and record
audits as part of their management control system. Other
control systems such as variance analysis or standard
costing analysis, pre- and post-market surveys, new patient
controls, and inventory controls were used less frequently.
(see Table #7-1)
Although control systems may serve many important
roles in a dental franchise system, these same control
systems, if overutilized or overenforced by managers, may
alienate the dentist-franchisee. This section will examine
three of the most important controls; incentive compensation
packages, productivity reports, and personnel supervision to
study how the degree of management control and its impact
upon the autonomy of the dentist-franchisees may influence
the ultimate success of the franchise.
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TABLE 7-1
CONTROL SYSTEMS IN DENTAL FRANCHISES
BY FRANCHISE
Jonathan Dental Consumer DHS Dwight Smiles Denta
Incentive
Package
Product-
ivity
Analysis
Record
Audit
Budgets
Personal
Super-
vision
Variance
Analysis
Standard
Costing
Inventory
Control
Marketing
Analysis
Service
Mix
Dental
X
Store Health
X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Dental
X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X X X X X X
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Health
X
1. Incentive Compensation Packages
One of the most commonly employed types of control
systems is a pay-for-performance or incentive compensation
package. Incentive packages are also called results
control' rewards since they reward employees for realizing
particular results or outcomes.(Anthony and Herzlinger 1980
p18) Results controls are used at middle and upper
management levels in most large organizations. They allow
for decentralization and autonomy, and yet are a means by
which effective control can be exercised over middle and
upper management.(Merchant 1985 p48)
As part of their control systems, the majority of
dental franchises report using some form of incentive
compensation package to provide incentives to dentists,
dental auxiliaries and managers based upon selected
criteria. The franchises do not actually provide the
compensation but only assist the franchisee.
The types of incentives employed for employees differ
by franchise. All of the franchises use cash bonuses the
most. Both successful franchises, Jonathan and DHS, also
employ vacation time. Jonathan Dental Inc. also uses stock
options as employee incentives.
Unsuccessful franchises employ a greater number of
incentives. All but one uses commissions and nonmonetary
rewards. This category includes such varied items as an
office microwave and flowers, as well as more customary
rewards such as dinners and trips. The one unsuccessful
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franchise that was publically traded, also allowed bonuses
to be converted into equity.
A. Incentives for Dentists
Incentive packages are not applied equally, nor are
they based upon the same criteria for all employees of a
dental franchise. Neither of the successful franchises use
incentive packages for dentists. They do not promote their
use or advise it.
In sharp contrast, all of the unsuccessful franchises
recommend some form of incentives for contracting dentists.
On average, they utilize five different criteria to base
compensation incentives for dentists. The most frequently
used is gross revenues of the dentist, followed by units of
service performed by the dentist, and gross revenues of the
center. Rarely used criteria include net profits of each
dentist, educational qualifications, and number of new
patients seen.
B. Incentives for Managers
All of the franchises, both successful and
unsuccessful, employ incentives for their managers. Both
DHS and Jonathan base managerial incentives on gross
revenues of the center and the increase in profits of the
center over the previous year. Of the unsuccessful
franchises, half base managerial incentives upon gross
income, and the other half upon net income of the center.
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Length of time employed and percentage of collection are
also rarely used to determine management's compensation.
C. Incentives for Auxiliaries
Incentives for dental auxiliaries are employed by both
successful franchises but only by half of the unsuccessful
franchises. DHS and Jonathan base the incentive system for
dental auxiliaries upon length of time employed and
educational qualifications of the auxiliary. Unsuccessful
franchises employing incentives for their auxiliaries base
the incentives solely upon gross revenues of the center.
Discussion
There appears to be a difference between the use of
incentive packages in successful versus unsuccessful dental
franchises. All franchises utilize results controls for
auxiliaries and managers. However, in contrast to
unsuccessful franchises, the successful franchises do not
recommend and have not designed an incentive package for
contracting dentists. By not exercising this type of
control over the dentists, there is less intrusion upon the
dentist's autonomy and less conflict in the organization.
The unsuccessful franchises use results controls more
for the relatively autonomous contracting dentists, than for
managers or dental auxiliaries. This strategy may be
counterproductive since many nondental corporations have
found that liberal performance-related bonuses create high
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productivity among even the lowest organizational
employees.(Haimann T, Scott W and Connor P 1978 p350) In a
dental center too, lower level staff such as dental
auxiliaries or receptionists, have a significant impact upon
the profits of the center, and when motivated by reward, can
be expected to perform maximally, and probably to a greater
extent than would a dentist-employee.(Merchant 1985 p18)
Design of Incentive Systems
In order to best coordinate results with goals,
franchises should, like any business, define its goals in
terms of clear and objective results that can be measured.
(Anthony and Herzlinger 1980 p227) The incentive system
should be based upon these criteria.
Results controls can be used to accomplish many goals
of the firm. If it is difficult to recruit specialists,
incentive programs might be structured to attract
specialists to the organization or to encourage general
practitioners to gain additional specialty training. To
increase profits of the firm, an incentive, such as
collections per individual dentist, might be used. By
basing incentive programs on key variables that achieve
corporate goals, employees will be motivated to perform in
the company's best interests.
Management experts also advise that variables measured
should coordinate corporate goals and employee results to
achieve 'goal congruence'.(Anthony and Herzlinger 1980 p18)
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For example, if dental assistant turnover is a problem in
the organization, rewards for these employees might be based
upon length of time employed in order to encourage employees
to stay. In this way, Jonathan Dental and DHS base rewards
for front desk personnel upon the percentage of recall
appointments made, in order to achieve a high recall rate.
In fact, most dental franchise organizations do not
coordinate center goals and employee results. For example,
three of the unsuccessful dental franchises studied;
DentaHealth, Omnidentix and Consumer Health base their
compensation system for dentists, dental auxiliaries and
managers upon gross revenues of the center. Five more
unsuccessful franchises reward their dentists based upon
their individual gross revenues. Basing incentives on gross
profits acts to encourage dentists to provide services to
patients who might not be able or willing to pay for them.
This practice may lead to an increase in revenues earned but
also a corresponding increase in corporate accounts
receivable. The goals of the franchise organization and the
actions encouraged by the incentive program might be made
more congruous by basing rewards on collections of each
dentist.
Using gross revenues of the center as an incentive also
produces a nonoptimal result, since it encourages what is
commonly known in economics as 'the free rider syndrome'.
That is, an individual employee might fail to perform
optimally upon realizing that rewards are based upon the
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efforts of the entire group, regardless of individual
effort. The larger the organization, the greater this
effect. This type of reward, often referred to as a group-
based reward since it is based on the entire group's
achievements is most useful when the link between individual
effort and results is weak.(Merchant 1985 p42) A dental
franchise however, is an intimate, service-oriented
business. The link between individual effort and results is
direct. Hence, group-based incentives will not alter
outcomes maximally in dental franchise organizations.
2. Direct Personnel Controls
Direct personnel controls refer to a system of direct
supervision by management of employees and their work.
Direct personnel controls are another form of management
control system employed to some degree in all dental
franchises. Direct personnel controls are simpler to
implement and less costly than results controls.
(Haimann,Scott and Connor 1978 p447)
Ideally, personnel controls monitor key variables of
employee performance affecting the firm's success. The
primary determinant of the return of a patient to a dental
center is patient satisfaction. Patient satisfaction
depends to a large degree upon two major factors; price and
quality of care received.(Kress et al. 1984 p3) Instead of
judging quality of care directly, patients look at indirect
factors. One of the most important factors is the
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employees. Therefore, many different characteristics of the
employee are also monitored by dental franchises including
efficiency, appearance, productivity, and quality of care
rendered.
The simplest type of personnel monitor occurs during
the hiring process.(Anthony and Herzlinger 1980 p10) Only
those individuals possessing traits which the organization
desires are hired. Thus, the hiring process can be used to
complement the personnel monitors in the organization.
Discussion
All of the dental franchises primarily monitor
contracting dentists and hygienists through the use of
productivity and quality control systems. Dental
auxiliaries are not monitored by most of the franchises.
There is no significant difference in the use of personnel
monitors between successful and unsuccessful franchises.
All of the franchises utilize personnel controls more
frequently for dentist employees than for either hygienists
or dental auxiliaries. The franchises responding to the
survey use on average six different personnel monitors for
dentists. All of the respndents except Smiles Inc., monitor
productivity, organization, personal appearance, patient
rapport, patient satisfaction, and quality of services
rendered for each employed dentist. Two franchises also
monitor dentists on time spent per service.
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Dental franchises use an average of five different
personnel controls for hygienists. Patient rapport with
hygienists is measured in five franchises while producitivy
is measured in four franchise organizations. Personal
appearance, patient satisfaction, quality of service
rendered, time spent per unit of service, and neatness of
hygienists is supervised in three franchises.
Dental auxiliaries are monitored the least by dental
franchises. Only four franchises supervise dental
auxiliaries for their neatness, personal appearance and
rapport with patients. One franchise also measures the
organization of the auxiliary.
Therefore, only one-quarter of the franchises monitor
its dental auxiliaries and other support staff. Many
experts feel that that this lack of monitorization may be a
mistake.(Merchant 1985) Nonproviders in the dental
organization determine a much larger share of patient
satisfaction than is commonly attributed to them. Dental
assistants and front-desk personnel especially, are critical
ingredients to patient satisfaction, and yet their
performance is rarely analyzed.
In the franchises surveyed, most of the personnel
supervision was directed at maximizing the patient/provider
rapport. An important factor affecting satisfaction of
dental patients is cleanliness and personal appearance of
the employees in a dental office.(Kress et al. 1985 p29)
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Thus, it is not surprising that all but one of the
franchises closely monitors these features of its employees.
Six of the franchises measure patient rapport and
satisfaction with its employees, notably the dentist and
hygienist. Dentists and hygienists are of primary
importance in determining patient satisfaction, since they
have direct patient interactions as providers.
Design of Monitoring Systems
Management control specialists (Anthony and Herzlinger
1980, Merchant 1985) advocate an objective and formal system
of monitoring employees. Having central management rather
than the dentist/owner perform evaluations will tend to give
a more accurate representation of employee performance.
Half of the dental franchises employ a formal system of
monitorization by the Dental Director while half utilize an
informal evaluation system performed by the dentist-
franchisee and which, by the very informality of its nature
is biased.
One franchise states that it employs both formal
supervision by central management and subjective, informal
monitorization by the dentist/owner. This type of dual
checks and balances combines the advantages of each system
and serves to maximize the efficiency of the monitoring
system.
Management experts suggest that the timing of personal
evaluations be periodic and regular. (Anthony and Herzlinger
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1980 p511) It must not, however, be so frequent as to
interfere with operations of the organization.
Monitorization was performed at various intervals. One
franchise organization reviews its employees twice annually
and another every three to six months depending upon the
length of employment in the corporation. Two more
franchises perform reviews in an ongoing manner as needed.
The timing thus varies greatly among the franchises
ranging from two weeks to once annually. Although the
timing varies in each organization, both the two and 52 week
evaluation appear to be extreme, and imply the existence of
excessive and underefficient management controls. A
reasonable approach adopted by one franchise was to 'visit
each office every 60 days or as needed based on monthly
monitors.'
3. Productivity
Business organizations of all kinds measure
productivity in the organization. Productivity refers to
output per units of input. In service-oriented
organizations like dental franchises where the primary input
is labor, productivity refers to output per man-hour.
Franchises use different key variables to measure the
productivity of its providers. The quantity of key
variables and the key variables themselves chosen as
monitors are integral in determining its usefulness to
management. (Merchant 1985 p25)
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No significant difference exists between the successful
and unsuccessful franchises' use of productivity measures.
All franchises measure such productivity variables as number
of patients seen and gross revenue for each contracting
dentist. Half of the franchises measure net revenue per
contracting dentist. For the most part however, the dental
franchises concentrate on measuring productivity for entire
dental centers rather than for individual dentists. Data
for the center as a whole provides management with a general
overview of the center's operations as well as being simpler
to understand and less time consuming to calculate than
measurements made for each individual dentist. All but one
of the unsuccessful franchises routinely measure gross and
net revenues per dental center and the number of patients
seen per center.
The timing of variable review as stated previously, is
another important ingredient in the effectiveness of any
monitoring system. Productivity variables are measured
more frequently in the unsuccessful than the successful
dental franchises. Every unsuccessful franchise measures
results daily and two franchises even measure results
hourly.
In contrast, at DHS and Jonathan, the results are
measured monthly. By measuring productivity less frequently
DHS and Jonathan intrude less upon the franchisee's autonomy
and thereby cause less conflict in the organization.
Management experts point out that it is important not to
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monitor too many variables since the critical ones may be
lost in the shuffle. (Merchant p48) Instead, an organization
should only focus on key variables that are important
indicators of the quality and quantity of performance
rendered. This appears to be done to a greater extent in
the successful franchises.
Feedback
A formal system for the provision of feedback to the
centers is used by both of the successful franchises DHS and
Jonathan Dental. However, only two-thirds of the
unsuccessful franchises use such a formal feedback system.
The others use an informal system.
An important theoretical advantage of the dental
franchise system is that continuous feedback is provided to
the franchisees by central management. The pattern of
feedback flow was different in the two groups. In
successful franchises, feedback flowed from the financial
manager of the central organization directly to the
owner/dentist. In the unsuccessful group, however, feedback
flowed either to the owner/dentist or the business manager
in the office.
Presenting feedback directly to the dentist-franchisee
as opposed to the center's business manager more effectively
precipitates positive changes in the organization.
Feedback directly to the franchisee also fulfills another
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important role of reassuring the dentists that the
franchisors are earning their franchise fees.
Discussion
The design and implementation of management control
systems are important in the success of non-dental
franchises and were initially hypothesized to be an
important factor in the success of dental franchises as
well. This does not, however, appear to be the case. In
fact, the successful dental franchises Jonathan and DHS
actually appear to employ fewer control devices than did the
unsuccessful franchises.
The reasons for this are complex, and reflect dentists'
desire for autonomy. Dental franchises are unique in that
although there is a managerial element in both the central
and local centers, management power is incomplete. The
central franchisor does not have complete control over the
dentist-franchisees nor do the franchisees have complete
power over contracting dentists. By their very nature,
professionals are motivated by competing standards; those of
the organization promoting efficiency and profit and those
of their profession stressing personal integrity and quality
of care. The degree to which both groups attempt to
establish control, however, is integral to the success of
the dental franchise.
Incentive compensation systems were hypothesized to be
an important factor in the success of a dental franchise.
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Every dental franchise employs compensation systems to
reward performance by managers and dental auxiliaries. Only
the unsuccessful franchisors also reward dentists, while the
successful franchises DHS and Jonathan do not. Perhaps by
excluding dentists from the reward system and by not
exercising control over their actions in this manner, these
franchises encouraged dentist autonomy and ultimately a
greater amount of dentist satisfaction within the
organization. Successful franchises also better coordinate
their goals within the incentive system for their non-
dentists employees, thereby increasing their effectiveness.
Personnel monitors are simple, relatively inexpensive
to implement, and serve to complement the results controls.
Direct personnel controls were used in most dental
franchises. There does not, however, seem to be any real
difference between the personnel monitors employed by
successful and unsuccessful dental franchises. Both
primarily monitor the personal appearance and neatness of
dentist-employees. Although management literature advocates
monitoring employees on a regular basis, the timing of the
review was inefficient in many franchises, ranging between
two and 52 weeks.
Unsuccessful franchises tend to monitor variables more
frequently than do the successful franchises and thus
interfere with the firm's operations. Both Jonathan and DHS
monitor fewer variables less frequently. In this way the
successful franchises appear to exert less control over its
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dentist-employees and dentist-franchisees than do the
unsuccessful franchises. This type of decreased central
control appears to be a factor in the success of the dental
franchises.
Control systems are credited with having increased
productivity and efficiency in the nondental organization.
In a dental franchise, however, where the level of autonomy
of individual dentists is quite high, a control system is
only as beneficial as the franchisee's willingness to modify
their behavior based upon management's suggestions. If a
franchisee is unwillling to cooperate, any control system is
useless and as this evidence suggests, forcing management
control upon dentists may act only to alienate them from the
organization.
II PROFESSIONAL RESISTANCE TO CONTROL
By entering into a franchise agreement, the dentist-
franchisee surrenders a measure of independence to the
franchisor. The survival of the typical franchise requires
constant supervision of franchisees by franchisors in order
to ensure that exacting standards of performance are met.
The need for a minimum level of quality is imperative, since
any new franchise depends upon the public perception of
already existing centers.
Despite initial expectations for tight control in
dental franchises, this type of control was rarely realized,
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due to unique characteristics of the dentist-franchisee.
The peculiar nature of dentists as professionals was
frequently expressed in the dentist's reaction to franchisor
management.
In every franchise studied, albeit to differing
degrees, the franchisees resisted the intrusion of
franchisor management upon their center, sometimes to the
point of ignoring management advice altogether. The lack of
adherence to franchisor advice and management and the
associated conflicts resultant from this professional
autonomy often caused an obstacle which dental franchising
is unlikely to overcome. Thus, the dentist-franchisee did
not, for the most part, ever relinquish his/her traditional
professional independence.
A major problem associated with management in the
franchises may be the lack of implementation of these
franchise systems by the dentist-franchisees. All of the
franchisors, although having a defined franchise system,
were unwilling to force the dentists to utilize it. They
reasoned that their function as non-dentists was to advise
the dentists about the business aspects of the practice, and
allow the dentists to tend to the clinical side of the
practice.
Past research on dentists has indicated that dentist
cooperation might be a problem. Kress and Silversin found
that only a minority (38 percent) of dentists surveyed
actually made or said that they were likely to make changes
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in their offices in response to feedback from these
researchers.(Kress and Silversin 1985) This low figure is
actually probably much lower since it only reflects the
dentists who said that they would make changes and not those
who actually did. The same pattern of non-obeyance found by
Kress and Silversin appears to be found in dental
franchises.
The franchisors did offer suggestions on how to operate
the centers. However, it appears that for a sizable
minority, these suggestions were largely ignored. In the
Smiles organization, almost 25 percent of the dentist-
franchisees did not do most of the things suggested by the
franchise management team. Even simple protocol such as
answering the phone in the advised way with the correct
introduction, franchise name, and tone was not closely
followed. Three of the Smiles dentists never even put up a
sign to show that they were affiliated with the franchise.
As one dentist put it, " A sign like that just wouldn't go
over well in this town." Another dentist doubted that the
prescribed sign would conform to his local ordinances with
respect to size and shape.
With such a high percentage of dentists not following
the simplest suggestions offered by franchisors, some of the
difficulties inherent in franchising dentists start to
become apparent. Since one of the mainstays of the
franchise philosophy is to perpetuate a system, and if fully
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25 percent of its members do not subscribe, success of the
system will not be easy.
The reasons for this lack of action appear not only to
be due to attitudes of the dentists but also due to the
attitudes of hygienists, staff, and patients. Not only the
dentists but other office staff had difficulty accepting the
new franchise system. Of the Smiles dentists, 25 percent
noted difficulty getting their staff to accept the Smiles
way. Three-quarters of the problems were due to hygienists
who did not want to complete the extra paperwork or follow
the prescribed steps in patient care. A small part of the
dissension came from the front desk support staff who also
resented the extra work involved. This conflict was usually
resolved by the unhappy staff member leaving the practice.
The amount of long run discontent, however, did seem to
depend upon the dentist. If the dentist seemed committed to
following the Smiles principles, the staff did as well. For
dentists who were unsure or negative, their feelings may
just have been reflected by the attitudes of the staff.
Timing of Resistance
This type of initial resistance to the franchise system
is not normally encountered in nondental franchises.(Lillis
1976) However, a second type of resistance to franchisor
advice that occurred in the dental franchises is common in
all franchises. This secondary resistance tends to occur
after the franchisee has been in the system for one to two
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years. After this time, the franchisee begins to feel that
he knows the system well, and that he no longer needs the
aid of the franchisor.(Lillis, Narayana and Gilman 1976)
Almost all of the dentist-franchisees interviewed in all of
the franchises expressed this opinion. In Omnidentix, DHS
and Smiles, nearly one-third of the dentists in the
franchise for more than one year felt that they no longer
needed franchisor advice on a regular basis. One-third more
felt that they did not need franchisor advice at all.
As discussed previously, this is a problem in all types
of franchises, and not just dental franchises. As such, it
is one of the most difficult time periods for any franchise.
Unless the franchise can continue to change and improve its
system and service, unhappy franchisees will continue to
leave the program. Previous contracts, agreements or
sevices rendered do not seem to sustain the franchisees'
faith in the company. As one franchisor put it, "the only
thing that seems to be important to the dentists is what
we've done for them today."
The dental franchises surveyed did not appear to make
the appropriate changes before the second wave of discontent
spread and dentists started to leave the franchise. This
failure contributed to the franchise failures.
It appears as if the less the management and the less
control exerted, the more successful the franchise. This
may be due to the dentists' feelings of independence and
dislike of control. Some dentists resent any exercise of
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control by the franchisors. One dentist describes the
franchisor's team as being 'too pushy'. Other dentists felt
that the franchise team wasn't aggressive enough. Another
dentist interviewed felt that the franchise representatives
were 'intimidated by dealing with professionals'. Most of
the existing dental franchises offer their franchise product
and managerial services as a voluntary aid to the
owner/dentist. Dental franchises do not mandate compliance
as closely as other types of franchises do.
In exercising control over the dentist-franchisee, the
franchisor must walk a tight line. The franchisor must
exercise enough control over the dentists to establish a
certain degree of uniformity in procedures and quality, and
yet not enough to harm the franchisee-franchisor
relationship.
Franchisor Control
Franchisor control can be divided into three distinct
segments. The first type of control deals with external
control of the franchise and includes control of the
development phase of the franchise. This would include the
location, building and setup of the franchise center. The
second type of control deals primarily with the management
operations of the center. The third type of control is over
the dental operations of a dental franchise.
Each of the different franchises appear to have
approached the issue of control differently. DHS spent most
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of its time and effort only during the initial stages of a
center's development. DHS management dealt primarily with
location, construction, and setup of the centers. Their CEO
does not believe in exerting any control over the internal
workings of the centers unless requested to.
Smiles appears to have exerted less control in the
initial stages of the centers and more in the dental
procedures of the practices. Since the centers already
existed when they converted to Smiles centers, the franchise
obviously had little influence over their location or setup.
Nonetheless, the dentists joined Smiles to participate and
to incorporate a philosophy of periodontics into the
practice. It is surprising that so many of the dentists
involved in it did so little to work within the system.
Omnidentix appears to have exercised most of its
control in the first and second spheres of control rather
than in the dental operations. Most of the dentists
interviewed did not want the franchisors involved except in
a superficial way in the workings of the franchise centers.
Franchisor Management Mistakes
When one examines the management tools employed by
Omnidentix and Smiles, the two franchises active in the
ongoing management of their centers, they appear to be very
similar to those used in nondental franchises. Only the
labels appear to have been changed to incorporate dental
terminology.
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The implementation of management systems designed for
nondental franchises appears to have caused problems within
these franchises. Most of these systems were thoughtful and
effective. However, a memorable minority proved to be
ineffective when applied to dental practices and were the
source of much dissatisfaction among its dentist-
franchiseees. Some specific examples from each of the
franchises will illustrate this management problem.
OMNIDENTIX SYSTEMS INC.
An examination of Omnidentix's control sheets reveal a
well thought-out program of management for costs,
productivity, and income. Unfortunately, by not realizing
the difference between dental franchises and other non-
dental franchises, some mistakes were made. According to
one franchisee, the vice-president who developed these
systems 'treated patient flow like fast food and seemingly
lost perspective.' This vice-president even created a
system to exactly calculate dentist production to the
second.
As another example, Omnidentix initially tried to
implement a time schedule for every contracting dentist that
was service dependent. Under this system, a prophylaxis
would require 30 minutes. Although in theory, this appears
to be an efficient way to organize a management system for
dentists, in practice, it did not work. With this system,
dentists were so pressured to get the patients in and out
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that there was no time for conversation, and the dentists,
staff and patients were unhappy.
From a management perspective, it also failed.
Although initially, the system proved to be very productive,
in the long run, multiple remakes lowered profits.
Omnidentix tried this system for about one year before
giving up on it. By the time it was abandoned, however,
franchisee and dentist support had ebbed. New dental
franchises are allowed few mistakes before losing franchisee
support.
Another example of a management control system which
failed was the short-lived policy of having the patient
treated by the first available dentist. This policy has the
advantage of decreasing patient waiting time, and increasing
the objectivity of the encounter. This may also improve the
quality of the care delivered since the dentist will have
colleagues evaluating the quality of work rendered. It
might also encourage fee uniformity since with less
knowledge of the patient, the dentist is less likely to
price discriminate. Despite all of these advantages, this
policy failed. Both dentists and patients, it seems, want a
longterm relationship and feel that better treatment is
realized as a result.
SMILES OF NEW ENGLAND INC.
Smiles also made many of the same types of mistakes
that Omnidentix management made. The Smiles hygiene manual
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is an impressive step-by-step manual for practicing dental
hygiene. Included in the hygiene system, however, are some
impractical methods. For example, Smiles required their
franchisees to buy a costly microscope that would allow
their patients to see periodontal bacteria, and thereby
increase their motivation. Not only did most of the
dentist-franchisees ignore this advice but the advice was
erroneous. A recent article in JADA reported that
microscopes were ineffective as a patient motivational aid.
Smiles also instructed its dentists to culture
periodontal bacteria, in order to effectively treat
periodontal disease. Such a technique may optimally treat
periodontal disease. However, this method is impractical,
and was rarely if ever performed by the dentists.
In both the Smiles and Omnidentix franchises, it
appears as if the monitoring forms were rarely filled out by
the dentists. When they were, most of the dentists were
unhappy with the feedback received. In Omnidentix, two-
thirds of the dentists felt that the feedback was poor, and
rarely helpful. In Smiles 55 percent of the franchisees
felt this way. This number increased as time went on and
the franchises began to worry about their very existence.
Another contributing factor to the poor management may
have been lack of time to improve the management system.
Both Omnidentix and Smiles appeared to have been in the
process of amending their management system when their
financial position soured, and the efforts were abandoned.
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The hygiene coordinator at Smiles describes how she had
almost completed perfecting her system when the company
began failing and upper level support diminished. Her final
system was never implemented.
It is important to note, however, that franchise
systems need to be refined in the early stages of
franchising, specifically, in the model franchise.
Obviously, all problems cannot be anticipated, but, at least
theoretically, the system should be functioning well before
it is franchised. DHS averted this whole potential problem
by simply not involving itself in center management services
at all.
Conflict Between Franchisee and Franchisor
Previously, when discussing conflict, it was
hypothesized that in any franchise organization, the amount
of conflict is inversely proportional to the success of the
organization over the long run. That is, the more conflict,
the less likely it is that the organization will survive.
The same relationship between conflict and success was
hypothesized to exist in dental franchises. The control of
conflict in an organization was hypothesized to be a
critical key to success. Although several different kinds
of conflict were initially hypothesized to exist, conflict
within the dental center between management and dentists and
conflict between the franchisor and franchisee, only the
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latter conflict and franchisors causes a significant
problem.
This section will first describe the amount of conflict
that exists in the dental franchises, and then discuss the
reasons for this conflict. Finally, the reasons why some
organizations have more or less conflict will be explored as
it relates to communication, organizational structure, and
amount and type of franchise intrusion.
Amount of Conflict
The levels of conflict, not surprisingly, were high at
the unsuccessful dental franchises yet they were also high
at the successful dental franchise. Importantly, the
conflict levels increased with time. (See Table 7-2)
TABLE 7-2
CONFLICT LEVELS BY YEAR BY FRANCHISE
Year
Year
Year
SMILES OF NEW ENGLAND INC.
----------------------------------------------
None/Low Medium High
One 21 (72%) 4 (4%) 4 (4%)
Two 19 (40%) 7 (28%) 8 (32%
Three + 7 (37%) 1 (5%) 11 (58
)
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OMNIDENTIX SYSTEMS INC.
None/Low Medium High
Year One 3 (100%) -
Year Two 2 (67%) 1 (33%) -
Year Three + - - 2 (100%)
DENTAL HEALTH SERVICES INC.
None/Low Medium High
Year One 9 (77%) 3 (23%) -
Year Two 5 (45%) 5 (45%) 1 (10%)
Year Three + 4 (35%) 5 (45%) 2 (20%)
OMNIDENTIX SYSTEMS INC.
During the first year of Omnidentix operation, there
was little conflict between the dentist-franchisees and the
franchisor. In year two, conflict started to appear,
although Omnidentix franchisees still rated it as low. By
year three, the conflict was rated as high by the
franchisees.
The reasons behind this conflict are due primarily to
advertising, management, and in one instance, the proximity
of another franchise to an already existing franchise.(See
Table 7-3) In general, two-thirds of the Omnidentix
franchisees feel that they had little control over the
franchise.
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Table 7-3
Reasons_foraco/r__se--
Reasons for Franchisor/Franchisee Conflict By Franchise
REASON
Smiles
Advertising/Marketing
Not Getting Money's Worth/
Program Not Working
Ongoing Provision of Services/
Management
Control/Lease Control/
Orthodontists
Location/
Proximity of Other Centers
Dental Procedures/Quality Control
Problem Solving/Leadership
Franchisee Dissension
NONE/MINIMAL
43
DHS
67
FRANCHISES
(percentages)
Omnidentix TOTAL
82 55
33 18 33 30
30 9 33
3 27
3 9
3 9
7 0
7 0
17 18
25
0 9
33
0
0
0
0
7
5
5
5
16
SMILES OF NEW ENGLAND INC.
During the first year of franchising, 65 percent of the
dentists report low conflict with their franchisor.(see
Table 7-2) However, even at this early period, almost one-
quarter report medium amounts of conflict, while an
additional 16 percent report high levels of conflict. By
year two, only 33 percent report low amounts of conflict; 23
percent have medium levels of conflict and 26 percent report
high levels of conflict. In year three, the conflict
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increases even more. Twenty-six percent of the franchisees
report low levels of conflict, six percent had medium and
almost one-third of the dentists report high levels of
conflict with their franchisor. These results are probably
low since other dentist-franchisees unhappy with the
franchise had already dropped out.
The major reasons for conflict among the franchisees
(see Table 7-3) were advertising (39 percent), the program
did not work or did not deliver what was promised (29
percent) and poor management (23 percent). Other less
commonly cited reasons were the cost (6 percent), dissension
among the group (6 percent), proximity of another location
(3 percent), and none (6 percent). Only one dentist
complained of clinical conflicts.
DENTAL HEALTH SERVICES INC.
The successful franchise, DHS has somewhat lower levels
of conflict than do the other two franchises studied.(See
Table 7-2) In year one, 82 percent of the franchisees rate
their conflict as low with the other 18 percent rating it as
moderate. In year two, 55 percent rate it as low and an
additional 45 percent rate it as medium. By year three,
only 27 percent of the dentists rate the conflict levels as
low, while 55 percent rate it moderate and 18 percent rate
it as high.
The largest source of conflict among DHS is advertising
(73 percent). A distant second is control over the
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orthodontic specialists (18 percent). (See Table 7-3) Other
areas, cited by only one dentist, are; the program not
working, lack of busyness, location, and clinical dentistry.
Two of the DHS dentist-franchisees report no conflicts at
all with franchise management.
Resolution of Conflict
At Omnidentix, when conflict was present, it was
usually resolved by verbal discussion and resolution of the
problem. This was satisfactory at the beginning for the
franchisees. With time, as the franchise grew larger, this
type of resolution became less and less satisfactory.
At Smiles, the dentists are evenly divided among those
who feel that conflicts are resolved by discussion and open
meetings with the franchisor or their district manager, and
those who feel that conflicts are never resolved. These
dentists feel that their franchisor utilized persuasion or
promises to pacify them, but despite their dissatisfaction,
franchisor policy did not change.
When conflict arises in DHS, it is usually resolved
through discussion and meetings. Only one dentist reports
that conflict is usually not resolved at all. Conflict is
also resolved in more drastic methods by many of the
franchisees, namely by terminating their franchise agreement
early, or by initiating a lawsuit against the franchisor.
Although none of the DHS franchisees have as yet
terminated their contract, almost 50 percent of the dentists
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have considered or have taken legal action against the
franchise. These legal actions have been due to unresolved
conflicts dealing with franchise advertising and lease
renewals.
In Smiles, 30 percent of the franchisees ended their
franchise affiliation early. Of these, half bought out
their contract with Smiles and the other half simply stopped
paying their franchise payments. Thirteen percent of these
unsatisfied dentists had taken or had considered bringing
suit against Smiles for nonfulfillment of their franchise
agreement. In Omnidentix, although none of the franchisees
terminated their agreement early, one did consider taking
legal action against the franchisor.
Minimizing Conflict Through Communication
According to franchising experts, communication is the
key to minimizing conflict in any organization.(Haimann et
al 1978, Butaney 1989) In general, although communication
does not seem to be emphasized in the dental franchises, the
franchisees do not seem to desire closer contact.
OMNIDENTIX SYSTEMS INC.
At Omnidentix, during its first two years, two out of
the three franchisees rate their communication as excellent
and only one rates it as fair. The two dentists, who
believe it to be excellent, report that they communicate
with their franchisor twice a week, either on the telephone
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or via site visits. One dentist thought this to be the
right amount, and one dentist wanted it to be more often.
The third dentist has site visits once per week, and
communicates with the franchisor only once per week.
Although he rates this communication as only fair, he does
not want to communicate more frequently with the franchisor.
DENTAL HEALTH SERVICES INC.
The majority of DHS franchisees rate communication
between themselves and their franchisor as either excellent
or very good (64 percent). Another 27 percent rate it as
fair, and only one dentist rates it as poor. Communication
consists mainly of office visits and telephone conversations
which occur one to two times per month, for 80 percent of
the franchisees. The remaining franchisees communicate with
the franchisor rarely (one or two times per year). Despite
this infrequent communication, only two of the DHS dentists
desire it to occur more often.
Although all but one of the DHS franchisees believe
that the lines of communication are open, possibly, a
problem arises because more than half of the dentists feel
that they do not speak the same language as their
franchisor. The franchisees are concerned about the quality
of their dentistry, their professionalism, and the success
of their own dental centers. The franchisor is perceived as
caring too much about the business side of the franchise
including money and expansion. The existence of such a
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communication gap might explain the unenthusisastic desire
for greater communication levels with the franchisor.
SMILES OF NEW ENGLAND INC.
In Smiles, the communication appears to be low. Sixty-
one percent of the Smiles franchisees rate their
communication with their franchisor as excellent or good.
Almost 40 percent rate it as fair or poor. Communication
for the vast majority of franchisees includes site visits or
verbal communication, once or twice per month. Only two
Smiles franchisees rarely communicate with their franchisor.
In contrast with the DHS franchisees, most of the
Smiles franchisees desire greater contact with their
franchisor. Sixty-five percent of the Smiles dentists
desire more site visits and more verbal communication
between themselves and their franchisor. Twenty-six percent
want the same amount and only ten percent desire less
contact.
By far the majority of Smiles dentists believe that
communication channels are open (61 percent). While a small
minority believe them to be closed (7 percent). When asked
if they feel they speak the same language as their
franchisor, nearly 50 percent feel that they do while nearly
35 percent feel that they do not. This trend is similar to
those of the other franchises studied.
It appears as if communication in the dental franchises
is mediocre by industry standards.(Merchant 1985 p60) The
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franchisors conduct site visits or communicate by telephone
to the franchisees usually only once per month and sometimes
even less often. This appears to have been sufficient
communication for the successful DHS franchisees. For DHS
and especially for Smiles, however, the majority of
franchisees desire greater contact with their franchisor.
Most Smiles dentists feel that lines of communication
between themselves and the franchisor are open.
SUMMARY
In summary then, it appears as if the management of the
failed franchises, by applying management approaches from
non-dental franchising to dental franchises, and some
plainly erroneous management systems to their dental
franchises, may have compromised the effectiveness of their
management approach. The one surviving franchise may remain
viable simply by distancing itself from the clinical
management of its franchise centers. Although absence of
management contributes to franchisee satisfaction, this same
lack of management may also be contributing to the recent
poor financial performance of DHS. Therefore, in order to
manage health care professionals, rather than ignore the
issues like DHS, management must alter traditional
management styles and strategies, and incorporate a unique
management strategy to deal with this special group of
clinicians.
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Conflict plays a large role in the success of the
franchises. Conflict levels are quite high in all three of
the franchises, although it was less in the successful
franchise. As hypothesized, the conflict grew larger as
time went on, but the amount of conflict was much greater
and occurred much sooner than in nonprofessional franchises.
Even in DHS where there was less conflict overall, the
trends paralleled those of the other franchises.
The areas of conflict also are the same in all three
franchises. The greatest area of conflict is poor
advertising, poor management and complaints that the program
did not work. In contrast to nondental franchises, the
dentist-franchisees are, in general, more prone to early
termination of their franchise affiliation by either
breaking their contract or bringing a lawsuit against their
franchisor if dissatisfied.
In order to be successful franchising dental practices,
it is necessary not only for the franchisor to keep the
lines of communication open by visiting and communicating
regularly, but also to ensure that they are speaking the
same language as their franchisees. By concentrating too
much on the short-term business side of the franchise, the
franchisor may alienate its franchisees.
Dental franchising does appear to have a continuing
niche in the dental care market, but maybe less of one than
previously thought. Franchising seems to better serve an
introductory role in a dental practice, rather than a
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continuing one. Dental franchises are successful in their
choice of a new dental center's location, marketing program,
and setup, enabling the center to attain profitability much
quicker than a private practice. Dental franchising
encounters difficulties when it goes beyond these startup
functions. Franchise management of ongoing dental center
operations or its continuing role in any clinical area of
the dental centers seems to generate discontent among the
dentist-franchisees and is seen as interference on the part
of the franchisor.
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CHAPTER 8
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Methods
Statistical examination of data collected from the
survey of dental franchises also confirms the relationship
between franchise success or failure and performance in the
areas of management, communication, marketing and finance.
The success of a dental franchise is modeled mathematically
using logistic regression. This technique assumes a
relationship between quality of service provided by a
franchise and franchise success. Alternative models were
examined to determine which produced a suitable fit to the
data.
The logistic model states that the probability of
franchise success depends on a set of variables xl,x 2 ...x p
such that:
Px = 1/(1 + e (-B + B 1X 1 +... + BpXp))
The variables xl,...xp represent potential factors
influencing the dependent variable. The B's are parameters
representing the effects of the x's on the probability of
success, adjusting for the presence of other variables in
the model.
The logistic betas are interpreted in terms of odds and
odds ratios. The relative odds of success for a franchise
with variable value x* = (x*1 ,x*2 ... ,x*p) as compared with a
franchise with the value x = (xl,x2... ,xp) is given by the
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odds ratio = e( Bi (x*i - xi) ). Parameters (B's) are
estimated from the data using maximum likelihood estimation.
Standard errors, confidence intervals and significance tests
are also calculated for model coefficients.
Results
Out of 213 variables, ranging from advertising to
training manuals to management systems initially analyzed,
seven were found to be significant with respect to franchise
success. These seven variables include overall franchisor
management performance, the franchise manual, location of
the center and age of dentist-franchisee. The other three
significant variables; level of autonomy, conflict and
characteristics of the franchisee-dentist were determined as
a combination of several related variables.
Statistical calculations (See Table 8-1) illustrate
that for management performance, beta coefficients were 3.8
and 2.2 at level one (low) and level two (high)
respectively. The corresponding odds ratios were 44.6 and
8.9. When the management variable is broken down into
specific types of management for example, management of
staff or costs, none of these subvariables prove to be
significant.
The other statistically significant variable is
characteristics of the individual dentist. This variable is
a combination of dentist characteristics including dental
and management experience, risk-taking, financial security
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and desire for autonomy. Analysis indicates that the beta
coefficient for this variable is 9.6 and the odds ratio is
2.5. Thus, franchises whose franchisees possess financial
security, dental and management knowledge and a high desire
for autonomy are two times more likely to succeed than not.
TABLE 8-1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic
Parameters Relating Seven Factors to Franchise Success
Variable Parameter Beta Pr > Odds Ratio
Chi-Square
x o intercept Bo -9.2857 .1890
x1 management
(low) B 1 3.7971 .1160 44.572
X2 managment
(high) B 2 2.1837 .3153 8.879
X3 manual
(low) B 3 -0.0492 .9806 0.952
X4 manual
(high) B4 2.16 .2942 8.671
X 5 location
(low) B5 -1.2554 .5257 0.285
X 6 location
(high) B 6 -0.3805 .8780 0.684
x7 individual DMD B 7 9.559 .1088 2.452
x8 autonomy B 8 -0.0962 .6185 0.908
xg conflict B9 -0.0510 .8459 0.950
x1 0 age B 1 0 -0.0765 .5091 0.926
Using the estimates of the logistic parameters in Table 8-1,
a model of franchise success is given by:
Px = 1 / 1 + e (- (-9.29 + 3.79 (X1) + 2.18 (X2 ) - 0.05
(X3) + 2.16 (X4 ) - 1.26 (X5) - 0.38 (X6) + 9.56 (X7) - 0.09
(X8) - 0.05 (Xg) - 0.08 (X1 0 )))
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The model's goodness of fit is assessed using
sensitivity analysis comparing the actual values of
variables with their predicted values. Table 8-2 indicates
that the sensitivity of the model (% correctly classified)
is approximately 85 percent. Another test for model fit,
the -2 log L row equals 14.78, indicating that the combined
effects of the independent variables are significant with
p=.14. The sample size is small so that the high p values
in Table 8-1 should not be taken to be accurate.
Table 8-2
Classification Table
Predicted
EVENT NO EVENT Total
EVENT 1 15 3 1 18
1 1
Observed 1 1
1 1
NO EVENT 1 6 2 1 8
TOTAL 21 5 26
Sensitivity = 83.3% Specificity = 25.0%
Correct = 65.4% False Positive Rate = 28.6%
False Negative Rate = 60.0%
Discussion
These statistical results show that professional
autonomy is a critical factor in franchise success.
Although management style plays an important role, the
ultimate success of an individual dental center depends upon
the individual dentist.
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The high odds ratio for the management variable is
explained by discussing the two outcomes present in the
analysis. In the first case, the franchise provides quality
management but fails. This scenario may be explained by an
overly structured franchise management system. This
strategy stresses technical management systems rather than
emphasizing more critical areas as dentist performance.
Such a system may result in inefficiencies due for example,
to excess paperwork or overreliance on computer applications
that individual dentists may not understand or use
effectively.
In the second case, the franchise management is
perceived to be inadequate but the franchise is successful.
Greater control of daily operations may provide greater
incentives for the professional to make the practice a
success. Most dental centers succeed despite the
effectiveness of management.
The variable reflecting characteristics of the dentist-
franchisee also plays an important role in predicting
franchise success. Management experience of the individual
dentist and not the franchisor, contributes to greater
success of the franchise. Greater risk-taking ability,
financial security and desire for autonomy by the dentist
correlate with success. More successful dentists are more
entrepreneurial and prefer to do things themselves. Greater
professional autonomy granted to dentists in DHS Inc.
contributes to lower conflict levels and greater success for
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the franchise. When autonomy is analyzed as a separate
variable, however, it proves to be roughly a linear variable
and not a significantly predictive variable for success.
The analysis on hand further indicates that lower conflict
levels correlate with greater franchise success, although
less significantly than previous results.
The statistical analysis predicts franchise success
moderately well. The model provides a suitable framework
for predicting success of a new franchise. This model also
serves as a basis for study of franchising in other
professions. Additional data collection will further refine
the model and improve its predictive value.
Summary
Structured management systems are not the critical
factors hypothesized in dental franchise success. The
provision of high quality service on a personal basis is
more important than management. Efficient management will
contribute to greater profits but will not impact the
typical center success. Professionals lack motivation to
relinquish control to outside management under these
conditions. Therefore, professional dominance and not
structural management plays the critical role in the success
of dental franchise organizations.
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CHAPTER 9
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
In order to explain the poor performance of the dental
franchise industry, a necessary final step is to analyze the
financial condition of the three dental franchises;
Omnidentix Systems Inc., Smiles Of New England Inc. and
Dental Health Services. Such a financial analysis must
analyze two critical factors;(Platt 1985)
1) Industry conditions and
2) Financial condition of the individual companies
The overall dental care market will be examined in the
first part of this chapter to determine the health of the
overall dental care market during the time when dental
franchises were failing. The second part of this chapter
will analyze the financial condition of the three dental
franchises utilizing financial statements and accounting
ratios.
Examination of the overall dental industry reveals that
while dental franchises were failing, the nonfranchised
dental market was thriving, thereby eliminating a sluggish
dental economy as a factor in dental franchise failure.
Analysis of Smile's and Omnidentix's financial statements
disclose the precarious financial positions of both
franchises from the outset. Financial documents also
indicate that even the performance of the surviving
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franchise, DHS, is questionable and foreshadows future
problems in this dental franchise as well.
I SUCCESS OF THE OVERALL DENTAL CARE MARKET
In order to evaluate the success or failure of dental
franchises, the health of the overall dental care market
during the relevant time period of dental franchise
operation and failure must be considered. It is important
to distinguish the extent to which changes in the overall
dental care market influenced or failed to influence success
or failure of the dental franchises. The economic record of
the nonfranchised dental care market during 1980-1984, the
time period when most dental franchises failed, will be
determined by an analysis of net income figures for private
dentists as well as through a comparison of the overall
expenditures for dentistry, medicine and the US economy as a
whole.
Dentist Income
One method of identifying the relative success of the
non-franchised dental care market is to examine gross income
figures for private dentists. Several studies examining
general dentist gross income have concluded that, with the
exception of a few years (such as 1978-81), dentists' gross
incomes between 1965 and 1985 have fared favorably when
compared to physician income and that of the population as a
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whole.(Gotowka 1985, Beazoglou 1989) The average gross
income of dentists increased from $29,200 to $212,700
between 1965 and 1985, a growth of 7.28 times during this
period.(Beazoglou 1989)
Another indicator of the general success of non-
franchised dentists is net income. Net income is defined as
the difference between the gross receipts of the dental
practice and the expenses of operating the practice before
the payment of income taxes.
Dentists' net incomes have risen steadily over the past
ten years. (See Table 9-1)
TABLE 9-1
Regional Mean Net Incomes of All Dentists, 1981-1987
(in $000s)
Region 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
New England $49.5 57.3 55.2 62.0 57.8 76.7 80.1
Mid Atlantic 51.3 58.5 57.6 62.5 62.2 80.8 72.0
East N. Central 57.8 61.6 59.6 62.1 67.6 72.5 71.2
West N. Central 51.9 53.8 50.0 60.2 57.0 67.5 62.5
South Atlantic 56.9 61.3 59.0 67.0 71.6 81.2 88.0
East S. Central 54.2 55.2 60.3 63.5 64.4 78.7 80.4
West S. Central 57.6 75.4 65.8 64.9 73.9 73.1 82.8
Mountain 53.5 50.7 61.1 63.3 62.8 76.7 80.0
Pacific 57.4 67.1 65.8 65.5 72.1 76.1 85.4
OVERALL 56.4 61.2 62.7 66.9 72.1 76.1 84.2
USA 18.9 19.0 19.3 19.7 25.3 26.4 27.4
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Sources:ADA Bureau of Economic and Behavioral Research,
Surveys of Dental Practice, 1982-1988.
US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
US:1990 (110th ed.) Washington DC,1990.
On average, general dentists' net incomes have risen
from $56,400 in 1981 to $84,200 in 1987, an almost 50
percent increase as contrasted to only a 44 percent increase
for the US population. During the critical period of 1981-
1984 when most dental franchises were failing, the rise was
especially great. The mean net incomes from general
dentists rose 18.7 percent versus only an increase of 4.2
percent in the mean net income of the general public.(See
Table 9-2) Thus, both dentist gross and net income figures
indicate a strong dental care market.
TABLE 9-2
Regional Percentage Increases in Mean Net Incomes of All
Dentists, 1981-1987
% Increase Between
Region 1981-1984 1984-7 Overall
New England 25.3% 29.2% 61.8%
Mid Atlantic 21.8% 15.2% 40.4%
East N. Central 7.4% 14.7% 23.1%
West N. Central 16.0% 3.8% 20.4%
South Atlantic 17.8% 31.3% 54.7%
East S. Central 17.2% 26.6% 48.3%
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West S. Central 12.7% 27.6% 43.8%
Mountain 18.3% 26.4% 49.5%
Pacific 14.1% 30.4% 48.8%
Overall 18.7% 25.9% 49.3%
USA 4.2% 39.1% 45.0%
Source: ADA Bureau of Economic and Behavioral Research,
Surveys of Dental Practice, 1982-1988.
When determining the health of the non-franchised
dental market, it is also important to consider regional
variation as an explanation of franchise failure. It is
possible that dental franchises failed because of poor
economic conditions in their areas. As a result, the
corresponding income figures for the New England region,
where both Omnidentix and Smiles were located, must be
analyzed individually.
Tables 9-1 and 9-2 provide the regional growth rates in
mean net incomes of private dentists. During the time
period when Omnidentix and Smiles were failing, other New
England dentists were prospering. The New England dentists
experienced greater than a 25 percent increase during 1981-
1984, the largest increase of any region in the country.
The New England region also saw a 62 percent increase in
mean dentist income from 1981-87. The South Atlantic
region, where DHS is located, experienced the second largest
increase in net income (54.7 percent). The same regional
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trends are seen when mean gross incomes are
examined.(Beazoglou 1989)
Growth of Non-Franchised Dental Care
The same positive trends evident in personal income
figures for non-franchised general dentists are seen in the
overall economic record of dentistry when contrasted with
the medical profession and the general economy. Table 9-3
compares the growth rate of the GNP for the entire US
economy with the growth rates of dental and medical
expenditures.
TABLE 9-3
Total Dental and Medical Expenditures and Gross
National Product in the US (nominal dollars) 1980-7
____________________________________________________________
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
ADE
($B)
$ 15.4
17.3
19.5
21.8
25.1
27.1
29.6
32.8
MCE
($B)
248.1
287.0
323.6
357.2
388.5
419.0
455.7
500.3
GNP
($B)
2732.0
3052.6
3166.0
3405.7
3772.2
4010.3
4486.2
4880.6
ADE=Aggregate Dental Expenditures
MCE=Aggregate Medical Expenditures
GNP=Gross National Product
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Sources: ADA Bureau of Economic and Behavioral Research,
Surveys of Dental Practice, 1982-1988.
US Dept of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, 1982-1988.
US Health Care Financing Administration, Health
Care Financing Review, Winter 1988.
During the period of 1980-1984, the aggregate dental
expenditures (ADE) increased from $15.4 billion to $25.1
billion, a 63 percent increase. In contrast to the dental
care market, both medical care expenditures (MCE) and the US
economy (GNP) grew more slowly at 57 percent and 38 percent
respectively.
When these figures are adjusted by the appropriate
price indices (See Table 9-4) to arrive at real growth
figures, the same trend is evident.
TABLE 9-4
Indexes of Medical/Dental Care Prices 1980-1988
(1982-4=100.0)
Year DFI MCPI CPI
1980 78.9 74.9 1.136
1981 86.5 83.7 1.041
1982 93.1 92.3 1.000
1983 99.4 100.2 .984
1984 107.5 107.5 .964
1985 114.2 115.2 .955
1986 120.6 122.8 .969
1987 128.8 131.0 .949
1988 137.5 139.9 .926
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DFI=Dental Fee Index
CPI=Consumer Price Index
MCPI=Medical Care Price Index
Sources: US Dept of Commerce, Survey of Business, 1981-1988.
US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the US:1990 (110th edition) Washington, DC, 1990.
Economic Report to the President, 1981-88.
Tables 9-5 and 9-6 reveal that real dental expenditures grew
from $19.5 billion in 1980 to $23.3 billion in 1984, an
almost 20 percent increase.
TABLE 9-5
Real GNP and Real Dental and Medical Expenditures in the
United States, 1981-1987 (1982 dollars)
Real ADE
(SB)
19.5
20.0
20.9
21.9
23.3
23.7
24.5
23.9
Real MCE
($B)
331.2
342.9
350.6
356.5
361.4
363.7
371.1
381.9
Real GNP
(SB)
3103.6
3177.1
3166.0
3351.2
3636.4
3829.6
4347.1
4518.9
ADE=Aggregate Dental Expenditures
MCE=Medical Care Expenditures
GNP=Gross National Product
Source: US Bureau of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
US:1990 (110th ed) Washington DC, 1990.
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Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
____ _·__
TABLE 9-6
Real Growth of Dental and Medical Expenditures and
Real GNP, 1980-1987 (1982-4=100.0)
Percentage Increase
Year ADE MCE GNP
1981 2.5% 3.5% 2.4%
1982 4.5% 2.2% -0.3%
1983 4.8% 1.7% 5.8%
1984 6.4% 1.4% 8.5%
1985 1.7% 0.4% 5.3%
1986 3.4% 2.0% 13.5%
1987 -2.4% 2.9% 4.0%
Overall 22.6% 15.3% 45.6%
1980-1984 19.5% 17.2% 9.1%
ADE=Aggregate Dental Expenditures
MCE=Medical Care Expenditures
GNP=Gross National Product
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
US:1990 (110th ed) Washington DC, 1990.
During the same time period, real medical care expenditures
expanded from $331.2 billion to $361.4, an increase of 17.2
percent. Real gross national product grew even more slowly
from $3103 to $3636 billion, an increase of only 9.1
percent, far less than the 20 percent growth rate in the
private dental care market.
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Summary
These data indicate that during the same time period
that most dental franchises were failing, the private dental
care market was successful. Private general dentists
experienced greater increases in personal gross and net
income than did the population as a whole. Real
expenditures on dentistry also increased at a greater rate
than that for medicine and more than double the rate of the
overall US economy.
These factors arguing towards a healthy dental industry
during most of the 1980s are reinforced by studies of
industry specific financial success records. Dental offices
were the third highest ranking category of start-up
businesses most likely to succeed, according to an Inc.
survey of 1.5 million companies as reported in the January
1988 issue.(Birch 1988) The study covered new business
ventures started between 1978 and 1987 in 236 categories.
Thus, the high failure rate of dental franchises during the
1980's does not extend to non-franchised dental offices.
Failures of dental franchises thus cannot be explained by
poor performance of the overall dental care market, but
rather by poor performances of the individual dental
franchises.
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II FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THREE DENTAL FRANCHISES
Overview
This section will analyze the finances of the three
dental franchises; Omnidentix Systems Inc., Smiles of New
England Inc. and Dental Health Services Inc. to determine
why failure or success occurred. A firm's success or poor
performance leading to bankruptcy can be predicted by
analysis of the financial statements using financial ratios.
From a financial standpoint, bankruptcy usually results
from any of the following:
1) Cash flow cycles - The relationship between
when revenues are collected and when expenses are paid.
2) Operating leverage - A firm's fixed cost (eg.
rent) with respect to profits earned from sales.
3) Financial leverage - The impact of net income
upon the firm's choice of financing debt. (Debt vs Equity)
4) The borrowing of money in the short-run or
long-run. (Casey and Bartczak 1984)
Key indicators of financial viability such as debt to
equity ratios, cash flow and liquidity ratios are discussed
to better assess the profitability of these dental
franchises. Table 9-7 displays the financial ratios of the
three dental franchises. Although industry averages are not
available for comparison, trend analysis as well as general
estimates can be used to indicate financial condition and
possibility of failure. An appendix defining financial
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terms is also included for the reader's convenience.(see
Appendix D)
TABLE 9-7
FINANCIAL RATIOS FOR DENTAL FRANCHISES
____________________________________________________________
Omnidentix Inc.
1981 1982 1983 1984
____________________________
Smiles Inc.
1983 1984
____________
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Profit/Sales
Cash Flow/Debt
Cash Flow
Price Earnings
Ratio
Earnings Per
Share
Share Price
Return on
Assets
Return on
Equity
Market/Book
Book Value/
Share
Debt Ratio
Times Interest
Earned
Z-ratio
0.30
0.23
-0.36
-2.54
-42709
-65.63
9.
9.
-1.
-369
-28
42 0.78
14 0.50
23 -1.33
- -2.01
253 -13146
.13 -21.15
0.32
0.22
-2.18
-1.52
64 -3992735
-1.43
-0.02 -0.08 -0.26 -0.70
1.31
0.45
2.25
0.26
5.5
0.85
1.0
0.55
-1.65 -7.04 -25.88 -69.59
1.85
0.01
0.90
1.19
11.00
0.20
-100.96
-0.05
0.09 0.44
- 45.71
0.52 0.92 0.90
-3.78
-0.26
0.84
24.45
0.49
86.63
86.63
2.27
2.17
-38.22
-459277
-6.94
-0.36
2.25 2.50
-0.93
-30.04
12.80
0.20
0.40
27.76 0.08
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TABLE 9-7 (continued)
FINANCIAL RATIOS FOR DENTAL FRANCHISES
____________________________________________________________
Current Ratio
Quick Ratio
Profit/Sales
Cash Flow/Debt
Cash Flow
Price Earnings
Ratio
Earnings Per
Share
Share Price
Return on
Assets
Return on
Equity
Market/Book
Book Value/
Share
Debt Ratio
Times Interest
Earned
Z-Ratio
Dental Health Services Inc.
1985 1986 1987 1988
5.52 4.48 1.88 1.48
4.81 4.14 1.83 1.46
8.33% 19.19% 9.23% -9.41%
0.41 1.15 0.29 -0.22
258919 698497 225377 -147655
4.0 2.0 6.0 -6.0
7.21
32.0
10.90%
22.42%
Private
32.0
28.0
59.70
26.77%
46.65%
Equity not
59.70
0.51
0.68
0.37
7.54
9.0
55.91
8.52%
-8.0
48.26
-7.61%
16.37% -15.84%
traded
55.91
0.37
2.91
48.26
0.40
-2.66
2.90 8 R1 1 1 Ao
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FINANCIAL RATIOS
A. CASH FLOW
Cash flow (CF) is the primary financial predictor of
bankruptcy or success. (Argenti 1976) Cash flow refers to
the time elapsing between manufacture of a good or service
and when cash is received for its sale. The timing of cash
flow is critical in any company's success. Suppliers may
serve as a source of funds by lengthening their payment
period. More importantly, managerial actions may influence
this time factor by extending credit, trade discounts or
changing the nature of the production process. If more
lenient credit is allowed, this will increase the time
factor and increase sales but also increase bad debt. If
more trade discounts are taken (i.e. bills are paid faster)
this will also increase the time factor and increase profits
as long as the trade discount is worth more than the cost of
finance.
Cash flow (CF) figures for Omnidentix show that the
funds provided by operations are not only negative but are
tripling each year. It is extremely unlikely that such a
firm will soon become profitable.
Omnidentix 1981 1982 1983 1984
Cash Flow = ($57,650) (368,440) (1,314,000) (3,946,000)
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A second indicator of future failure or success is
operating cash flow (OCF). (Argenti 1976) Operating cash
flow for Omnidentix reveals the same negative cash flow
figures.
Omnidentix 1981 1982 1983 1984
OCF = $41,980 (171,275) (1,152,936) (3,935,886)
Although Operating Cash Flow is slightly less negative than
Cash Flow figures, the Operating Cash Flow for Omnidentix
still shows a significantly negative cash flow that has been
steadily increasing.
The Cash Flow for Smiles Inc. was also a significant
negative number ($459,277) for 1984 indicating a poor cash
flow position.
The Cash Flow for DHS also indicates a negative trend.
DHS 1985 1986 1987 1988
Cash Flow= $258,919 698,497 225,377 (147,655)
Cash Flow for DHS is within acceptable limits for the years
1985 and 1986. In 1987, however, the Cash Flow begins to
fall and by 1988 it is negative. This worsening of Cash
Flow reflects a decreasing net income and might foreshadow
troubles ahead for the franchise.
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B. LIQUIDITY
Liquidity ratios indicate a company's ability to pay
its current debts and so are useful in the prediction of
company success. The current ratio (CR) of Omnidentix
increases from 0.3 in its first year to a healthy 9.4 in
1982 reflecting the cash proceeds of the Company's first
public stock offering. Current ratio then drops
precipitously and ends at a low 0.32 in 1984. A general
standard for comparison is 2:1 or better for a successful
company.(Granof 1983 p215) All of Omnidentix's ratios in
1983 and 1984 are low enough to cause considerable concern
over the company's readiness to meet its short-term debts.
The low figures and downward trend for both current ratio
and quick ratio (QR) are indicative of an impending cash
crunch and financial failure.
Examination of the liquidity of Smiles Inc., shows
similarities to that of Omnidentix. Smiles' current ratio
and quick ratio both decreased dramatically from 86,
following its public stock offering, to 2.2 in just one
year. The current ratio of 86 in 1983 is too high and
probably indicates inefficient cash management. Nonetheless
the downward trend indicates potential problems and the
current ratio and quick ratio of 2.2 in 1984 is marginally
acceptable.
Trends in the current and quick ratios for DHS are
similar to the other two dental franchises. The Current
ratio decreases from 5.52 in 1985 to 4.48 to 1.88 and 1.48
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in 1988. The initial decrease in current ratio can be
viewed as a positive sign since the company's position is
too liquid. However, the rapid decline between 1986 and
1989 are signs of an impending liquidity crisis for DHS.
C. PROFITABILITY
Profitability ratios indicate the combined effects of
liquidity, asset management and debt management on operating
results. Omnidentix's profit margin in 1981 was a negative
-0.36 and continued to decrease until it reached -2.18 in
1984. These figures show that Omnidentix will experience
even greater losses should an economic recession occur and
an increase in costs or a decrease in prices. The
decreasing trend points to an ever increasing disparity
between income and sales, so that increasing sales leads to
greater losses for the Company.
The Return on Assets (ROA), measuring the return after
interest and taxes on total assets for the dental
franchises, parallel other negative profitability measures.
Return on assets for Omnidentix is (-0.2) in 1981 and
steadily decreases to (-42.0) in 1984. Since this is not
the result of Omnidentix's use of high levels of debt, it is
probably due to low sales prices or high costs or both. As
a general standard for comparison, the average dentist's ROA
is about 28 percent according to a 1987 ADA survey.
Profitability ratios for Smiles Inc., are also
extremely poor at (-38.22). Again, the annual net losses
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for Smiles account for this ratio. Smiles had a similarly
poor profitability ratio profile. In 1984, its only
financial performance recorded, Return on Assets was (-0.93)
and Return on Equity was (-0.3) indicating significant
problems achieving corporate profitability at any time in
the future.
The profitability ratios for DHS are excellent for its
first three years. DHS' profit margin initially was 8.3
percent, 19.2 percent in 1986 and 9.2 percent in 1987. By
1988 it had decreased to (-9.4 percent) which may just may
reflect an off year for the firm.
The return on assets and return on equity for DHS
parallel its profit margin. Return on assets decreases from
its high of 27 percent in 1986 to 8.5 percent to (-7.6
percent) in 1988. Return on equity also decreases from an
impressive 47 percent in 1986 to 16 percent in 1987 to
(-16 percent) in 1988. The first three years indicate a
very healthy firm with high profit potential although the
return on assets and equity fall off dramatically in 1988.
D. MARKET VALUE RATIOS
The ominous profitability ratios predicting
Omnidentix's failure are echoed in the stock market's
opinion of the company's future as evidenced by its price-
earnings (P/E), earnings per share (EPS) and market to book
ratios. Both Omnidentix's P/E and EPS ratios are negative
and increasing over time suggesting that investors regarded
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growth prospects for Omnidentix as being poor with a high
risk attached. These figures indicate that Omnidentix is
realizing less income from its assets than the average
nonfranchised dental firm. This along with the increasingly
negative trends indicate a high possibility of future
failure.
The same negative trends are apparent when the market
ratios for Smiles are analyzed. Both the P/E and EPS ratios
are negative in 1984, indicating Smiles to be risky for
investors with poor growth prospects. However, since the
ratios only exist for one year it is difficult to form any
firm conclusions.
The market viewed DHS as an excellent investment during
the period from 1985-1987 as shown by the EPS and the P/E
ratios. Yet the P/E and EPS drop significantly in 1988 to
(-6) and (-8) respectively indicating new doubt in the minds
of investors about the long-term viability of the firm.
E. DEBT MANAGEMENT
Both Omnidentix and Smiles used equity and not long-
term debt financing as a primary source of funding until
financial problems had already developed. However, even
when the short-term debt assumed by the franchises is
analyzed, financial problems are evident.
Omnidentix had a high percentage of total funds
provided by creditors as evidenced by its Debt Ratio. After
incurring small amounts of short-run debt at the outset and
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a debt ratio of 90 percent in 1981, the company quickly
decreased its debt in 1982 with a stock offering to just 9
percent. When equity ceased to be a profitable option,
Omnidentix management began to use debt which quickly
ballooned to 84 percent by 1984. For comparison, the Debt
to Asset ratio for the average US firm is 0.33.(Granof 1983
p335)
Such a high ratio indicates that creditors have
supplied most of Omnidentix's total financing. Omnidentix
would then find it difficult to borrow additional funds at a
reasonable cost as creditors would be reluctant to lend to
such a firm. Additional borrowing would only increase the
company's risk of bankruptcy. This aids in understanding
why NewWorld bank cancelled Omnidentix's revolving credit
loan, an action which, according to Omnidentix management,
directly led to the company's bankruptcy.
Omnidentix's times interest earned (TIE) at (-1 times)
in 1981 and (-24 times) in 1984 also indicates that the firm
would be hard pressed to cover its interest charges and
merits a poor financial rating.
Smiles Inc. had a debt ratio of 40 percent indicating
that the debt position of Smiles was under control.
Although slightly high, Smiles could still borrow additional
funds if necessary.
The Debt position of DHS has remained within reasonable
limits during its operation. The Debt ratio although high
in 1985 at 51 percent was reduced by 1986 to a relatively
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constant 37-40 percent over the next three years. This
indicates that DHS management has managed its debt well and
has not resorted to heavy borrowing to remain financially
viable. The times interest earned (TIE), however, has shown
the same pattern that many of DHS' other financial ratios
have shown. The TIE for DHS was 0.68 in 1985, 7.54 in 1986
and then decreases from 2.9 in 1987 to (-2.66) in 1988. By
1988 then, DHS was having difficulty covering its interest
charges, signifying the possibility of a poor financial
position.
F. Z-SCORE
A final method to analyze the financial performance of
the dental franchises is through the use of Altman's z-
score, a multiple discriminant analysis technique.(Altman
1988) Z-scores have been used with much success by credit
analysts to quantify ratio analysis and establish default
probabilities for companies. The Z-scores for Omnidentix as
shown in Table 9-7, were well below Altman's threshold for
success at 2.99. Omnidentix's z-scores never rose above 1.0
and after reaching a high of 0.92 in 1982, continued to fall
to 0.49 in 1984. The z-score for Smiles was also well below
1.0, indicating a high probability of failure within the
next two years.
The z-score for DHS followed the same downward trend as
its financial ratios. The z-score was 2.9 in 1985, 4.81 in
1986 and 2.81 in 1987. These early scores indicate that
Page - 187
there is only a small chance that the firm will fail. By
1988, however, the z-score had fallen to 1.49, forecasting
possible failure for DHS within the next two years.
DISCUSSION
Analysis of the financial documents of Omnidentix shows
that it was in severe financial difficulties from its
inception. Although revenues were increasing, costs were
increasing at an even greater pace and as a result, the
company experienced an increasing net operating loss every
year. Liquidity problems experienced by Omnidentix can be
explained by problems with management, recruiting new
investors, and debt. Poor management decisions led to
overexpansion and large operating deficits.
Along with greater than expected working capital costs
for its corporate-owned dental centers, Omnidentix was also
experiencing an increase in receivables from its licensing,
advertising, management and other fees. These doubtful
receivables were steadily increasing from $0.2 million in
1982 to $0.4 in 1983 to $1.9 in 1984. As a result, cash
flow became a problem and as debt levels increased, new
investors were discouraged from investing in Omnidentix.
Analysis of the financial statements of Smiles Inc.
shows a similar pattern to that of Omnidentix. Like
Omnidentix, Smiles had difficulties making a profit from the
very beginning. Smiles' first year of operations resulted
in a net loss of $251,292 or $.18 per share. This type of
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early loss is not unique since program development costs and
licensing efforts are a necessary cost for any franchise
startup. Earnings continued to slide as dentist-
franchisees, unhappy with the franchise, stopped paying
their franchise fees. New franchisees could no longer be
found.
In order to pay off its debt, Smiles sold over $400,000
shares of stock. This type of successful public stock
offering in what was then a bullish market, helped
contribute to short term profits for both Omnidentix and
Smiles. Shortly thereafter, Smiles, like Omnidentix, had to
resort to debt to keep financially viable.
In contrast to these unsuccessful franchises, DHS's
financial picture looks much healthier. All of the
financial ratios for DHS appear positive during its first
three years of operation. In contrast to the other
franchises, DHS did not offer public securities and instead
sold private equity. Although DHS did acquire large amounts
of debt at the beginning, management reduced the debt to a
manageable level where it would not impede the firm's
success.
By 1988, however, financial ratios indicate severe
problems within the organization. The net loss experienced
by DHS appears to be the result of a steadily diminishing
revenue performance. Fees for management services decreased
as did lease income. Franchise fees remained flat as new
franchise sales ceased.
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In order to consolidate its assets, DHS sold its dental
laboratory at a loss so that income was further reduced by
the loss of laboratory income. The z-scores also reflect
this downward trend and cast doubt about the ability of DHS
to survive.
CONCLUSIONS
An analysis of the financial statements of the three
dental franchises, Omnidentix, Smiles and DHS allow a better
understanding of the financial conditions that led to
failure for Omnidentix and Smiles. Both failing franchises
had severe cash flow problems that were worsening over time.
The financial ratios of these franchises reflect these
losses and are very low with a downward trend.
Although in almost every instance the franchises'
performances and trends are quite poor with respect to
general industry expectations, definitive statements
concerning the cause of failure are difficult to make. Few
industry standards exist with which to compare performance.
Breakeven for dental franchises may involve a much greater
time period than other industries making interindustry
predictions unreliable.
Nonetheless, the dramatically poor financial
performance as evidenced by the financial ratios and their
downward trend would have made forecasting of the future
bankruptcy of these franchises a very likely possibility and
as it turned out a reality.
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In contrast, DHS appears to be, if not extremely
profitable, a viable firm. During its first three years,
most of its financial ratios reflect a profitable company.
In 1988, however, the company experienced problems for the
first time as revenues dropped, the number of new franchises
sold decreased and expenses increased. DHS' poor
performance in 1988 may signal its future failure but it is
too early to draw any definite conclusions. Nonetheless,
despite the excellent past financial performance of DHS, the
failures of Omnidentix and Smiles suggest that DHS may have
some significant financial problems to deal with if it
intends to be successful in dental franchising.
The negative numbers demonstrated by the dental
franchises in this financial analysis are overwhelmingly
poor. As a result, they appear to contradict franchisor
contentions that the poor performances of their companies
were the result of poor timing or bad luck. Instead, these
financial analyses testify to the enormous problems inherent
in the dental franchise industry.
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CHAPTER 10
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
PARALLELS TO AMBULATORY MEDICAL CLINICS
The preceding chapters have shown how dental franchises
have failed as a result of overexpansion and doctor
dissatisfactions concerning their autonomy. Ambulatory
medical centers have shown a similar pattern of development
and similar difficulties.
Walk-in ambulatory clinics correspond to dental
franchises in design and management-orientation. Ambulatory
clinics are marketed as centers for routine health care and
treatment of minor emergencies without appointment. Many
centers contract with HMOs and private corporations to
provide health care for their members.(Berliner 1987)
The first ambulatory center opened in 1973. As with
dental franchises, predictions for future growth of
ambulatory medical clinics were optimistic.(Milne 1987) By
1986 ambulatory clinics were experiencing the largest growth
of any alternative delivery system. (Anderson HJ 1986)
The ambulatory medical clinic industry continued to
expand until 1989, when the number of freestanding clinics
declined. The 13 independent companies operated only 180
centers in 1989 as opposed to 192 in 1988. (Lutz 1990) The
only franchisor in the field of ambulatory clinics, Medical
Networks, Inc. of Houston, Texas (Hotch 1986) ceased
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franchising in 1989. The company states that franchised
operations were suspended "due to differences in goals
between ourselves and our franchisees."(Friske 1990)
The Case of Health Stop Inc.
Expansion
A study of the largest of the independent chains,
Health Stop Medical Management Inc., highlights parallels
between ambulatory medical clinics and dental franchises.
The failure of Health Stop reflects the same pattern of
overexpansion and physician dissatisfaction as found in the
dental franchises.
From 1983 to 1989, Health Stop expanded rapidly from a
single center to over 100 clinics in nine states. (Lutz
1989). A former Health Stop CEO states "Part of our
strategy was to get larger quicker than other people and to
establish market share." Health Stop grew primarily by
acquisition. Following the 1988 purchase of 34 Chicago area
MedFirst clinics from Humana Inc, (which will not comment on
its own inability to make MedFirst profitable,) Health Stop
began to experience financial difficulties.
Company losses have steadily increased despite annual
gross revenues exceeding 50 million dollars. Pretax losses
have grown from -$1.6 million in 1986 to -$1.9 million in
1987 to -$4.5 million in 1988.(Biddle 1989) By 1989, in
order to avoid bankruptcy, three million dollars of venture
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capital was infused into Health Stop in exchange for a
majority interest in the firm. Efforts to reorganize and
achieve profitability have included the replacement of two
chief executive officers and two medical directors in the
past two years. Health Stop is also attempting to sell
unprofitable centers to physician employees.(Biddle 1989)
Professional Autonomy
Health Stop physicians rate autonomy as the most
important component of job satisfaction.(Cashman in press)
Moreover, study of a Texas-based ambulatory clinic also
notes that a primary concern of physicians is
autonomy.(Yunker 1986) Nonetheless, Health Stop utilized
management control of physician behavior in an attempt to
achieve efficiency and profitability.(Health Stop 1987)
Excessive control of physician work practices
contributed to Health Stop's unprofitability and physician
dissatisfaction. Several aspects of the tight control
particularly angered physicians. Doctors asserted that
Health Stop routinely pressured them to order unnecessary
medical tests and radiographs. Clinicians criticized having
their performance evaluations based upon patient
billings.(Bock 1988, Kuritzkes 1988) Management focus on
productivity and other types of control devices also
resulted in physician dissatisfaction and turnover.(Biddle
1989)
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To achieve profitability, Health Stop has now abandoned
its past stategy of strict physician control. Health Stop
has discontinued its use of pressure on clinicians to order
more tests, monthly memos, rankings of centers and
physicians and other control devices which have angered
clinicians. Health Stop's current approach to management of
physicians by decreasing central administrative control,
appears to be successful. A recent study of Health Stop
physicians indicates that decreases in central control have
greatly increased physician satisfaction. (Cashman in press)
It is likely that a key factor in the success of Health Stop
is the return to the traditional approach of allowing high
levels of professional autonomy in clinical care. "More and
more walk-in clinics ... being operated by private
physicians who have moved in behind failed clinics and are
really just operating old-fashioned general practices with a
new sign outside."(Biddle 1989 p39) In summary, exercising
a relatively low degree of centralized control is an
important factor in the success of dental franchises and
ambulatory care clinics.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGED DENTAL CARE
Overview
Professional autonomy issues have great relevance for
the rapidly expanding sector of managed health care.
Managed care refers to financing and delivery programs
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ranging from health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to
modified fee-for-service programs. Often closed panel,
these programs provide for close examination of physician
behavior through utilization review and case management.
Although managed care programs are not yet a powerful force
in dentistry, they are likely to proliferate due to
encouragement by insurance companies.
The design of an optimal health care system must
provide for the efficient management of operations, staff
and supplies. Research from dental franchising demonstrates
that efficient management requires decentralization of
control. Dentists are most cooperative and content when
allowed to practice, as if in solo practices. Therefore,
managed dental care programs are most likely to gain
professional compliance and be successful when the system
encompasses a high degree of professional autonomy.
Management should concentrate on strategic levels such as
administration where professionals accept outside control
rather than on operational levels such as clinical
dentistry.
Strategies For Managing Autonomy
In addition to avoiding excessive central control,
medical care management needs to establish clear
organizational guidelines and consistently enforce
them.(Rohrer 1989) Franchise managers blame their failure
to enforce rules and regulations on even such simple facets
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of a prescribed franchise system as installing a franchise
sign, on being intimidated by the dentists. Yet when a
consistent approach is delineated at the outset, enforcement
will not only increase professional compliance but decrease
professional frustration.(Burns et al. 1990)
An example of an inconsistent strategy in dental
franchises which led to professional dissatisfaction is
chart audits. Expecting dentists to view chart audits as an
intrusion upon their autonomy, franchises did not follow
through on chart audit policies. In fact, many dentists
(42%) expected the audits, and were unhappy that chart
audits did not occur. The inconsistency of dental
franchises in adhering to management protocol, undermines
the system, and provokes dissatisfaction among dentists.
Organizational rules must be enforced in a direct and
consistent fashion. When franchise dentists complain about
management guidelines, instead of ensuring compliance, the
franchises invariably relent. A sizable minority (38%) of
franchise dentists are frustrated by the inconsistent
messages, and prefer franchisors to employ tighter controls.
Dentists, previously committed to their franchise, decrease
their own compliance upon discovering management's lack of
response to uncooperative dentists. Twenty-six percent of
Smiles' franchisees ceased paying franchise fees, despite
contractual obligations, upon discovering that the
organization was not prosecuting non-payors.
Page - 198
Control systems in managed dental systems should be
simple. Forms to be completed must be short and concise.
Dentists must receive adequate orientation, so that they
understand how the system operates. Many Smiles' dentists
are unwilling to comply with such protocol as the
presentation of treatment plans or the completion of control
forms. Forty-four percent of the dentists ascribe their
noncompliance to the vast amounts of paperwork involved and
its perceived irrelevance. A Smiles' manager states,
however, that when a system is demonstrated to clearly
benefit quality of care or practice profitability, dentist
compliance increases.
Implementing Change in Areas of Physician Autonomy
In order to effect change in operational spheres such
as clinical practice, the managed care organization must
manage the process of care, and not the individual provider.
To change the professional's actions, training and positive
reinforcement should be employed rather than criticism.
Legitimacy for a new concept or technique can be achieved
through training conducted by an outside, respected
clinician or manager. Educational sessions conducted at
Omnidentix and Smiles were perceived as more beneficial when
presented by outside speakers, than when given by employees
of the organization.
Training seminars play an important role in altering
dental practice without creating dissension. Managed care
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systems might employ training to alter the professional bias
of providing more rather than less care. This philosophy is
advantageous in a fee-for-service practice, but not in a
managed care system. For example, managed care systems can
control costs by eliminating unnecessary third molar
removals through educational sessions detailing its
indications and contraindications. Ninety-three percent of
the franchise dentists questionned enjoyed seminars given by
their franchisor and felt them worthwhile.
Seminars are particularly valuable when instructing or
reinforcing organizaitonal protocol or clinical techniques.
Seventy-three percent of dentist-franchisees report using at
least some of the management techniques discussed in an
earlier chapter and 63 percent incorporate new clinical
techniques presented at seminars. Dentists are more
comfortable and willing to use a technique the more they
understand it and believe it to be beneficial. Quality
circles will also contribute to provider acquiescence.
Research in both industrial and health settings has
found that participation in management decisions increases
satisfaction and perceived autonomy. Participating
physicians are more likely to perceive that organizational
change is being made to achieve high quality care. (Schulz
and Schulz 1988, Barr and Steinberg 1983). Therefore, the
more that dentists participate in management decisions
affecting their clinical environment, the greater their
cooperation in other areas. For example, allowing dentists
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in managed care systems control over their operatory setup,
assistant, and materials will increase provider
satisfaction.
In contrast, centralizing power to effect change, is
ineffective in health care systems. Employing management
techniques such as productivity analysis and time allotments
is consistently unproductive in dental franchises.
Correction or punishment of an individual provider only
serves to increase professional dissatisfaction as
demonstrated by the public display of anger by ex-Health
Stop physicians. In order for change to be effected, the
emphasis must be placed on altering the process through
which a problem occurs, and not by criticism of individual
providers.
Incentives For Change
Data from dental franchises indicate that management
does not necessarily use the most efficacious incentives to
change provider work practices. Given that most dentists
are financially secure, money is a weaker incentive for
change than is the clinican's desire to provide improved
quality of care and to increase patient satisfaction.(Burns
1990)
Smiles Inc. was successful in using quality of care as
an impetus for change. Smiles Inc. associated preventive
periodontal concepts and quality of care, and thereby
induced dentists to join the organization. Seventy percent
Page - 201
of Smiles' dentists joined Smiles because they believed it
would increase the quality of care they provided to
patients. Ninety-three percent of Smiles' dentists accepted
and incorporated most of the preventive periodontal system
into their practices. Most dentists believe that both their
practices and their patients benefited from involvement in
the Smiles system. Complaints concerning the system of
periodontal treatment revolve primarily around the
appropriateness and amount of paperwork involved. Harvard
Community Health Plan utilizes a similar quality of care
strategy to induce its physicians to accept greater
monitoring and control.
Infection control provides a further example of
franchise dentists conceding autonomy in clinical areas when
it relates to quality of care and patient satisfaction.
Dental Health Services Inc. employed several information
seminars to increase compliance with OSHA's new infection
control recommendations. This type of educational approach
is not only perceived as valuable but is also effective.
Prior to the training programs, 34 percent of the dentists
adhered to OSHA guidelines while 65 percent complied after
the sessions.
Choice of Provider
Just as the choice of dental franchisee plays an
important role in the success of dental franchises, so does
the choice of dental provider in a managed dental program.
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Dental franchises realize the importance of selecting
providers who can adapt to their system. Prospective
dentists should be screened before being hired to determine
their ability to function in a managed environment.
The presence of a senior dentist also contributes to
success of managed programs. A successful element of DHS'
Pennsylvania region is the presence of a senior dentist,
knowledgeable in both dental and management techniques.
Young dentists benefit from such mentors introducing them to
the system and its rules and regulations. Dentists appear
to learn best from other dentists.
The tremendous dissatisfaction with dental directors in
franchises also shows the importance of having at least one
dentist in the upper levels of the organization. Such a
chief dentist should be respected as a clinician and as a
manager. Chief dentists must emulate the ideals of the
organization and have frequent contact with clinicians. As
the dentist's representative in the organization, he or she
must also have power to change things in the organization.
Leaders must strike a delicate balance between allowing
dentists autonomy and holding them accountable for their
actions.
Older dentists must be employed sparingly in a managed
care setting. Older dentists in dental franchises appear to
be less adaptable to change. Age is a determinant of
acceptance of management control devices. When asked if
specific franchise techniques are employed in their centers,
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82 percent of dentists said yes. When classified by age
group, 87 percent of dentists under 40 and 84 percent of
dentists between 40 and 50 years of age said yes. In
contrast, only 45 percent of dentists over 50 years old
agreed.
Summary
The study of dental franchising illuminates factors for
success in a managed dental care system. Just as in a
dental franchise setting, difficulties will arise from the
incongruence between a managed care environment and
professional ideals of autonomy possessed by clinical
providers. An approach to managing clinicians which
recognizes that autonomy is rooted in professional
tradition, is critical for the success of a managed dental
care system.
Managed care should carefully define its boundaries.
Managers should not intrude into operational areas such as
clinical dentistry, where dentists desire to retain
autonomy. Intrusion of this type through for example,
productivity or case mix analysis of the performance of an
individual clinician, will lead to provider dissatisfaction.
Instead, managed care organizations should exercise control
in strategic areas such as administration, where autonomy is
less critical. Dentists are more willing to adhere to this
type of organizational guideline including for example, the
completion of pretreatment estimates, or acceptance of an
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insurance company's classification of reimbursable clinical
procedures.
Change in dentist behavior is best achieved through
education, positive feedback, and participation in
management decisions, and not by punishment or correction of
an individual provider. The choice of providers and chief
dental officer is also critical to the success of a managed
care system.
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH POLICY
Data from the study of dental franchises have important
consequences for health care policy. The shift in health
care from small-scale solo practice to large-scale
bureaucratic organizations may be an irreversible process.
Driven by forces of cost control, efficiency and profits,
alternative delivery systems have experienced tremendous
growth. Some believe that a concurrent loss of physician
control is occurring. (Navarro 1988, Haug 1988)
Today's physicians require sophisticated medical
technology to treat illness. By increasingly relying upon
expnsive medical technology and the health organizations
which provide it, clinicians further reduce their autonomy.
At the same time, the health organizations are increasingly
employing devices to control the work practices of their
physicians, such as computerized systems that compare
medical practices and identify deviant practitioners. A
paradox emerges of physicians' increasing reliance on
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organizations for employment and services while at the same
time realizing that these same institutions are increasingly
intruding upon their autonomy. Therefore, changes in the
organization, delivery and financing of health care threaten
the ability of doctors to maintain their professional status
as autonomous providers of health care.
Data from dental franchises and ambulatory clinics
suggest, however, that professionals will not surrender
their autonomy. Professional autonomy has been a guiding
principle for the development of the health care system, and
it remains a dominant force shaping the nature of health
care in the US today.
In order to create an effective health care system,
management must respect the autonomous nature of the
professional. This is accomplished through management of
global restraints that do not intrude upon professional
realms such as clinical care. Disregard for professional
autonomy can jeopardize the success of a health care
organization.
One can conceptualize a continuum of autonomy along
which organizations are structured. At one end of the
continuum is physician autonomy which has expanded to
include control over more than just clinical procedures. At
the other end is bureaucratic management control. With the
growth of managed medical systems, the continuum appears to
be moving towards greater control of professionals.
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Professional resistance has slowed the rate of change but
not prevented it.
In dentistry, however, traditional emphasis upon
autonomy and independence persists. Starr suggests that the
development of a health care system appears to progress only
when it is a preferable alternative to other plans.(Starr
1987) Traditional dentistry is still financially lucrative.
Thus, dentists generally do not alter their mode of practice
in reaction to market or societal stimuli. Instead,
dentists react to external threats like dental franchising,
by adapting their individual practices in nonoperational
ways, such as expanding hours of practice, changing
locations or using marketing services. (Cashman working
paper) In this way, although dental franchises failed, many
of its concepts have been incorporated into the fee-for-
service phase of dental care. These types of competitive
reactions decrease further the likelihood that change in
dentistry will occur, since a competitive advantage of a new
health organization, vanishes quickly. Dentists thus have
little incentive to compromise or become affiliated with
organizations emphasizing management and control of
professionals.
Management's financial mistakes can be averted with
knowledge and patience. Difficulties arising from
professional autonomy issues, however, are more difficult to
approach and solve. Recognizing that professional autonomy
and resistance to control are critical factors in dental
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franchise and ambulatory clinic industries allow them to be
successfully incorporated into new types of alternative
delivery systems.
Additional research should be conducted to examine ways
in which the medical and dental professions are affected by
changes in health care delivery. Longitudinal studies could
be designed to determine the impact of alternative delivery
and financing systems on the management of professionals.
Further studies are needed to elucidate those areas in which
professionals desire autonomy and those in which they will
relinquish control to managers. In this way, Freidson's
theory of professional autonomy can be modified to
incorporate the current complexities of modern health care.
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Appendix A
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SURVEY
For each of the following questions, please check the
appropriate response(s) for your organization or supply the
information requested.
1) Type of organization
_ group franchise HMO PPO Other (specify)
2) Number of Centers Number Sold Number Open
With locations in (list city and state)
3) Number of years organization has been in existence
4) Ownership status
private public
5) Demographically, your centers primarily serve
(Please circle all that apply)
- urban / rural areas
- white / black / Hispanic population
- low / middle / upper class
- Medicaid / fee for service / insurance /HMO
6) Total Gross Income in 1985 of your organization:
$<0.5 m $0.5-1 m $1-2 m $2-5m $>5m
7) Types of monitoring systems currently used in the
organization. Please check all that apply:
budgets
compensation packages
personal supervision
productivity analysis
variance analysis
standard analysis
record audits
other (please specify)
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9) Productivity Reports
If productivity reports are used, what key variables are
measured routinely? Check all that apply:
Number of patients seen
per dentist
per center
per hour / day / week / month / year (circle all
that apply)
Number of services performed
per dentist
per center
per hour / day / week / month / year
Gross revenue
per dentist
per center
per hour / day / week / month / year
Net revenue
per dentist
per center
per hour / day / week / month / year
B) Types of services performed:
Are services provided broken down into broad
categories of services for example: % preventive services,
% operative services? yes / no
If yes, please check all categories that you use.
diagnostic
preventive
endodontics
periodontics
operative
crown and bridge
removable
oral surgery
orthodontics
other (specify)
To whom are these applied? individual dentist / center/ both
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10) Incentive Compensation Packages
A) If incentive compensation packages are used to reward
employees, what are they based upon? Please check all that
apply:
For Dentists:
Gross revenue of each dentist
Net profits of each dentist
Units of services performed by each dentist
Number of new patients seen by each dentist
Gross revenues of the center employing the dentist
Net income of the center employing the dentist
Net income of the entire organization
Length of time employed
Educational qualifications
Other (please specify)
For Managers:
Gross revenues of the center employing the manager
Net income of the center employing the manager
Net income of the entire organization
Increase in center profits from previous year
Length of time employed
Other (specify)
For Dental Auxiliaries:
Gross revenue of the center employing auxiliary
Net income of the center employing the auxiliary
Net income of the entire organization
Length of time employed
Number of new patients seen
Units of service produced for each auxiliary
Educational qualifications
Other (specify)
B) What forms of incentive packages are utilized in the
organization? Please check all that apply:
Cash bonus
Base salary plus commission
Stock options
Vacation time
Nonmonetary rewrads (describe)
Other (describe)
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11) Direct Personal Supervision
A) If direct personal supervision is used in the
organization, what specifically is supervised and measured?
Please check all that apply and circle the employee type for
which it applies.
Productivity per dentist / hygienist / auxiliary
Time spent per service per dentist/hygienist/auxiliary
Organization of dentist / hygienist / auxiliary
Neatness of dentist / hygienist / auxiliary
Personal appearance of dentist / hygienist / auxiliary
Patient rapport with dentist / hygienist /auxiliary
Patient satisfaction with dentist/hygienist/auxiliary
Quality of service rendered by dentist/hygienist/
auxiliary
How is quality of service measured?
Other (specify)
B) Who in the organization performs the personal supervision
described above?
C) How frequently are personal evaluations performed?
12) Variance analysis
A) If variance analysis, or any form of analysis of
deviations of actual results from expected results, is used
in the organization, what key variables are measured? Please
check all that apply:
Material variance
Labor variance
Please describe how the labor efficiency
standards are set and by whom
Setup time
Operation time/unit
Standard costs
Please describe briefly how these are
determined.
B) If variance analysis is used, at what point are
discrepancies investigated?
C) If variance analysis is used, how is responsibility
assigned?
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13) Record Audit
A) If a record audit procedure is used in your practice
setting, what variables are measured? Check all that apply.
Proper medical alerts
Proper medical history
Blood pressure in adults
Proper dental history
Complete intial charting
Proper treatment planning
Patient signature on treatment plan
Proper progress notes
Medications used and prescribed
Description of procedures
Complete financial information
Diagnostic quality of radiographs
Proper referrals
Proper notes of specialist consults
Proper medical and dental updates
Other (specify)
B) Who in the organization performs the record audits?
C) How often are they performed?
D) How are they performed?
Hand tabulation
Computer
14) Budget
A) If a budget is utilized, what type is employed?
Line-item budget
Flexible budget (A master budget that is adjusted
for changes in volume)
Program budget (Linking plans and programs to
budget)
If yes, what programs are used?
hygiene services
dental services
management services
other (specify)
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B) Does your organization have cost centers within the
organization? Yes / No (please circle)
If yes, what are these cost centers?
How many cost centers are there in the organization?
C) What key variables are included in your financial
management system?
Sales forecasts
Direct material usage
Direct material purchases
Direct labor costs
Specifically, labor costs of which employee group?
Please check all that apply:
dentists
dental hygienists
dental auxiliaries
management
other (specify)
Center overhead costs
Specifically, which overhead costs are included in
your overhead calculations? Please check all that
apply:
supplies
indirect labor
maintenance
depreciation
property taxes
property insurance
other (specify)
Selling and Administrative Expenses
Specifically, which selling and administrative
expenses are measured? Please check all that apply
advertising costs
executive salaries
selling expenses
other (specify)
15) Is feedback from the information gathered routinely
reported in the organization? Please circle: Yes / No
If your answer is yes, please answer the following questions
Is this feedback system formal / informal (circle)
How often is such feedback given?
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What is the average length of time for returning
feedback?
From whom to whom is feedback given (eg from center
manager to dentist)?
What is the average length of time for returning
feedback?
Give examples of the kinds of changes that are made as a
result of the feedback?
16) Describe any changes that have been made as a result of
the monitoring systems employed in the organization. For
example, what changes have been made or have occurred.
- in the performance of dentists
- in the performance of the center
- in levels of compensation
- in the structure of the monitoring systems
themselves
- in the goals/objectives of the organization
- in the standards used.
17) Does the organization plan to be adapting any additional
types of monitoring systems in the near future? Yes / No
If yes, please describe them.
18) Do you feel that the monitoring systems used in your
organization are worth the time and administrative effort
that they require?
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Appendix B
FRANCHISOR QUESTIONNAIRE
For each of the following questions, please check the
appropriate response(s) for your organization or supply the
information requested.
1) GENERAL:
Number of Centers Open Number of Centers Sold
Please list locations of all centers (city and state)
Number of years organization is in existence
Name/Background of CEO
Name/Background of CFO
Name/Background of Chief Dental Officer
Ownership Status
public If so, Why?
private If so, Why?
Total Gross Income (last operating year) of
organization:
$250-500K $.5-1 m $1-2 m $2-5
How did you develop your franchise concept?
your
m $>5 m
How did you test your franchise concept?
2) FRANCHISEE SELECTION / TRAINING / RELATIONS
Please describe the franchisee selection process.
Estimated cost for recruitment per new franchisee?
List any factors which you believe are essential for
franchisee success.
Preferred background for franchisees (in order of
perceived importance) eg. business experience, finances
1.
2.
3.
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4.
How is training of franchisees performed?
How long does this training take?
Please describe - Program content
Program methods
Program staffing
Evaluation of Results
Basis for Training Evaluation: Participation
Knowledge Test
Performance appraisal
Other (describe)
Is followup education provided? Yes / No
If so, please check all types that apply:
video
newsletter
personal meetings
other (describe)
Please rank the content in order of concentration
dentistry/ new materials/procedures
practice management
staff / auxiliaries
other (describe)
How would you describe your relations with your
franchisees? business only business and friend
Have you noticed any differences in dealing with
franchisees over time? (eg resistance to change)? Explain
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Is it difficult to convince franchisees of the need for
change? (eg dental techniques, operations, redecoration)
Explain
3) MANAGEMENT
Initially, how would you rate your :
Capital reserves
Management expertise
Financial expertise
Idea
Plans for franchise
Training manual
Operations manual
Excellent
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Good Fair
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
At the end, how would you rate your:
Capital reserves
Management reserves
Financial reserves
Idea
Plans for franchise
Training manual
Operations manual
Please describe your central organization's structure
including personnel titles, and numbers (at the beginning
and end) Please attach corporate diagrams if possible.
4) FINANCIAL
Type of Initial financing: Debt
Equity
Franchise fees charged:
Initial fee
Marketing fee
Management fee
Service fee
Royalties
Other (describe)
How was the initial fee
Term loan
Bonds
Other (describe)
Preferred stock
Common stock
Other (describe)
$ / month
$ / month
$ / month
$ / month
$ / month
$ / month
set?
How was the management fee set?
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
What percentage of your revenue is derived from:
Iniital franchise fees %
Continuing franchise fees %
Which of the following financial planning items were
prepared prior to franchising? Accuracy of
Poor Fair Good Excellent
Startup cost (itemized)
Proforma income statement
Proforma cash flow
Projected cash flow
Breakeven analysis/goals
Ratio Analysis
Building Plans
Layout/Design of offices
Critical size goals
Please estimate any savings (over market price) your
franchise realizes when buying:
Equipment purchases %
Supply purchases %
Leases %
What forms of financial assistance do you offer franchisees?
How do you price your products?
at competitive levels of surrounding dentists
cost based
demand based
less than competing dentists
other (describe)
5) MARKETING
Total amount budgeted for marketing annually $
Estimate marketing costs as a % of overall budget %
Describe your marketing strategy.
Estimate the breakdown of total marketing between
external and internal marketing external %
internal %
How do you set your advertising budget?
affordable method
% of sales method
competition
objectives
Types of marketing used by your organization:
External marketing
Newspaper print % of total
Magazine print % of total
Television % of total
Radio % of total
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Direct mail coupons % of total
Yellow pages % of total
other (describe) % of total
Which type of marketing do you feel is most effective for
your organization? Why?
Describe your target population
Estimated cost/thousand $
Short run timing Continuous
Intermittent
Which type of advertising appeal do you use most?
rational
humor
fear/ guilt
information
Internal marketing:
Please check all that apply
For consumer promotion contests
coupons
samples
gifts
For salesforce promotion bonuses
contests
What % of your new patients do you believe are attracted
because of your:
Franchise Name %
Marketing Efforts %
Location %
Word -of- Mouth %
Has your organization ever used external marketing agencies?
a lot some use no use
advertising agency
sales promotion agencies
marketing consultants
marketing research
Are pre-market surveys performed? Yes / No
Are post-market surveys performed Yes / No
Discuss your franchise's positioning.
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Are you planning to increase / decrease / no change
your expenditures for marketing?
6) GENERAL
How easily was replication of your dental franchise system
accomplished?
Have any of your franchise units failed or terminated
their franchise agreement with you? Yes / No
If yes, how many?
Why?
Have you terminated your franchise agreement with any
franchisees? Yes / No
If yes, how many?
Why?
Please describe any strategies for change that your
organization might have. (eg costs, targets, expansion)
What has been the biggest problem that your organization has
faced? How have you solved it or tried to
Why do you think that so many franchises have failed?
What is your prediction for the future of franchised
dentistry?
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Appendix C
FRANCHISEE QUESTIONNAIRE
General
Number of centers owned and operated
Years with the franchise system
Total number of employees full-time equivalents
Number of contracting dentists
Number of hygienists
Number of dental assistants
Number of managers
Number of other office staff
Personal
Your age
Education
Years of residence in your current area
Marital status S M D (please circle)
On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate yourself on your:
Low High
Creativity 1 2 3 4 5
Dental background 1 2 3 4 5
Management background 1 2 3 4 5
Risk taking 1 2 3 4 5
Relative autonomy 1 2 3 4 5
Financial security 1 2 3 4 5
Satisfaction with 1 2 3 4 5
dentistry
Services Provided by your Franchisor
Sales Promotion
Advertising
System for mgt of
dentists
System for mgt of
other staff
System for mgt of
operations
System for mgt of
insurance and A/R
System for cost
control
System to increase
productivity
Staff compensation
Computerization
Training-startup
Training-continuing
Equipment-discounts
Importance Percv'd Performance Trend
Not very
1 2 3
1 2 3
very
4 5
4 5
Poor
1 2
1 2
Exc
3 4 5
3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 -= +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 - = +
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Supplies-discounts 1
Inventory management 1
Bookkeeping 1
Operations manual 1
Quality assurance 1
Location 1
Financing 1
New products 1
Design of unit 1
Management services 1
Lease negotiation 1
Franchise rep 1
Cooperation of rep 1
Quality of rep advicel
Franchise idea 1
Franchisor-generated
demand for product 1
Frequency of reports 1
Computerized payroll 1
Tax planning 1
Insurance planning 1
Other (specify)
1
2 345 1 2 3 4 5
2 345 1 2 3 4 5
2 345 1 2 3 4 5
2 345 1 2 3 4 5
2 345 1 2 3 4 5
2 345 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 345 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 -= +
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 -= +
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 -=+
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 -=+
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 -= +
2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 -= +
Are there any services
have?
not provided that you would like to
Promised
Low High
Hours/work required 1 2 3
Earnings claimed 1 2 3
Service fees 1 2 3
Terms of franchise contractl 2 3
Startup costs 1 2 3
Reality
Low High
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
Satisfaction
Low High
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
Relationship with Franchisor
To what degree do you feel that you had
practice with respect to:
Dental procedures
Management/operating procedures
Advertising
Staff selection/training
Administrative/accounting
Supplies
Equipment
Fees
Hours
Site selection
Site location
Upgrading of facility
Product mix
Quality control systems
autonomy in your
Low High
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
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=+
To what degree if any, did conflict exist between you and
your franchisor?
Estimate the conflict level between you and your franchisor:
In year 1 High / Medium / Low / None
In year 2 High / Medium / Low / None
After year 2 High / Medium / Low / None
What have been the major sources of conflict? Be specific
How much control do you feel you have over your franchise?
(circle) High / Medium / Low / None
When there was conflict, how was it usually resolved? How
did your franchisor handle the conflict? Was this
satisfactory to you?
What initially attracted you to franchising in general?
(check all that apply) Boredom / need for change
Challenge / excitement
Management expertise
Lack of downside risk ie
low franchise failure rate
Unsatisfied with just doing
dentistry
Greater competition
What attracted you to this particular franchise?
Advertising
Word- of- mouth
Franchise representative
Media articles
Communication
How would you rate the level of communication between you
and your franchisor? Excellent / Good / Fair / Poor
How often did a franchise representative visit the premises?
_ x/week x/month x/year
Should this be done: More often / Less often / The same
How often did you communicate verbally with your franchisor?
x/week x/month x/year
Should this be done: More often / Less often / The same
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How often did you communicate in writing with your
franchisor? x/week _ x/month x/year
Should this be done: More often / Less often / The same
How open were lines of communication? Open / Medium / Closed
Did you talk the same language? Have the same concerns? Have
the same business philosophy? Have the same economic
objectives?
How influential were you in the decision-making process?
Very / Somewhat / Not very / None
Product
How would you rate the franchise product as to:
Good Average Poor
Job satisfaction for you
Employment opportunity for DMDs
Employment opportunity for staff
Quality of dental care provided
Patient satisfaction
Dental practice efficiency
Dental fees
If you had it to do over, would you choose to franchise? If
not, what kinds of alternatives would you choose?
Have you ever been involved in a legal dispute with your
franchisor? Have you ever considered taking legal action?
Marketing
To what degree do you feel that your franchise established
its franchise name (awareness and preference) in the
public's mind?
Excellent / Very good / Good / Somewhat / Poor / None
Please check 1) all marketing techniques used by your
franchise 2) whether these promotional ideas were yours or
the franchisors 3) your satisfaction with the technique.
Do you use? Franchisor Satisfaction
provided with
Newspaper advertisements Y / N Y / N Y / N
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Newspaper coupons Y / N Y / N Y / N
Posted Specials on premises Y / N Y / N Y / N
Flyers in newspapers Y / N Y / N Y / N
Direct mail flyers Y / N Y / N Y / N
Other (specify) Y / N Y / N Y / N
How important is: In dentistry NondentalIndustry
Very Not very Very Not very
A recognized brand name 1 2 3 1 2 3
National advertising 1 2 3 1 2 3
Quality of advertising 1 2 3 1 2 3
Promotion 1 2 3 1 2 3
Market research 1 2 3 1 2 3
Finances
How would you rate the relative cost of franchising vs solo?
Greater / The same / Less
How would you rate the rate of return of franchising vs
solo? Greater / The same / Less
How well were your financial expectations met? Well/Not well
Estimates of Number of new patients per week
Return rate of patients
Turnover rate of contracting DMDs
Gross income
Net income
Total franchise fees paid
Growth opportunities
As a percentage of gross income:
Advertising %
Other marketing %
Staff costs %
DMD costs %
Franchise fees %
Rent %
Equipment/Supplies %
Overhead %
Total annual franchise fees as a percentage of gross income?
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Why do you think that your franchise failed?
Appendix D
LEGEND OF FINANCIAL RATIO TERMS
Cash Flow (CF) = Net Income (NI) + Depreciation (DEP)
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) = CF + Other expenses not
affecting WC - Other revenues not affecting WC -
increase in Accounts Receivable - increase in inventory
+ increase in Accounts Payable + increase in accrued
liabilities.
Current
Ratio
Quick Ratio
Return on
(ROA)
Return on
(ROE)
Assets
Equity
Debt Ratio
Times Interest
Earned
(TIE)
Working Capital
(WC)
= Current Assets/Current Liabilities
= Cash+Securities+Accounts Receivable
Current Liabilities
= Net Income+Interest After Taxes
Average Assets
= Net Income-Preferred Stock Dividends
Average Equity of Common Stockholders
= Total Debt / Total Assets (TA)
= Net Income+Interest+Income Taxes
Interest
= Current Assets - Current Liabilities
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